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ABSTRACT
Essays on the Political Economy of State Government Saving and the
Role of Budget Stabilization Funds
Gary A. Wagner
This dissertation explores the saving behavior of state governments in the context
of the ability of states to weather recessionary periods. The first chapter of the
dissertation discusses the role of savings as a policy option for state decision-makers in
light of the fiscal constraints facing state governments, reviews the previous literature
that has examined the savings behavior of state governments, and outlines the research
agenda for the dissertation. Chapter 2 provides statistics on the post-World War II
savings of states to explore recent trends in their savings behavior and discusses the data
employed in the dissertation. The third chapter examines an implication of the common
pool problem associated with public sector savings by investigating how anticipated
future changes in the controlling parties of states' legislatures affect the current level of
saving. The results provide evidence that state saving is adversely impacted by future
changes in controlling political parties, suggesting that politically unstable states may be
ill-prepared to deal with recessions relative to politically stable states. Chapter 4 of the
dissertation examines the role that political stability and other factors have had on states'
choices to adopt budget stabilization funds. The results provide evidence that states
which have experienced more long-term political instability, have been severely hit by
recessions, and have expenditure and/or tax limitation laws in place, are more likely to
adopt a budget stabilization fund as an additional vehicle for saving. The final research
chapter of the dissertation investigates the effectiveness of budget stabilization funds by
examining how states' savings behavior has changed as a result of utilizing budget
stabilization funds. The results from this chapter provide evidence that budget
stabilization funds governed by explicit deposit and withdrawal rules can assist state
decision-makers in saving and thus enhance a state's ability to mitigate recessions in the
future. Chapter 6 provides a summary of the dissertation and discusses areas of future
research investigating state saving and budget stabilization funds.
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1Chapter 1
State Savings and their Role in Fiscal Structures
1.1 Introduction
State governments are active savers. At the end of fiscal year 1996 aggregate reserve
balances retained by states exceeded $19 billion, or more than 0.6 percent of Gross
Domestic Product. Despite its magnitude, very little research has been conducted to
understand the savings behavior of state governments. This dissertation will attempt to
answer several central questions regarding state savings and relate the implications to
states' abilities to deal with fiscal crises.
This introductory chapter of the dissertation will discuss the role of savings as a
policy option in the context of the fiscal constraints facing state governments and briefly
outline the remaining chapters in the dissertation. Chapter 2 will focus on recent trends in
the savings behavior of states and discuss the data used in the dissertation. Chapter 3
examines an implication of the 'common pool' problem associated with public sector
savings by investigating how anticipated future changes in the controlling parties of
states' legislatures affect the current level of savings. Chapter 4 of the dissertation
examines the role that political, and other factors, has had on states' choices to adopt
budget stabilization funds as an additional vehicle for saving. Chapter 5 investigates the
effectiveness of budget stabilization funds as a means for saving by comparing states'
pre-stabilization and post-stabilization fund savings behavior. In addition, Chapter 5 also
investigates the role that specific stabilization fund characteristics have played in the
behavioral change experienced by states since adopting a stabilization fund. Finally,
Chapter 6 will conclude the dissertation by reviewing the conclusions and implications
2from each chapter and also discuss future prospects for research investigating states'
savings.
States' use of savings is important as a means to help alleviate fiscal stress.
According to a 1993 U.S. General Accounting Office survey of states, of the 32 states
that had recently experienced budget deficits, nearly one-third of the aggregate deficit
was correcting using savings. Although an investigation into the nature of state fiscal
crises is interesting in its own right, such an investigation is not the primary focus of the
dissertation. Holcombe and Sobel (1997), in their book Growth and Variability in State
Tax Revenue: An Anatomy of State Fiscal Crises, have examined the causes of state fiscal
crises in detail and it useful to briefly discuss their findings.
Broadly speaking, state fiscal stress is a situation in which the demands for state
expenditures exceed the state's supply of revenue. While many factors contribute to a
state's fiscal stress, Holcombe and Sobel note that there are sources of continuous fiscal
stress and sporadic sources of fiscal stress. Continuous sources of state fiscal strain, such
as the growth in Medicaid expenditures, various unfunded federal mandates, rising school
enrollments, and reduced federal aid, contribute to state fiscal stress but are not the
primary cause of state fiscal crises.1 According to Holcombe and Sobel, fluctuations in
the growth of a state's revenue stream is the most influential factor affecting a state's
fiscal health. Holcombe and Sobel note that such fluctuations in a state's revenue stream
may come from two sources: fluctuations in the state's economy and fluctuations in the
state's tax bases. Although states may reduce some cyclical variability in the growth of
                                                
1 See Holcombe and Sobel (1997), Gold (1995), Poterba (1994), Dye and McGuire
(1992), and Gramlich (1991) for a discussion of the causes of the state fiscal crisis of the
early 1990s.
3their revenue streams by utilizing tax bases which are negatively correlated over the
business cycle, states cannot completely remove the effects of cyclical fluctuations on
revenue streams since they cannot diversify away market fluctuations. As a result, it is
virtually impossible for states' decision-makers to know precisely when the next
contraction will arise and exactly how their revenue streams will respond to that
contraction.
1.2 Fiscal Constraints Facing States' Decision-Makers
The options available to a state's decision-makers to mitigate periods of fiscal stress and
fiscal crises are limited by the state's institutional structure.2 Most states face a complex
set of fiscal constraints. The most well known fiscal constraint facing state governments
is balanced budget laws. Every state, with the exception of Vermont, is subject to some
form of balanced budget rule. These laws can broadly be classified as ex ante and ex post
balanced budget rules. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
(ACIR, 1987) classifies state balanced budget rules into five categories: (1) the governor
is required to submit a balanced budget; (2) the legislature is required to adopt a balanced
budget; (3) the state may carry forward a budget deficit to be corrected in the next fiscal
year; (4) the state may not carry forward a budget deficit into the next budget cycle
(which is 2 years for the 20 states operating on a biennial cycle); and (5) the state may not
carry forward a budget deficit into the next fiscal year. Categories (1) and (2) are
examples of ex ante rules placing constraints on behavior prior to the fiscal year and do
                                                
2 For a general overview of the role of institutions in influencing state fiscal behavior see
Poterba (1996), Bohn and Inman (1996), and Knight and Levinson (1999b).
4not require any actions to remedy an end-of-the-year deficit. Category (3) permits
perpetual debt finance so long as planned expenditures in the next fiscal year plus the
current deficit do not exceed expected revenue. The final two categories, (4) and (5), at
least theoretically force states to take some actions if an end-of-the-year deficit arises.
Despite the variation in balanced budget rules across states, most states' balanced
budget laws are stock rather than flow in nature.3 Consequently, a majority of balanced
budget laws do not prohibit deficits in a given fiscal year as long as the state has
sufficient funds on hand to remedy the revenue shortfall. Thus, states that have
accumulated sufficient reserve balances (savings) may run a deficit in any given fiscal
year, thereby affording their decision-makers greater flexibility in dealing with periods of
fiscal stress. Table 1.1, which summarizes each state's fiscal constraints in place as of
1998, illustrates each state's ACIR (1987) balanced budget classification(s).
Strong empirical evidence suggests that stringent balanced budget rules, such as
categories (4) and (5), have more impact on state fiscal behavior than less stringent laws.
Poterba (1994), using data from 1988-1992, finds that states with stringent balanced
budget rules reduced per capita expenditures by $44 in response to a $100 per capita
unanticipated budget deficit, as opposed to a $17 reduction in per capita expenditures by
states with weak balanced budget rules. In contrast though, Poterba finds no statistical
difference between the per capita tax responses of states with strict balanced budget rules
and states with weak balanced budget rules in response to a $100 per capita unanticipated
budget deficit. This suggests that states with strict balanced budget rules in place tend to
                                                
3 See Gramlich (1991) for a discussion.
5Table 1.1 - Summary of State Fiscal Constraints
State ACIR
BBR Category
Expenditure
limitation law
Tax limitation
law
Supermajority
tax increase
Referendum
debt approval
Mandate
funding rule
A L 5 Ö 1988
AK 1,3 1982 Ö
AZ 5 1978 1992 Ö
AR 5 1934
CA 1,3 1979 1979 Ö 1973
CO 5 1991,1992 1992 1992 Ö 1981
CT 1,2,3 1991,1992
DE 5 1978 1980
FL 5 1994 1971 1978
GA 5 Ö
HI 1,4,5 1978 1979
ID 5 1980 Ö
IL 1,2 1981
IN 5 Ö
IA 5 1992 Ö
KS 5 Ö
KY 4,5 Ö
LA 2 1993 1979 1966 1991
ME 5 Ö 1992
MD 1,2,3
MA 1 1986 1981
MI 3 1978 1979
MN 4 Ö
MO 5 1980,1996 Ö 1980
MS 5 1992 1970 Ö
MT 2,4,5 1981 1974
NE 5 Ö
NV 1,2 1979 1993
NH 1 1984
NJ 5 1990 Ö
NM 5 Ö 1984
NY 1
NC 5 1991
ND 4 Ö
OH 5 Ö
OK 5 1985 1992
OR 4 1979 1996 Ö
PA 1,2,3
RI 5 1992 Ö 1979
SC 3,5 1980,1984 Ö 1993
SD 5 1978 Ö 1978
TN 3,5 1978
TX 2,4 Ö
UT 5 1989 Ö
VT
VA 4 Ö
WA 3 1993 1993 Ö 1980
W V 5 Ö
WI 3 Ö
W Y 4 Ö
Sources: ACIR (1987), NCSL (1998), Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996), Knight (1998a), and Knight (1998b).
6rely more heavily on expenditure reductions to remedy unexpected deficits than do states
with ex ante balanced budget rules.
In addition, Poterba also finds that states with strict balanced budget rules adjust
both expenditures and taxes to account for more than the unexpected budget deficit (a
$120 per capita adjustment for every $100 per capita unexpected deficit), while states
with less stringent balanced budget rules adjust expenditures and taxes to mitigate only
$79 of every $100 per capita unexpected budget deficit. Moreover, Bohn and Inman
(1996) find that states with strict balanced budget rules have a lower annual average
probability of running a budget deficit than do states with weak balanced budget rules.
Given this evidence that states with strict balanced budget rules face budget
deficits less frequently and respond more vigorously to deficits than states with weak
balanced budget rules, one might expect states with strict balanced budget rules to
experience more volatile business cycles. Bohn and Inman (1996), using a panel of 47
states over the period from 1970 to 1991, find no statistical difference between the
business cycle volatility of states with strict balanced budget rules and states with weak
balanced budget rules. Bohn and Inman explain the lack of increased business cycle
volatility for states with stringent balanced budget rules as being dependent on states'
savings. They find, on average, that states with strict balanced budget rules save about
$100 per capita more than states with weak balanced budget rules, which is consistent
with the findings of Alt and Lowry (1994). Moreover, Bohn and Inman also find that
states with strict balanced budget rules also experience significantly less cyclical
volatility in their savings than states with weak balanced budget rules. Thus, Bohn and
Inman assert that states with strict balanced budget rules may use savings as a means to
7ensure that fiscal limits do not bind, thereby limiting fluctuations that may be caused by
prohibiting budget deficits.
While the estimates of Poterba (1994) indicate that states rely on expenditure
reductions and tax increases to mitigate unanticipated shocks, the GAO's (1993) study
seems to indicate that states consider savings to be a vital policy tool. From the
standpoint of a state's decision-makers, research also suggests that savings may dominate
both expenditure reductions and tax increases as a policy option. Using state level data
from 1990 and 1991, Sobel (1998) finds that both expenditure reductions and tax
increases significantly increased states' legislative turnover rates. Thus, states' decision-
makers may have an incentive to maintain fungible balances as an alternative to
expenditure reductions and/or tax increases for the purpose of weathering recessions.
States also use many outlets other than savings during periods of fiscal stress in an
effort to remedy revenue shortfalls. Aside from accounting gimmicks, such as
accelerating tax collections and deferring payments between fiscal years to temporarily
delay a deficit, many states rely partly on debt to remedy short-run fiscal stress. While
only 9 states prohibited issuing any guaranteed debt in 1990, most states required either
voter approval or supermajority legislative approval to issue guaranteed debt (Kiewiet
and Szakaly, 1996). In terms of non-guaranteed debt such as revenue bonds, only 15
states had any limits in place in 1990 (Kiewiet and Szakaly, 1996). States that required
voter approval to issue debt in 1990 are cited in Table 1.1.
Not surprisingly, von Hagen (1991), Bunch (1991), and Kiewiet and Szakaly
(1996) find that states with more stringent restrictions on the issuance of guaranteed debt,
such as constitutional restrictions limiting the quantity of debt and voter approval, issue
8less general obligation debt and more revenue debt than states that do not require voter
approval to issue debt or have weak constitutional debt restrictions. In addition, Kiewiet's
and Szakaly's finding that total per capita outstanding debt of states which strictly limit
general obligation debt is statistically smaller than the total per capita debt of states which
do not limit general obligation debt provides evidence that restricting general obligation
debt has caused states to reduce the quantity of debt issued. While much of the non-
guaranteed debt issued by states is not subject to constitutional or statutory limits, and
thus may be potentially useful as a source of revenue in lean times, the fact that non-
guaranteed debt generally pays a higher rate of interest may actually increase the degree
of fiscal strain states feel over time if non-guaranteed debt is continuously utilized as a
policy choice (Forbes, Fischer, and Peterson, 1981). Moreover, Bohn and Inman (1996)
find that capital investment is lower for states with strict balanced budget rules than for
states with weak rules, which they claim indicates that states with strict balanced budget
rules are using non-guaranteed debt at the expense of capital investment to finance state
expenditures.
Thus, while some states appear to use debt as means to finance expenditures in
the short-run, the use of savings as a policy option may also dominate the issuance of
debt. Since bond rating agencies, such as Moody's and Standard and Poor's, consider all
fungible monies and outstanding debt when rating state bonds, states with higher levels of
total debt (both guaranteed and non-guaranteed) and smaller surpluses (savings) may find
themselves faced with increasing costs for capital investment if the state's bond ratings
are lowered. Thus, the issuance of debt as a policy option may not only increase future
fiscal strain, it may also increase the cost of capital investments, which may be
9particularly adverse for states already experiencing reduced capital investments as a
result of fiscal limits.
In addition, many states' decision-makers are faced with the existence of tax and
expenditure limitation laws designed to limit the growth in the state's spending and/or tax
revenue. In general, tax and expenditure limitation laws specify the maximum increase in
the rate of growth in the state's tax revenues and expenditures from one year to the next.
The limits vary widely across states but are typically based on the growth in real personal
income or population growth plus inflation. The year each state adopted their expenditure
and/or tax limitation law is provided in Table 1.1.
The evidence of the effectiveness of tax and expenditure limitation laws has been
mixed, but generally illustrates that such laws have been binding. Cross-sectional studies
by Abrams and Dugan (1986), Cox and Lowery (1990), and Bails (1990) all find that tax
and expenditure laws are not significant in influencing states' fiscal behavior. However,
more complex time-series or panel studies by Dugan (1988), Stansel (1994), Ruben
(1995), and Elder (1992) suggests that expenditure limitation laws, but not tax limitation
laws, have influenced states' fiscal behavior. All of the time-series and/or panel studies
find evidence that the enactment of expenditure limitation laws significantly reduces the
growth in government spending. Elder (1992) also finds that the growth in tax revenue is
significantly lower as a result of expenditure limitations, but that tax revenue growth is
independent of tax limitation laws. Moreover, Poterba (1994) finds that states with
expenditure and tax limitation laws in place increase taxes less than states without such
laws in response to a $100 per capita unanticipated budget deficit.
10
While the empirical evidence supports the notion that expenditure limitation laws
have more influence than tax limitation laws, a tax limitation law may still have a
dramatic impact on a state's ability to raise revenue during a recession since decision-
makers will be constrained in how much they can increase taxes. 
Another potential barrier to raising revenue is the existence of supermajority
voting rules that require approval of two-thirds of a state's decision-makers in order to
increase taxes. Knight (1998a), using an instrumental variables approach to account for
the potential endogeneity of supermajority rules, finds that states which require
supermajorities for tax increases have a significantly lower average tax rate than states
that do not require a legislative supermajority.
 Finally, to satisfy fiscal constraints many states have followed the model of the
federal government and have shifted financial responsibility to local governments and
often do not provide funds necessary to meet such obligations. While 19 states require
mandates given to local governments be fully funded, the majority do not (Knight,
1998b). Thus, states may shift the financial burden of some services to local governments
and bear little or no expense. States that possess mandate funding requirements are
provided in Table 1.1, denoting the year in which the rule was adopted.
1.3 Previous Literature and Savings as a Policy Choice
The usefulness of savings as policy option during periods of depressed revenue requires
that states actually do save. Traditionally, state savings took the form of surplus balances
in the state's general fund account. A state's general fund account is an account from
which expenditures can be made to finance any good or service at the discretion of the
11
legislature. All states earmark at least a fraction of their revenue, often having separate
accounts for specific expenditures, so surplus funds retained by a state in any account are
typically transferred to the state's general fund. Monies held in the state's general fund
may accumulate over time, but in terms of state accounting practices general fund
balances are non-accumulating balances. This means that at the end of any given fiscal
year surplus funds are automatically treated as revenue in the next fiscal year. Thus in
order for general fund surpluses to exist in times of fiscal stress, states' decision-makers
must possess the fiscal discipline to resist spending surplus balances during expansionary
periods.
In recent decades however, states have begun to rely more heavily on budget
stabilization funds as an additional vehicle for saving. A budget stabilization fund, often
referred to as 'rainy day fund,' is an account separate from the state's general fund in
which typically a fraction of general fund surplus balances are retained.4 Prior to the
recession of the early 1980s only 10 states utilized budget stabilization funds, but that
number has grown to 44 by the end of 1998 and the legislatures of Oregon and Illinois
considered legislation to adopt reserve accounts during 1998.5 A state's ability to use
savings to mitigate fiscal stress will be dependent on the funds available from the state's
                                                
4 Unlike general fund accounts, which are treated as revenue in the coming fiscal year,
the accounting convention with stabilization funds is that the monies held in the fund are
left to accumulate over time. Thus, stabilization fund balances are not automatically
treated as a component of future revenue.
5 Information regarding Oregon's and Illinois' consideration of a budget stabilization fund
can be found on the Internet at
http://www.ost.state.or.us/news/eedbudstab_02031999.htm [Accessed 23 July 1999] and
http://www.ioc.state.il.us/FiscalFocus/ffmenu.cfm [Accessed 23 July 1999] in the
February/March 1999 edition.
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general fund and budget stabilization fund since their sum is the total quantity of fungible
balances available to a state at the end of any fiscal year.
In a broader sense, state budget stabilization funds are essentially self-insurance
schemes aimed at providing states with a source of fungible balances to deal with
unanticipated shocks. During the 1970s the federal government developed a counter-
cyclical revenue sharing plan, enacted by the Public Works Employment Act of 1976,
that was designed to compensate state and local governments for losses in revenue
growth resulting from recessions. The program would provide funds to state and local
governments when the seasonally adjusted national unemployment rate exceeded some
target value, and the allocation of these funds across states depended on the total funds
available (which was linked to the difference between the national unemployment rate
and the target unemployment rate) and individual state unemployment rates. Vogel and
Trost (1979) examined the counter-cyclical revenue sharing program and argued that
states would benefit very little for several reasons. First, they argued that the use of the
national unemployment rate and state unemployment rates to allocate funds is not
precisely linked to states' revenue growth. Next, the funds provided by the federal
government were likely to be much less than the revenues lost by states. Finally, there
was likely to be long lags between the end of the recession and the disbursement of
funds.
The notion of insuring states against contractions received little attention in the
years following Vogel and Trost (1979), and the counter-cyclical revenue sharing
program was rescinded in 1984. However, the recent formation of the European
Monetary Union (EMU) has once again propelled public sector insurance schemes to the
13
forefront of economic research. 6 Much of this recent literature focuses on the possible
advantages and disadvantages of risk pooling between states (or countries in the case of
the EMU) and the role that regional insurance may play. While state budget stabilization
funds can be thought of as "counter-cyclical self-insurance" for mitigating recessionary
periods, I do not explore the potential benefits to states from risk pooling or forming
regional stabilization funds. However, the notions of political control resulting from the
public sector common pool problem examined in Chapter 3 and the role that stabilization
fund rules play in states' gains to savings explored in Chapter 5 apply to the broader
literature which has investigated risk pooling and regional insurance among the U.S.
states and EMU nations.
The research investigating the savings behavior of state governments has tended
to focus on the role of budget stabilization funds in assisting states' efforts to save rather
than on the role of savings to mitigate fiscal stress. However, in examining the state fiscal
crisis of the early 1990s, Sobel and Holcombe (1996a) calculate the degree of fiscal stress
experienced by states. Measuring fiscal stress as the amount of expenditure reductions
plus the amount of discretionary tax increases less their long-run trend in expenditures,
they compute the quantity of savings each state would have needed to have on hand to
maintain their long-run expenditure growth rate throughout the recession without relying
                                                
6 The use of a single currency in the EMU nations essentially eliminates individual
countries from utilizing monetary policy as a tool to deal with asymmetric shocks,
thereby leaving fiscal policy as the primary tool. Thus, investigations focusing on
regional or state-specific stabilization funds to deal with both symmetric and asymmetric
shocks should be particularly fruitful in coming years. For recent research exploring
regional insurance schemes in the U.S. see Athanasoulis and Wincoop (1998), Asdrubali,
Sorenson, and Yosha (1996), and Sorenson and Yosha (1997). For investigations in
regional risk sharing in the EMU see von Hagen (1998), von Hagen and Hammond
(1998), and Sorenson and Yosha (1998).
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on increasing taxes for additional revenue. They find that only Kansas and Hawaii had
sufficient savings to maintain their long-run growth in expenditures throughout the
recession without any need for tax increases. The states in the worst savings position, as
calculated by Sobel and Holcombe, were Alaska and Connecticut. Both states had
accumulated savings less than 20 percent of what was needed to maintain expenditure
growth without relying on tax increases.
While Sobel's and Holcombe's investigation is suggestive that states may not save
enough, the optimal quantity of savings is dependent on the preferences of the state's
decision-makers. It may be the case that states' decision-makers desire to reduce
expenditure growth and/or increase taxes to some extent during slowdowns rather than
relying solely on savings. In an editorial addressed to the State of Oregon regarding the
adoption of a budget stabilization fund, Oregon State Treasurer Jim Hill stated that "this
is not to say that a reserve fund makes the state recession proof; it does not. However, it
does give the state some breathing room during recession to craft a reasonable, solution
to the problem."7
Research that has investigated budget stabilization funds does suggest that states'
fiscal health has improved as a result of utilizing budget stabilization funds. Examining
the impact that stabilization funds had on states' abilities to cope with fiscal stress during
the 1990-1991 recession, Sobel and Holcombe (1996a) find that states with budget
stabilization funds experienced fewer reductions in expenditures below their long-run
growth rate than did states without stabilization funds. Sobel and Holcombe also find that
                                                
7 Jim Hill's Opinion/Editorial was accessed online at
http://www.ost.state.or.us/ews/eedbudstab_02031999.htm [Accessed 23 July 1999].
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states whose stabilization funds had explicit deposit requirements experienced
significantly less fiscal stress than states whose budget stabilization funds did not contain
such requirements. More recently, Knight and Levinson (1999a), using a panel of data
from 1984-1997, find that states with budget stabilization funds save more than states
without budget stabilization funds (but the difference is not statistically significant), and
that total savings increases with the adoption of stabilization funds. In addition, states
with budget stabilization funds have been found to experience less volatile business
cycles than states which do not have budget stabilization funds (Levinson, 1998).
1.4 Dissertation Research Agenda
While the limited research investigating the savings behavior of state governments does
suggest that savings and budget stabilization can be effective policy tools, many
unanswered questions remain. The dissertation will provide new insights into
understanding the savings behavior of states by examining several aspects of states'
savings behavior.
Before proceeding to the research chapters, Chapter 2 presents and discusses
some descriptive data regarding the post-World War II savings behavior of state
governments. Included in Chapter 2 is a discussion concerning states' use of budget
stabilization funds in recent decades.
An issue in public sector saving which has thus far been untouched in the
literature is the common pool problem associated with savings. Since the right to access
and allocate the common pool of a state's savings is granted to the political party or
coalition which controls the political outcome, a state's savings may be adversely affected
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by an anticipated change in the controlling party. If decision-makers currently controlling
the political outcome expect to lose their ability to control outcomes in the future, then
they may opt to increase current spending and reduce current savings while they are still
guaranteed control over the allocation of funds. Chapter 3 investigates this implication of
the common pool problem by developing a theoretical model which describes why a
representative legislator will opt to increase current spending, thereby reducing current
saving, when his prospects for controlling future political outcomes diminish. An
empirical model, which is based on the theoretical model in Chapter 3, is estimated to test
this implication of the common pool problem. I find strong evidence in support of the
notion that states' legislators opt to increase current spending and reduce current saving
when a change in the future controlling party of a state's lower house is expected. The
implication of this finding is that public sector savings may be systematically adversely
impacted by anticipated changes in political control. Thus, states that are more politically
unstable than other states will be less prepared to deal with periods of fiscal stress, all
other factors constant.
While political manipulation of states' savings by legislators for self-gain is
possible due to the common pool problem, budget stabilization funds have the potential
to provide states with a vehicle for saving than can lessen the common pool problem. In
states' general fund accounts, a simple majority vote of the state's legislators is all that is
required (along with executive approval) to allocate funds. With budget stabilization
funds, states can reduce political manipulation of savings by placing restrictions on the
manner in which funds are to be allocated to and from the stabilization fund. In essence,
political manipulation of states' savings resulting from changes in political control is a
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short-run problem since a one-time anticipated change in the controlling parties will
adversely affect only the current level of savings. Systematic political manipulation of
states' saving resulting from changes in political control is more of a long-run problem.
States which experience systematic changes in their controlling parties over a long period
of time should, on average, save less than states which are more politically stable, ceteris
paribus. Since saving funds may be beneficial to all legislators because it reduces the
need to rely on expenditure cuts and tax increases, decision-makers in states which have
witnessed more systematic political instability will have more to gain from saving than
decision-makers in states which have been politically stable. Thus, decision-makers in
states which have experienced systematic political instability may be more likely to adopt
a budget stabilization fund as a solution to the long-term problems with political control
resulting from the common pool problem.
Chapter 4 examines the determinants of state budget stabilization fund adoption to
investigate the role that various political and economic factors have had on states'
choices. Estimating an empirical model consisting of 46 states over the period from 1945
to 1996, I find evidence consistent with the notion that states which have experienced
more political instability over the long-run are more likely to adopt stabilization funds, all
other factors constant. I also find strong evidence that states hit more severely by
recessions are more likely to adopt budget stabilization funds, ceteris paribus. Moreover,
I find that states that have expenditure and tax limitation laws in place are also more
likely to adopt budget stabilization funds, suggesting that some states adopted
stabilization funds as a means to circumvent the fiscal restrictions adopted during the 'tax
revolt' of the late 1970s and early 1980s.
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The final research chapter examines the effectiveness of budget stabilization
funds in aiding states' savings. While research by Sobel and Holcombe (1996a) and
Knight and Levinson (1999a) suggest that budget stabilization funds have enhanced
states' fiscal health, these studies have been restricted to examining states' uses of
stabilization funds only after 1983 due to data limitations. Using data obtained from each
state over their entire history of stabilization fund usage, I estimate an intervention model
for each state separately to examine how the state's average rate of saving and average
total balances have changed as a result of adopting a budget stabilization fund. I find that
one state has experienced a significantly higher average rate of saving after adopting a
stabilization fund, but more than one-third of states have experienced significantly higher
average total balances after adopting funds. This provides very strong evidence that the
states that have benefited from stabilization funds have not done so by saving more in a
given year, rather they have benefited by retaining the funds that they do save longer.
Moreover, I also find evidence that the structure of state budget stabilization funds plays
a very large role in the gains to savings experienced by states. Specifically, I find that
states whose stabilization funds contain explicit deposit and withdrawal rules are much
more likely to enhance their fiscal health, and thus their ability to mitigate recessions,
than are states whose budget stabilization funds are governed solely at the discretion of
the state's legislature.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation. The methodology and importance of
each chapter are reviewed in the context of the policy implications from each chapter for
states' abilities to deal with fiscal crises. The concluding chapter also provides prospects
for future areas of research regarding states' savings and budget stabilization funds.
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Chapter 2
Recent Trends in the Savings Behavior of State Governments
2.1 Defining Savings
As alluded to in the introduction, states have long been active savers. The fiscal
constraints facing states' decision-makers allow states to save surplus funds that can then
be allocated in the future. To understand the nature of states' savings behavior it is
necessary to make a distinction between two definitions of savings used throughout the
dissertation.
Most states rely on both general fund balances and budget stabilization fund
balances as their source of reserve balances. While monies retained in the state's general
fund may accumulate over time, for the state's accounting purposes general fund
surpluses are non-accumulating funds. This means that any fiscal-year-end general fund
surplus at time t becomes a component of the state's general fund revenue at time t+1.
Hence, if Ohio has a $100 million surplus in the state's general fund at the end of fiscal
year 2000 and forecasts general fund revenue in fiscal year 2001 to be $1 billion, the
state's decision-makers would plan their level of expenditures in fiscal year 2001 using a
revenue expectation of $1.1 billion rather than $1 billion.
In contrast to general fund surpluses, monies retained in the state's budget
stabilization fund are accumulating balances, which means that these funds are not
automatically treated as revenue in the upcoming fiscal year. Thus, states' decision-
makers do not typically plan future expenditures based upon the state's balance in their
budget stabilization fund. Hence the common definition of savings, which is current
revenue less current expenditures, can be obtained for a given state at time t by summing
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the change in the state's general fund position between time t and t-1 and the change in
the state's budget stabilization fund position between time t and t-1. This definition is
referred to as a state's current savings in the dissertation. This definition of savings is
examined in Chapter 3 when I study how political control influences states' current
savings. In addition, this definition is also employed in Chapter 5 as I investigate how the
rate at which states save annually has changed as a result of utilizing budget stabilization
funds.
An additional measure of a state's fiscal health is the total quantity of fungible
balances available at time t. As Gold (1995) notes, the total quantity of fungible balances
available to a state at any given time is perhaps the best indicator of the state's fiscal
position since a state's ability to mitigate periods of fiscal stress will be dependent upon
such balances. This definition of 'savings', which is referred to as the state's total balances
in the dissertation, is the public sector analog to the consumer definition of wealth.
Essentially a state's current savings is a flow measure of savings while the state's total
balances is a stock measure of savings. Chapter 5 investigates how states' total balances
have changed as a result of enacting budget stabilization funds. Moreover, previous
investigations of the savings behavior of state governments, undertaken by Sobel and
Holcombe (1996a) and Knight and Levinson (1999a), examined states' total balances
rather than states' current savings.
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2.2 Facts and Figures Regarding States' Saving
Now that the distinction between a state's current savings and a state's total balances has
been introduced, it is useful to examine the magnitude and recent trends in state
government savings.
As is evident from Figure 2.1, which plots the average per capita current savings
by states over the period from 1945-1996, the average per capita current savings behavior
of states has been somewhat volatile. As one would expect, average per capita current
savings tends to fall during, or just following, economic contractions.8 The fact that
annual contributions to total balances decreases (and is often negative) is not surprising
given that states' tax bases tend to contract during recessions leaving states' decision-
makers in need of fungible balances to maintain expenditure growth.
Moreover, it is also apparent from Figure 2.1 that the average per capita current
savings of states has tended to increase following recessions. The most pronounced
increases in average per capita current savings occurred in 1962, 1970, 1976, 1983, and
1993, all of which immediately followed contractions. Given that states often increase
taxes during recessions to increase revenue, it is not surprising that current savings tends
to rise following recessions since tax bases tend to expand during recoveries and states
often do not remove the tax increases instituted during contractions. This combination of
higher tax rates and expanding bases often results in a windfall of revenue for states
(Mattoon and Testa, 1992). This practice of increasing current savings immediately
                                                
8 The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) recession dates appearing in
Figure 2.1 include 1945, 1949, 1953-1954, 1957-1958, 1960-1961, 1969-1970, 1973-
1975, 1980-1982, and 1990-1991. In addition, Alaska is excluded from Figure 2.1 due to
its extremely volatile current savings behavior.
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Figure 2.1 - Average Per Capita Current Savings 1945-1996
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
In
 1
99
2 
D
ol
la
rs
Average Per Capita Current Savings
   Notes: Excludes Alaska.
following a recession may be interpreted as prudent behavior by states' decision-makers
since states are often left with very few reserve balances by the beginning of the recovery
phase (Mattoon and Testa, 1992). Thus, it seems that the trend in the current savings
behavior of states is to expand their fungible balances immediately following
contractionary phases since their reserve balances are likely to be depleted as a result of
the recession.
While Figure 2.1 provides average information regarding the current savings
behavior of all states, the average per capita current savings of each state is provided in
Table 2.1. On average, the majority of states have contributed to total balances rather
than dissaving during the post-war era. In fact, 80 percent of states have averaged
positive current savings, while only 10 states have averaged dissaving over this period.
The largest average dissaver in the post-war period has been Louisiana, averaging an
annual deficit of $3.33 per person. The state averaging the greatest contributions to
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current savings has been Alaska, saving more than $118 per person each year. While this
figure is much larger in magnitude than the second largest saving state (which is
Delaware at just over $10 per person), the figure for Alaska should be interpreted with
caution. The State of Alaska is unique regarding fiscal behavior in the sense that the state
receives very large royalties from the oil industry making it essentially an outlier when
compared to other states.
Table 2.1 - States' Average Current Savings Behavior 1945-1996
State Average
Per Capita
Savings
Average
Savings as a
% of  1996
Revenue
State Average
Per Capita
Savings
Average
Savings as
a % of
1996
Revenue
Alaska $118.92 0.66% Montana $0.74 0.04%
Alabama -$0.91 -0.03% North Carolina $1.96 0.09%
Arkansas $3.56 0.13% North Dakota $6.50 0.21%
Arizona $1.10 0.05% Nebraska $2.11 0.08%
California -$1.39 -0.01% New Hampshire -$2.86 -0.08%
Colorado $2.01 0.07% New Jersey $1.70 0.06%
Connecticut $3.49 0.11% New Mexico $5.24 0.07%
Delaware $10.07 0.26% Nevada $3.46 0.12%
Florida -$0.61 -0.01% New York $1.85 0.05%
Georgia $0.14 0.002% Ohio $3.15 0.14%
Hawaii $1.93 0.08% Oklahoma $2.52 0.09%
Iowa $2.70 0.10% Oregon $1.37 0.06%
Idaho $3.52 0.13% Pennsylvania -$0.10 -0.004%
Illinois -$0.63 -0.02% Rhode Island -$0.44 -0.01%
Indiana $3.07 0.13% South Carolina -$0.97 -0.04%
Kansas $1.02 0.04% South Dakota $0.36 0.02%
Kentucky $5.69 0.21% Tennessee -$0.93 -0.05%
Louisiana -$3.33 -0.14% Texas $1.87 0.04%
Massachusetts $2.20 0.06% Utah $1.03 0.07%
Maryland $4.40 0.17% Virginia $0.60 0.03%
Maine $2.35 0.08% Vermont $0.004 0.02%
Michigan $2.62 0.09% Washington -$2.74 -0.07%
Minnesota $3.61 0.11% Wisconsin $4.91 0.17%
Missouri $3.77 0.17% West Virginia $2.58 0.09%
Mississippi $2.26 0.08% Wyoming $6.75 0.17%
Notes: All figures reported are in 1992 dollars (CPI).
Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States and phone survey of states.
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Table 2.1 also reports each state's average total current savings as a percentage of
the state's 1996 general fund revenue. As a percentage of revenue, Alaska's average
current savings is the largest at 0.66 percent of revenue. However, the average current
savings of Delaware, Kentucky, and North Dakota were the next largest as a percentage
of the state's 1996 revenue. Most states average current savings were roughly one-tenth
of one percent of the state's 1996 general fund revenue.
While ten states have averaged dissaving over the post-war period on an annual
basis, this dissaving does not indicate that these states are less prepared for periods of
fiscal stress relative to states which averaged positive savings on an annual basis over the
same period. Since states' abilities to solve periods of fiscal stress depends on the total
quantity of funds available, the states in Table 2.1 which have averaged dissaving from
1945 to 1996 have simply averaged reducing their total balances each year during this
time. Table 2.2, which illustrates each state's average per capita total balances over the
post-war period, makes this point even more clear. From Table 2.2 one can see that
Alabama has maintained average total per capita balances of $12.38, yet the state has also
averaged dissaving annually over the same period. This implies that while Alabama has
funds available to deal with an economic downturn, the state's per capita reserve balances
have been declining, on average, during the post-war period.
In addition, several states have averaged negative total balances while averaging
positive current contributions to total balances. For instance, Hawaii has averaged the
largest total balance deficit while also averaging positive current savings. Hawaii's total
balance deficit has averaged -$38.25 per person while averaging annual gains to total
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balances of $1.93 per person. Thus, while Hawaii's total balances has averaged a deficit,
the state has averaged annually increasing their total balances in the post-war era (or
reducing their total balance deficit).
Moreover, Table 2.2 illustrates that 9 states have averaged negative total balances
over the period from 1945 to 1996. Of these 9 states, only New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
and Washington have also averaged annual dissaving during the post-war period. Hence
Table 2.2 - States' Average Total Balances Behavior 1945-1996
State Average
Per Capita
Total
Balances
Average Total
Balances as a
% of  1996
Revenue
State Average
Per Capita
Total
Balances
Average Total
Balances as a
% of  1996
Revenue
Alaska $1266.87 12.53% Montana $42.57 1.38%
Alabama $12.38 0.55% North Carolina $22.64 0.75%
Arkansas $43.34 1.50% North Dakota $64.87 2.16%
Arizona $12.46 0.19% Nebraska $38.17 1.44%
California $19.15 0.32% New Hampshire -$65.87 -2.05%
Colorado $47.94 1.70% New Jersey $14.07 0.48%
Connecticut $19.23 0.73% New Mexico $187.29 4.14%
Delaware $86.41 2.36% Nevada $36.24 0.55%
Florida $11.45 0.19% New York $54.38 1.47%
Georgia $17.72 0.52% Ohio -$3.53 -0.16%
Hawaii -$38.25 -0.44% Oklahoma $56.77 2.44%
Iowa -$24.85 -0.97% Oregon $6.65 0.39%
Idaho $42.91 1.41% Pennsylvania $1.02 0.07%
Illinois $10.75 0.46% Rhode Island -$33.29 -1.02%
Indiana $53.85 2.15% South Carolina $19.14 0.66%
Kansas $31.25 1.20% South Dakota -$1.95 -0.08%
Kentucky $11.80 0.47% Tennessee $15.17 0.54%
Louisiana $13.34 0.40% Texas $71.29 2.46%
Massachusetts -$20.61 -0.50% Utah $7.33 0.30%
Maryland $26.62 1.19% Virginia $17.49 0.71%
Maine $34.56 1.22% Vermont -$6.83 -0.04%
Michigan $30.16 1.06% Washington -$19.12 -0.48%
Minnesota $81.98 2.33% Wisconsin $58.93 1.91%
Missouri $34.00 1.42% West Virginia $4.17 0.12%
Mississippi $18.56 0.74% Wyoming $247.72 6.29%
Notes: All figures reported are in 1992 dollars (CPI).
Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States and phone survey of states.
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most states which have averaged total balance deficits during the post-war period have
reduced their total balance deficit with their positive current savings. This dissaving in
total balances while maintaining positive current savings is common for states, especially
following recessions. If a state has negative total balances equaling $10 million, or a
deficit in the sum of their general fund and budget stabilization fund, at the beginning of
the recovery phase and saves $1 million during the next fiscal year, their current savings
will be positive and equal to $1 million while their total balances remain negative (and
equal to $9 million).
Of the states averaging total balance deficits, New Hampshire has averaged the
largest per capita deficit, exceeding $65 per person. Excluding Alaska, the state with the
largest average per capita total balances over the post-war period has been Wyoming,
with average balances of more than $247 per person. New Mexico had the next largest
average balances with more than $187 per person, and 8 more states have averaged per
capita balances of more than $50.
While the average per capita balances of each state is an important indicator of
each state's ability to survive revenue shortfalls, per capita figures at the level of an
individual state make it difficult to ascertain the aggregate magnitude of states' total
balances. Figure 2.2, which plots total state balances as a percentage of Gross Domestic
Product, illustrates the size of total balances maintained by state governments. As a share
of Gross Domestic Product, aggregate state total balances reached its peak in the mid-
1960s when the stock of savings was roughly 0.7 percent. During the post-war era,
aggregate total balances has averaged around 0.3 percent of Gross Domestic Product.
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Aside from large increases in aggregate total balances during the mid-1960s and mid-
1970s, which subsequently vanished during the next recession, the decade of the 1980s
witnessed large aggregate total balances as a percentage of GDP. Throughout the entire
decade of the 1980s, aggregate total balances did not fall below 0.2 percent of Gross
Domestic Product. In fact, the average annual growth rate in aggregate total balances
throughout the 1980s exceeded 16 percent.
In addition, apart from the aggregate negative total balances which occurred
during the 1990-1991 recession, the 1990s seemed poised to be the second decade in a
row in which aggregate total balances fair well. Even including the recession years of the
Figure 2.2 - Aggregate Total Balances as a Percentage of GDP 1950-1996
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early 1990s, the average growth rate in aggregate total balances from 1990 to 1996
exceeded 83 percent. Between fiscal years 1992 and 1993 aggregate total balances
increased more than $16 billion, translating into an annual growth rate of more than 490
percent!
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One factor that may have played a role in the large increases in states' total
balances over the past two decades is budget stabilization funds. As alluded to in the
introduction, most states now utilize stabilization funds in addition to the state's general
fund for retaining fungible reserves. Although New York was the first state to begin
utilizing a budget stabilization fund in 1945, the vast majority of states did not begin
utilizing budget stabilization funds until after 1980 (only ten states utilized budget
stabilization funds prior to 1980). While Chapters 4 and 5 address particular questions
regarding budget stabilization funds and states' savings behavior, it is useful to provide a
general overview of budget stabilization fund usage.
As Figure 2.3 illustrates, aggregate budget stabilization fund balances represent a
sizable component of states' total balances, although general fund surpluses continue to
account for the majority of total balances. Aggregate stabilization fund balances peaked
in 1979 at nearly $10 billion before falling to into deficit during the 1980-1982 recession.
In recent years, aggregate budget stabilization fund balances have been increasing,
reaching more than $8 billion dollars by the end of fiscal year 1996.
While budget stabilization funds represent a respectable share of states' total
balances, there is no guarantee that the dramatic increase in budget stabilization fund
usage has caused the increase in states' total balances over the last two decades. Since
budget stabilization balances for most states are deposited from the state's general fund
surplus, budget stabilization funds and states' general funds may be fungible substitutes.
That is, states' fiscal positions may not be enhanced when the state retains balances in the
general fund and a stabilization fund since those balances could have otherwise been
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Figure 2.3 - Aggregate Total Balances and Aggregate Total Budget Stabilization
Fund Balances 1945-1996
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retained in the state's general fund.
The year each state began utilizing budget stabilization funds and each state's
average total balances retained in stabilization funds during the 1990s is presented in
Table 2.3. As is evident, states' reliance on budget stabilization funds varies, but most
states have retained positive average total balances during the 1990s. The only state
which has averaged a stabilization fund deficit is California, averaging a deficit of more
than $50 million. Although it may seem odd that states can run deficits in their
stabilization funds, most states' statutes do not prohibit deficits. Since stabilization funds
are separate accounts in the state's budget, just like capital accounts for instance,
California (as well as other states) is permitted to run a deficit in their stabilization fund
by issuing bonds.9
                                                
9 See California's Government Code Section 16312 and Section 16314.
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Table 2.3 - Summary of States' Budget Stabilization Fund Usage
(in millions of 1992 dollars)
State Year of
First BSF
Adoption
Total
Balances -
Average of
1990s
Total
Balances in
BSF -
Average of
1990s
State Year of
First BSF
Adoption
Total
Balances -
Average of
1990s
Total
Balances in
BSF -
Average of
1990s
AK 1986 $1294.56 $259.16 MT -- $61.52 --
AL -- $125.89 -- NC 1991 $411.36 $161.61
AR -- $227.77 -- ND 1987 $105.88 $9.67
AZ 1990 $126.80 $64.85 NE 1983 $88.15 $25.87
CA 1976 -$2106.72 -$53.90 NH 1987 -$84.84 $10.67
CO 1983 $591.16 $200.41 NJ 1990 $67.49 $99.98
CT 1979 $56.97 $25.98 NM 1966 $238.33 $113.82
DE 1977 $320.00 $69.58 NV 1994 $35.89 $31.44
FL 1959 -$480.26 $186.58 NY 1945 $1560.67 $78.41
GA 1976 -$140.86 $129.77 OH 1981 $18.69 $245.81
HI -- -$56.01 -- OK 1985 $311.27 $110.95
IA 1984 $55.03 $63.56 OR -- $253.04 --
ID 1984 $215.10 $31.01 PA 1985 -$186.98 $56.71
IL -- $158.70 -- RI 1985 $184.00 $27.62
IN 1982 $756.41 $345.82 SC 1978 -$108.06 $136.89
KS 1993 $158.95 $18.14 SD 1991 $32.09 $12.46
KY 1983 $515.67 $61.44 TN 1972 -$173.48 $88.05
LA 1990 -$253.01 $0 TX 1987 $1047.48 $39.57
MA 1986 $110.79 $261.67 UT 1986 $107.93 $52.51
MD 1986 $725.88 $143.73 VA 1992 $332.19 $21.37
ME 1985 $34.99 $6.39 VT 1988 $3.58 $3.21
MI 1977 $981.95 $512.32 WA 1981 -$400.11 $162.52
MN 1981 $726.17 $456.57 WI 1981 $785.50 $254.40
MO 1992 $630.22 $17.70 WV 1994 $197.95 $9.69
MS 1982 $365.92 $95.28 WY 1982 $158.08 $19.92
Notes:  Many states have multiple budget stabilization funds so the date of adoption presented is the year in
which each state began utilizing their first stabilization fund. See Chapters 4 and 5 for a more thorough
discussion of stabilization funds. The average total balances retained in stabilization funds during the 1990s
include balances from all stabilization funds.
As Table 2.3 also illustrates, many states have averaged total balance deficits
during the 1990s while maintaining positive average stabilization fund balances. This
simply implies that states such as Florida, Georgia, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
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Tennessee, and Washington, have averaged general fund deficits large enough to more
than offset their average positive stabilization fund balances.
In addition to states who have averaged general fund deficits, many other states
have averaged stabilization fund balances during the 1990s that are in excess of the state's
average general fund position. This, at least on the surface, suggests that states consider
the use of stabilization funds as an important vehicle for mitigating periods of fiscal
stress.
2.3 Budget Stabilization Fund Data
While nearly all of the data presented in this chapter and used throughout the dissertation
are from common sources, such as the Statistical Abstract of the United States, this
dissertation utilizes a new data set on state budget stabilization fund balances and date of
fund adoption which has been previously unavailable to the literature.
All previous studies investigating the savings behavior of state governments,
namely Sobel and Holcombe (1996a) and Knight and Levinson (1999a), have relied upon
data published by the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO). Since
1983 the NASBO has published the fiscal-year-end balance of each state's budget
stabilization fund(s). However, these studies have been limited because fiscal-year-end
balances were not reported separately from the state's general fund balance prior to 1983.
The data set used in this dissertation was obtained by contacting each states by
phone to obtain the fiscal-year-end balances of the state's budget stabilization fund(s)
over the state's entire history of budget stabilization fund usage, date(s) of budget
stabilization fund(s) adoption, and information regarding the rules governing the use of
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stabilization fund monies.10 The data obtained from each state does not match the fiscal-
year-end balances reported by the NASBO very well. Table 2.4 illustrates the difference
between the fiscal-year-end balances used in the dissertation that were obtained from
each state and the fiscal-year-end balances reported by the NASBO.
As is evident from Table 2.4, there are several noticeable, and some quite sizable,
differences between the fiscal-year-end balances reported by individual states and the
balances reported by the NASBO. Of the 44 states having budget stabilization funds, the
difference between the fiscal-year-end balance reported by individual states and the
balance reported by the NASBO differ by an absolute value of more than $100 million
for 8 states, with Alaska's differing by more than $1 billion. The average absolute value
difference for fiscal year 1994 alone is more than $77 million dollars. In the aggregate,
the figures reported by each state are $1.2 billion more than the aggregate figures
reported by the NASBO.
The data obtained from each state possess several advantages over any published
data on the fiscal-year-end balances of budget stabilization funds. First, the data provided
by the states is likely to be more accurate than the data published by a second-hand
source. Second, I obtained the year in which each state's budget stabilization fund was
adopted, which was data not published by NASBO. Third, obtaining each state's
                                                
10 I am indebted to the following individuals for their assistance in obtaining these data:
Carolyn Middleton, Rick Zelznak, Robert Waisbord, Margaret Feigee, Alan Boifsvert,
Bob Harris, David Blowman, Linda Keillor, Bill Smith, Rose Renn, Mark Brown, Calvin
McKelvogue, Ron Carson, Steve Winham, Keith Todd, Neil Bergsman, Tim Sullivan,
Nancy Rooney, Beth Colosimo, Tom Kynerd, Mark Reading, Gerry Oligmueller, Tom
Martin, Nancy Jones, Michael Benze, John Traylor, Emily Sams, Jim Belonus, Frank
Rainwater, Bill Anderson, Shawn Ashley, Bill Petersen, Jason Dilges, Bryan Chriske,
Lisa Minton, Patrick Ogden, Sheila Rogers, Pam Davidson, John Montgomery, Lori Peal,
and Jeff Urry.
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fiscal-year-end balance over the state's entire history of stabilization fund usage provides
more flexibility to examine the role of stabilization funds in influencing states' fiscal
health than had previously been permitted.
Table 2.4 - Comparison of NASBO Reported Balances and Data Obtained from
Each State: Fiscal Year 1994 (in millions of nominal dollars)
State NASBO
Reported
Balance
State Reported
Balance
State NASBO
Reported
Balance
State Reported
Balance
AK $1014.5 $2.03 MT -- --
AL -- -- NC $175.9 $210.6
AR -- -- ND $0 $0
AZ $33.5 $42.2 NE $24.7 $27.8
CA -$410 -$362.2 NH $20 $20
CO $134.4 $310 NJ $155.5 $158.9
CT $0 $0 NM $94.2 $156.1
DE $71.7 $71.7 NV $0 $19
FL $296.6 $296.2 NY $134 $134.2
GA $0 $267.2 OH $21 $21
HI -- -- OK $91.1 $45.6
IA $34.4 $38.4 OR -- --
ID $18.4 $32.9 PA $25 $29.8
IL -- -- RI $41.9 $43
IN $205 $370.3 SC $66.5 $167
KS $75 $78 SD $24.9 $21.6
KY $33.5 $90 TN $100 $101.4
LA $0 $0 TX $0 $29.1
MA $230.4 $383 UT $64.3 $41.6
MD $152.6 $161.8 VA $31.1 $0
ME $0 $0 VT $0 $1
MI $61 $775.5 WA $125 $125
MN $360 $500 WI $0 $234.9
MO $20.1 $36.9 WV $0 $0
MS $160 $162.9 WY $0 $19.3
Notes: States for which no figures are reported do not have budget stabilization funds.
Source for the NASBO figures: Fiscal Survey of States, NASBO.
2.4 Conclusion
The data presented in this chapter have illustrated the magnitude and recent trends in the
post-war savings behavior of state governments. As the data indicate, most states have
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been active savers in the sense that they have averaged positive current savings over the
post-war period. Thus a majority of states have been adding to their total balances over
this period, which implies that most states have been enhancing their fiscal positions
through saving.
Moreover, the additions to states' total balances have been quite profound in
recent decades. Aside from the 1990-1991 recession, aggregate total balances retained by
states during the 1980s and 1990s has averaged more than 0.5 percent of Gross Domestic
Product. The fact that more than 30 of the 44 states utilizing budget stabilization funds
did not adopt their stabilization fund until after 1980 is suggestive that budget
stabilization funds have contributed to the savings gains experienced by states in recent
years.
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Chapter 3
Political Control and Public Sector Savings: Life Cycle Evidence from
the States
3.1 Introduction
The institutional structure of the public sector essentially affords individual and group
decision-makers within government an opportunity to exert disproportionate control over
political outcomes. Two ways that individuals and/or groups may control political
outcomes is through centralized vote-trading (or block-voting) and agenda control. As
McKelvey (1976) first noted, under majority rule any individual that can control pairwise
votes in the agenda may obtain any outcome they desire. Since members of the majority
party of a legislature control legislative leadership positions, such as committee chair and
speaker positions, and thus determine which legislation receives hearings and votes, these
individuals (or group if they are acting on the party's behalf) may exert tremendous
influence over the political agenda. Experiments by Plott and Levine (1978) illustrated
that such agenda control can have a dramatic affect on voting outcomes. Thus members
(and leaders of the majority party) can exert tremendous influence on political outcome
through their ability to manipulate the agenda.
Second, the majority party can essentially dictate the outcome of any majority
rule vote since their numbers are superior. In order to determine the political outcome, the
members of the majority must of course all vote in a similar manner. Koford (1982)
developed a model in which such block-voting was optimal for parties. In his model,
party leaders were responsible for organizing vote-trading among party members in an
effort to maximize the party's welfare. In essence, party leaders maximized their party's
welfare by organizing the party to vote in a similar manner on legislation which was
36
important to party leaders. As a result, any such legislation could be adopted by
organizing the votes of the party members. Hence when individual legislators or parties
collude on their choice of votes, it provides the group with superior membership the
ability to pass or defeat any legislation they desire.
A characteristic feature of public sector savings may cause current savings to be
very responsive to future political outcome control. Consider a private sector agent
determining her optimal spending/saving decision. For this agent, her saving is under her
explicit control. If she decides to save at time t in order to spend the savings at time t+k
(k>0), then the funds saved at time t are guaranteed to be available to her in the future
assuming she saves the funds in some risk-free instrument. In the public sector, this
guarantee does not necessarily hold. Under a multi-party political system governed by
majority rule, the right to access (and ultimately spend) public sector savings is
determined by the group or party which can control the political outcome. As a result,
there is no certainty beyond the previous election that the party currently controlling a
state's savings will continue to control the funds in the future. In short, unlike savings of
private sector individuals, public sector savings is a common pool governed by an
uncertain controlling party. As a result of the known differences between the spending
preferences of political parties, if political party A expects to lose control over political
outcomes in the future to political party B, party A would be unlikely to save in the
current period for fear that the funds will be allocated by party B in a manner not
consistent with the preferences of party A. 11
                                                
11 For recent evidence that the composition of state-level spending differs by controlling
political parties, see Husted and Kenny (1997) and Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995).
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In this chapter I develop a simple extension of the Life Cycle/Permanent Income
model (hereafter LCPI) which can be used to formalize the effect that uncertain future
political control has on an individual legislator's preferences for spending and saving. The
representative legislator is assumed to maximize the present value of his utility over his
infinite lifetime by choosing the level of government expenditures, subject to the state's
resource constraints, to maximize the net benefits of government spending in his district.
The legislator is assumed to face uncertainty regarding his reelection and his future
prospects of being a member of the majority party (affording him the ability to control
political outcomes). Unlike the standard private sector agent LCPI models in which
agents' optimal choice of consumption is based solely on initial wealth and permanent
income, the model presented here has the feature that the level of spending arising from
the legislator's optimal choice is influenced not only by fiscal variables such as revenue,
interest rates, and fungible assets, but also by his expected future political environment.
The model implies that as a legislator's compound probability of being reelected and part
of the majority party in the future diminishes, he will opt to forgo current saving in favor
of current spending while he is ensured control over allocation decisions. Thus, the model
implies that legislators face a trade-off in their expenditure/saving decision between the
desire to smooth the net benefits of government spending to their district and the desire to
spend the funds while control is certain.
To test empirically the theoretical implications of the model, I estimate a two-way
fixed effects model for 39 states over the period from 1973 to 1995. Employing binary
variables of changes in the future controlling party in each legislative house to capture the
effect of changes in future political outcome control and the weighted average of turnover
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rates in the state's legislature to capture the expected probability of reelection, the
estimation results provide evidence that an actual change in the state's majority party in
the lower house adversely affects states' current savings in the year prior to the change. In
fact, the results indicate that a future change in the controlling party of a state's lower
house reduces current real per capita savings by an average of 68 dollars. F-tests for the
joint significance of political party changes in both the lower and upper house of a state's
legislature reveal that future political outcome control is a significant determinant of the
current level of savings. The results suggest that state fiscal behavior may be
systematically affected by changes in the state's political environment if the change is
expected, implying that politically unstable states may be ill-prepared for future
recessions relative to politically stable states, other factors remaining constant.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds in the following manner. Section 3.2
briefly discusses states' use of savings as a fiscal tool and previous research examining
state fiscal behavior. Section 3.3 develops the theoretical model that can be used to
examine the impact that political reelection and the prospects for political control have on
an individual legislator's preferences for current spending/saving and serves as the
foundation for the empirical estimation. Section 3.4 chronicles the transition from theory
to measurement, while Section 3.5 presents the estimation results. Section 3.6 concludes
the chapter.
3.2 Previous Investigations of State Fiscal Behavior
Previous investigations of state fiscal behavior have focused almost exclusively on
expenditures and no previous research has addressed the common pool problem inherent
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in public sector saving. Most of the previous research examining public sector spending
has been based on Down's (1957) median voter model. 12 In general, these models have
attempted to explain public sector fiscal behavior as a function of variables reflecting
preferences of the pivotal constituent. However, research by Morton (1991), Greene and
Nelson (1994), and Poole and Rosenthal (1996) suggests that the behavior of legislators
can not be accurately proxied using the preferences of a representative consumer. Morton
(1991) claims that inefficiencies in the decision-making process of the public sector, such
as cost asymmetries across voters and barriers to political competition, drive these
differences between constituent and legislator preferences. In addition, Poole and
Rosenthal (1996), using data for the United States Senate, reject the notion that
legislators are agents for constituents even when controlling for vote-trading and
reelection considerations.
In contrast to the static median voter models, recent work by Holtz-Eakin et al.
(1994) and Dahlberg and Lindstrom (1998) utilized a Life Cycle/Permanent Income
(LCPI) framework for studying state and local government expenditures which forms the
basis for the model developed in Section 3.3. One of the key features of the LCPI
framework is that agents are forward looking. They make choices based on information
that often extends well beyond one period. In the LCPI models of Holtz-Eakin et al.
(1994) and Dahlberg and Lindstrom (1998), they examine public sector spending
assuming a representative private sector agent (or bureaucrat) to determine the share of
                                                
12 For some of the initial models utilizing the median voter theory see Barr and Davis
(1966), Davis and Hines (1966), and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). For recent
applications of the median voter model see Holcombe (1980), Gramlich and Rubinfeld
(1982), Holcombe (1989), and Turnbull and Mitias (1995).
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aggregate state and local spending that is explained by permanent as opposed to current
resources. Their models, while similar in theory but differing in data aggregation, provide
an interesting contrast of results. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994), examining aggregate state and
local expenditures in the U.S., find that nearly 100 percent of state and local expenditures
are determined by current rather than permanent resources. Dahlberg and Lindstrom
(1998) on the other hand, find that most (around 90 percent) of local expenditures in
Sweden are determined by permanent rather than current resources.
While the general intertemporal framework utilized by previous researchers is
insightful for examining public sector decisions, their choice to model a private sector
agent (or bureaucrat) ignores central differences between the private and public sector. In
the public sector, decisions are not made solely by one individual, rather they are
determined by a collection of individual legislators. As alluded to earlier, research
suggests that differences between the preferences of legislators and the preferences of
constituents may be substantial. Ignoring the institutional differences between the private
and public sector may induce a source of bias into the theory presented.  For instance, if
public sector decisions were made by a benevolent social planner that always acts as his
constituents desire and was not subject to removal from office, implying that they faced
no uncertainty about their prospects for future control of political outcomes, then the
public sector's decision-making problem would be perfectly analogous to the consumer's
problem. However, this is not the case. Legislators face uncertainty regarding their
political survival and their prospects for future control of political outcomes. Thus, the
model developed in Section 3.3 focuses on the choices and constraints facing an
individual legislator rather than a representative consumer.
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3.3 Theoretical Treatment
3.3.1 The model
The model developed here assumes a representative legislator that maximizes the present
value of his lifetime utility, V, by choosing the level of government expenditures in each
period subject to the state's resource constraint. Although the legislator must vote on the
total size of the budget, his political survival is determined by the individuals (voters)
within his district. So as long as the legislator continues to seek reelection, and thus
requires votes from his district, he faces a powerful incentive to cater to his constituency.
As a result, I assume that the legislator derives no utility from the level of government
expenditures per se, rather he derives utility only from the government expenditures in
his district in excess of revenue obtained from his district, which I refer to as the net
benefits of spending. Hence in an effort to maximize his utility, the legislator attempts to
maximize the net benefits of government expenditures in his district in any given period
by choosing the total size of the budget.
The net benefits (or net spending) to the district is defined as the difference
between government expenditures in the district and revenue obtained from the district.
Thus, we may write the net benefits to district i at time t as it
i
t
i
t RGNB -= , where 
i
tG
and itR  are government expenditures to district i at time t and revenues obtained from
district i at time t respectively.
Defining itq  and 
i
tg  as the share of total government expenditures and total
revenue share corresponding to district i, we may write the net benefits to district i as
t
i
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i
t
i
t RGNB gq -= , where tG  and tR  are the total amounts of government expenditures
and revenue at time t. Both itq  and 
i
tg  are assumed to depend on an indicator function,
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denoted tI , which reflects one of two possible outcomes for the legislator. The first
outcome, in which the indicator function equals one, is a situation in which the legislator
is reelected and part of the majority party. This outcome is the scenario under which the
legislator has the ability to control the political outcome. The ability to control political
outcomes will have a substantial impact on his ability to direct government expenditures
toward his district while simultaneously diverting taxes. However, since legislators
systematically face uncertainty regarding reelection, the outcome in which a legislator is
reelected and part of the majority party is not certain. Thus, we shall assume that the
indicator function equals one with probability tP , where tP  is the legislator's exogenous
compound probability of being reelected and part of the majority party.
The second outcome, under which the indicator function equals zero, is a situation
in which the legislator is either not reelected or not part of the majority party. Under this
scenario, the legislator is assumed to lose his ability to control the political outcome. The
probability that such an event is realized is of course tP-1 . From the perspective of the
legislator, the desirable outcome occurs when he is reelected and part of the majority
party. This ensures that he will have greater control over the allocation of spending and
taxes. Thus, over his infinite lifetime, a representative legislator should care about his
prospects for controlling the political outcome in every period since the realization of
such an event (which is represented by the indicator function) governs his ability to direct
expenditures and redirect taxes. If the legislator is presently a member of the majority
party and the majority party always votes as a uniform coalition, then the individual
legislator will have the ability to control the outcome over members of the minority party.
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In addition, it is assumed that the legislator's district's share of total expenditures
and total revenue, the legislator's compound probability of being in office and a member
of the majority party, and the state's revenue are all known in period t prior to the
legislator's choice of expenditures in period t. Revenue obtained by the state is assumed
to be exogenous and deterministic, which precludes the legislator from a precautionary
motive for saving. 
Using the definitions of net benefits described above and omitting the superscript
i , the legislator's lifetime utility function, V,  may be written as:
                       ¥
=
=
0}{ stG
MAX
V  
þ
ý
ü
î
í
ì
úû
ù
êë
é
-å Õ
¥
= =0 0
0 ])()([
s
s
t
tssss
s IRIGIUE gqb                    (3.1)
where 0E  is the legislator's expectation of future events conditional on information
available at time 0, U  is the legislator's time-separable utility function which is assumed
to be concave in its function argument for all t and twice continuously differentiable, and
)1/1( rb +=  is the legislator's discount factor (with discount rate r ) which is assumed
to be positive and constant over time. Substituting the probability that a legislator is
reelected and part of the majority party for the indicator function in equation (3.1) and
setting 10 =P , allows us to write the legislator's maximization as:
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where tA  denotes the state's stock of fungible assets available at time t, and tr  is the real
rate of interest at which the state can lend and borrow freely which is assumed to be
exogenous.13
The choice to model the state's resource constraint as permanent rather than
current resources coincides with the Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994) and Dahlberg and
Lindstrom (1998) framework. Both Inman (1983) and Holtz-Eakin (1994) have argued
that actual spending of state governments does not have to coincide with planned
expenditures outlined in the state's budget. In fact, of the 49 states currently utilizing
some form of a balanced budget rule, only 17 states have constitutional requirements that
the Governor submit and sign, and the legislature adopt, a balanced budget. In a majority
of states, legislators (and the Governor) are merely required to adopt a balanced budget
projection no matter how unrealistic it may be.14
The model can be thought of almost as a general case of a standard consumer
LCPI model. If the representative legislator were replaced by a single social planner or a
                                                
13 To simplify the model, we do not distinguish between not being reelected and not
being a member of the majority party. In either situation, which occurs with probability
tP-1 , the model implies that the legislator will receive no utility because the future
becomes irrelevant for the legislator. If a legislator is elected to office again in the future
we assume that future savings is independent of previous savings since future savings
will depend on the optimization facing future legislators. In addition, this simplification
ignores any utility premium for holding public office over the private sector. Sobel
(1992) developed a model in which such a utility premium was crucial to a legislator’s
endogenous choice to remain in office. In his model, a legislator could optimally shirk
himself out of office if his choice in office increased his expected utility in the private
sector. The decision to ignore such a distinction greatly simplifies the derivation of the
model without altering the qualitative results.
14 For specific information regarding state balanced budget rules, see Budget Processes in
the States, September 1997, National Association of State Budget Officers. Moreover,
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994, p.160) cite an example in which the Governor of New Jersey
submitted a budget to the legislature which had little chance of being realized.
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representative private sector agent that were not subject to issues such as reelection and
political districts, then the model breaks down into the basic LCPI model in which private
sector agents prefer perfect expenditure smoothing so long as private consumption and
government expenditures are separable in the agent's utility function (which is the finding
of Dahlberg and Lindstrom, 1998). Thus the model captures how features of public sector
decision-making, such as political control and reelection, can force government
expenditures to deviate from the consumer-preferred smooth path. 15
To solve the model, we may apply dynamic programming methods and substitute
the equation of motion, equation (3.3), into the objective function and rewrite the
objective function to contain both a current and future component. Doing so allows us to
rewrite the objective function as:
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where the value function, ),( tt XAV , is the maximum obtained value from the
legislator's optimization. tX  is a vector of the model's state variables at time t. Since tP
is a probability which is realized at time t prior to the choice of spending, it acts only as
scalar in the model. As a result, the probability that a legislator is reelected and part of the
                                                
15 The fact that optimal government expenditures should follow a smooth path can easily
be derived for a representative private sector agent using the LCPI model. As long as the
agent's rate of time preference equals the real interest rate and private sector consumption
is separable from government expenditures, private sector agents would prefer a smooth
expenditure path. See Dahlberg and Lindstrom (1998) for such a derivation. An
interesting extension to this model would integrate the notions of expenditure smoothing,
tax smoothing (see Barro, 1979) and credit markets conditions (Poterba and Rueben,
1997) into a model with an uncertain political climate. Unfortunately, such a model is
beyond the scope of this chapter. An interesting note to such a model is that Strazicich
(1997, 1996), using state-level data, found no evidence that states engage in tax
smoothing.
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majority at time t+1 serves essentially as a state variable at time t. In addition, since the
future component of the value function, ),( 11 ++ tt XAV , assumes optimal behavior in
every future period, 1+tX  includes not only the state variables from time t+1, but also the
state variables from every future period. Thus, { }}{,}{,}{ 11 ktktktt rPRX +++++ = for
.,...,1 ¥=k
Formulating the model in this framework allows for a straightforward
examination of the comparative statics, which is presented in Section 3.3.2. To obtain the
first-order condition, we may differentiate equation (3.4) with respect to the choice
variable which yields:
                                    ),()( 111 +++=- ttAtttttNt XAVPRGU bgqq                             (3.5)
where NU  is the derivative of the utility function with respect to the net benefits
argument. While useful for comparative statics, the intuition from equation (3.5) is rather
difficult given the future component of the value function. 16 However, using the value
function we may derive an equivalent first-order condition that can easily be interpreted.
Differentiating equation (3.4) with respect to tA  using the envelope theorem yields:
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Combining equation (3.5) and (3.6) gives us:
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16 The transversality condition for the model requires that
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Substituting equation (3.7) into the left hand side of equation (3.5) and
substituting the one period update of equation (3.7) into the right side of equation (3.5)
yields:
                     )()1()( 1111111 +++++++ -+=- ttttNtttttttNt RGUrPRGU gqqbgqq         (3.8)
which is the common formulation of the first-order condition in this type of model.
Unlike the standard private sector agent LCPI model in which the evolution of
government spending between periods is determined by the relative intertemporal prices,
this formulation implies that the evolution of government spending between periods
depends on relative prices and the legislator's expected political environment. Notice in
equation (3.8) that the legislator's realized and expected compound probability of being
reelected and a member of the majority party act as additional discount factors in the
legislator's optimal choice of expenditures (through its effect on tq ). If the legislator's
expected probability of being reelected and part of the majority at time t+1 tends to zero,
then this reduction serves to discount future utility. As a result, when the compound
probability that he will be reelected and part of the majority falls, ceteris paribus, the
legislator will opt to increase spending in the current period (while he is guaranteed to
control the outcome) and forgo current saving. The incentive to save is greatly
diminished when a legislator's prospects for controlling the outcome shrink because he is
aware that any savings at time t may not be accessible by him at time t+1. Thus, a utility-
maximizing legislator will choose to increase spending in the current period, thereby
increasing his current utility, while he in ensured control over political outcomes if it is
likely that his position will change in the future. In short, the model implies that
legislators face a trade-off between the desire to smooth the net benefits of government
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expenditures and their desire to spend (and save) funds while they control the means of
allocation. As the prospects of controlling the means of allocation in the future diminish,
the legislator will deviate from the smooth net benefits path in the current period. The
model suggests that legislators will follow a ‘help yourself first policy.’ Even though
private sector agents may prefer a smooth level of expenditures over time, once the
legislator perceives his political survival or his prospects for political control are in
jeopardy, he will choose to increase spending in the current period to maximize the
(certain) net benefits of spending.
3.3.2 The determinants of public sector saving
The impact of all the state variables on current savings can be obtained from equation
(3.5) given that savings in the current period, tS , is defined as the difference between
current revenue and current spending. Since revenue obtained by the state at time t is
exogenous to the choice of realized savings, equation (3.4) allows us to write savings as:
                    )}{,}{,}{,,,()( ktktkttttttt rPRRArGRS +++-=×   for .,...,1 ¥=k       (3.9)
Since government expenditures at time t depends on all future values of revenue, interest
rates, and the probability of being reelected and part of the majority, current savings will
also depend on these variables. Signing the effects of these variables on current
expenditures gives us their a priori impact on the current level of savings. These
comparative statics are derived in Appendix A.
The impact of current fungible assets ( tA ) and future revenue ( 1+tR ) can be
conclusively signed to negatively impact current savings. The model predicts that
legislators save less in a given year when they have a larger stock of fungible assets at
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their disposal. Also, the model implies that when legislators expect increased revenue in
the future they opt to increase current spending in favor of saving. Thus we have,
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On the other hand, current revenue and the compound probability that the
legislator is reelected and part of the majority in the coming election can be shown to
have a positive impact on current saving. Hence,
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However, in order for current revenue to positively impact current saving, it is sufficient
that  tt gq > . The intuition of this condition is that legislators will opt to save in the face
of increased revenue during any period in which his share of district expenditures
exceeds his district's revenue share to ensure a smooth flow of net benefits to his district
in the future.
Finally, both current and future interest rates can not be conclusively signed from
the model. Thus,
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Since no theoretical restrictions were placed on the state's fungible assets ( tA ), current
interest rates ambiguously impact current saving. However, since it is likely that states
will primarily hold positive wealth in practice, it is likely that increases in current interest
rates will increase current spending (through the income effect) and reduce current
saving. In short, while neither the impact of current nor future interest rates on current
saving can be signed, it is likely that increases in current interest rates adversely impact
current savings as a result of the income effect.
3.4 Specifying the Empirical Model and Data Description
3.4.1 The empirical model
A first-order linear approximation to equation (3.9) is estimated utilizing a two-way fixed
effects model for 39 states.17 According to theory, equation (3.9) implies that current
savings will depend on all future values of revenue, real interest rates, and the probability
of being reelected and part of the majority. To keep the empirical model estimable,
equation (3.9) is estimated using both one and two periods of future values. Given that
legislators discount the future and the fact that a majority of states have at least one house
following a two-year election cycle, it is unlikely that future values extending beyond two
periods play a significant role in legislators' decisions. Formally, the one period fixed-
effects model may be expressed as:
            ititititititittiit PRrRArS ebbbbbbnhf +++++++++= +++ 161514321        (3.11)
                                                
17 Generally in LCPI models researchers are interested in details regarding the form of the
utility function so they tend to estimate the Euler equations directly. The focus of this
chapter is not to obtain information regarding an average legislator’s utility function, but
rather to determine the extent to which changes in controlling political parties and
reelection considerations influence states' current savings.
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where f  is the common constant term, ih  are the state-specific effects, tn  are the time-
specific effects, N is the state index, T is the time index, and ite  is the error term assumed
to be uncorrelated over time and between states. According to theory, the primary
hypothesis is that 6b < 0, which implies that as a legislator's prospects for controlling
political outcomes diminish, she will opt to increase current spending in favor of current
saving. The model in Section 3.3 also implies that we should expect 2b < 0 , 3b > 0, 5b <
0, and 1b  and  4b  ambiguous.
3.4.2 Data Description and variable definition
In the empirical model, itS  is state i's real per capita saving at time t, which is calculated
as the difference between the change in the state's real general fund revenue and real
general fund expenditures plus the real per capita change in the balance of the state's
budget stabilization fund. This common formulation of savings addresses only the
contributions to savings in a given year rather than the total quantity of savings available
to allocate and is consistent with the definition employed in the theoretical model.
We define the state's fungible assets available at time t ( tA ) as the real per capita
sum of the state's previous general fund position plus the state's previous real per capita
budget stabilization fund balance. The definitions and source of all the variables are
included in Table 3.1.
itR  is state i's real per capita general fund revenue at time t less any revenue
surplus at time t-1. Since general fund surpluses at time t-1 is a component of the
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Table 3.1 - Variables Employed in Political Control Empirical Model
itS  = real per capita current savings of state i at time t. [in dollars]
 1, 2, 5
itA  = real per capita assets of state i  available at time t.[in dollars]
1, 2, 5
itR  = real per capita general fund revenue of state i at time t less any
general fund revenue surplus at time t-1. [in dollars]1, 5
itr  = real interest rate of state i's twenty-year general obligation bonds
between at time t.3
1+itTURNOVER = weighted average of legislative turnover rate in state i 's lower
and upper house at time t+1. [percent *100]4
1+D itLower  = '1' if there was a change in the controlling party of state i's lower
house between time t and t+1.4
1+D itUpper  = '1' if there was a change in the controlling party of state i's upper
house between time t and t+1.4
Notes: All variables in real terms were deflated using the CPI (1992=100).
Sources:
1 Data on state general fund expenditures and revenue are from various issues of the Statistical
Abstract of the United States.
2 Data on the balance of state budget stabilization funds were obtained from each individual state.
3 The relative yield difference (from New Jersey) on twenty-year general obligation bonds was obtained
from the 'Chubb Relative Value Study', conducted biannually by the Chubb Corporation. The interest rate
for the benchmark state of New Jersey was approximated using the interest rate on Moody's index of ten-
year state general obligation bonds. See text for a thorough discussion of this variable.
4 Data on the number of members in each political party and legislative turnover rates were obtained from
various issues of the Book of States and Statistical Abstract of the United States.
5 State population data were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of the Census.
fungible assets available at time t, a collinearity problem will exist if the surplus revenue
component is not subtracted from current revenue.
Moreover, data on state-level interest rates ( itr ) were obtained from the Chubb
Relative Value Study which is conducted biannually by the Chubb Insurance Company.
This study provides information on the yield of twenty-year state general obligation
bonds relative to the benchmark state of New Jersey. Since bond yields on ten and
twenty-year municipal bonds are highly correlated, the yield on New Jersey's twenty-year
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general obligation bond is proxied using the nominal interest rate from Moody's Investor
Services index of ten-year AAA state general obligation bonds. The interest rates for all
remaining states are then computed from the New Jersey proxy using the data provided
by the Chubb Relative Value Study. 18
The probability that a legislator is reelected and part of the majority ( 1+itP ) is
proxied using three variables. The probability that a legislator is reelected is proxied
using the weighted average of legislative turnover rates ( 1+itTURNOVER ) in both houses
of the state's legislature.19 The higher the turnover rate, the less likely a given legislator is
to be reelected. Thus an increase in the turnover rate, which lowers the legislator's
probability of being reelected and part of the majority, should reduce current saving in
favor of current spending according to the theory. In addition, the probability that the
majority party retains control over is proxied using binary variables of the actual change
in the controlling party of each house in the state's legislature. If legislators are assumed
to form their expectations regarding the future rationally, which implies that on average
their expectation will be correct, we may approximate the ex ante change with the ex post
                                                
18 The starting year of my sample was determined by the fact that the Chubb Relative
Value Study did not begin until 1973. The Chubb Relative Value Study excludes the
following states which do not issue general obligation bonds: AR, AZ, CT, IA, ID, IN,
KS, NE, SD, and WY. MN is also excluded from the sample because legislators in
Minnesota were elected without party designation for several years in the sample period
making it impossible to determine the controlling party. Bayoumi et al. (1995) previously
used data from the Chubb Relative Value Study and their paper provides a more thorough
explanation of the data and survey methodology. I would like to thank Thomas Swartz of
the Chubb Insurance Company for his assistance in obtaining these data.
19 I also examined the impact of turnover rates in states' legislatures using separate
variables for both the lower house and upper house but found no qualitative difference in
the empirical results.
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information. 20 Hence, 1+D itLower  ( 1+D itUpper ) takes on the value of 1 if the lower house
(upper house) experienced a change in their controlling party between time t and t+1, and
is zero otherwise. This specification will allow us to ascertain the impact that an actual
change (as a proxy for the anticipated change) in the controlling party had on the level of
savings in a given year. According to the theory, a reduction in the probability that a
legislator will remain part of the majority will cause him to forgo current saving in favor
of current spending. Thus, we would expect 1+D itLower  and 1+D itUpper  to exhibit a
negative effect on current savings.
3.4.3 Issues in estimation
The use of a two-way fixed effects model for the empirical investigation can control for
institutional factors not explicitly addressed in the theoretical model. The theoretical
model ignores fiscal constraints such as balanced budget rules, expenditure and tax limit
rules, and does not explicitly account for credit market conditions because they are not
the primary focus of the chapter. However, there has been some evidence suggesting that
these factors influence state fiscal behavior.21 Thus it is necessary to include the state-
specific effects to control for any impact on individual states that such rules may have in
order to isolate the impact of an anticipated change in the state's controlling parties. The
                                                
20 Under the assumption of rational expectations, all values of future variables in the
empirical model were approximated using actual values.
21 Evidence that balanced budget rules affect state fiscal behavior can be found in von
Hagen (1991), Poterba (1994, 1995),  Alt and Lowry (1994), Bohn and Inman (1996),
and Levinson (1998). Evidence that expenditure and tax limitation laws influence states
can be found in Elder (1992). For research concerning the role of credit markets in
affecting state behavior, see Goldstein and Woglom (1992), Bayoumi et al. (1995), and
Poterba and Rueben (1997).
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inclusion of time-specific effects will absorb the impact that any aggregate economic
shock may have on states.
In addition, the timing of states' elections causes the values of the political
variables two periods in the future to be zero. Since the fiscal data are in fiscal years and
the political data are in calendar years, fiscal year 1995 occurs simultaneously with
election year 1994. Thus for the future political environment to affect current fiscal
behavior as the theory suggests, the 1994 election year will only impact fiscal 1994
because the election is realized when savings decisions in 1995 have been made. Hence,
the two period future values of 1+itTURNOVER , 1+D itLower , and 1+D itUpper , which
occurs simultaneously with fiscal year 1996, have no realization since the next elections
occur in the subsequent year. As a result, these political variables have been excluded
from the two future period model of equation (3.11).
Moreover, since the average real per capita savings of Alaska was $2222 during
the sample period (1973-1995) and its nearest neighbor was Delaware at $325, the choice
to include Alaska in the empirical model introduces heterogeneity which implies that
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of equation (3.11) will not be efficient.22 To
compound the problem, Cochrane-Orcutt estimates of first-order serial correlation were
computed separately for each state using the OLS residuals from both models. The results
from the one period future model are presented in Table B1 in Appendix B and illustrate
substantial heterogeneity across states. Since the data are pooled, a Generalized Methods
of Moments (GMM) estimator is used to efficiently estimate the standard errors. I assume
a general error covariance structure that allows for constant correlation within individual
                                                
22 Excluding Alaska did not change the qualitative results of the model.
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states over time and constant correlation between states over time. These assumptions
imply a covariance structure which may be written as:
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where S  is the error covariance matrix, ijs  is the covariance between the 
thi and thj
states, and I is an identity matrix with dimension T x T. This system error covariance
structure, which has dimension NT x NT, may also be expressed as IAij Ä=S s  for
Nji ,...,1, = , where A is a matrix of ones having dimension N x N and Ä  is the
Kronecker product. The GMM estimator for efficient standard errors is given by:
                                           11 )()()()ˆ( -- ¢S¢¢= XXXXXXVar b                               (3.13)
where X  is the matrix of K regressors including the constant term, state-specific effects,
and time-specific effects having dimension NT x (K+N+T-2 ).  
3.5 Estimation Results
The estimation results of equation (3.11) with heterogeneity-corrected standard errors
provide some interesting findings and are presented in Table 3.2. The model which
includes two future values of real per capita revenue and real interest rates performs
slightly better than the model which only includes values from one future period, but both
models seem to fit the data very well as indicated by the significant F-Tests (both at the 1
percent level) and 2R  in excess of 0.86.
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Table 3.2 - Impact of Political Control on States' Current Savings
Dependent Variable:  Current savings ( itS )
One future period Two future periods
Variables Sample period: 1973-1995 Sample period: 1973-1994
Constant (f ) -1962.700***
(234.964)
-2093.500***
(210.820)
itA -0.159
(0.177)
-0.150
(.108)
itR 0.811
***
(0.120)
0.881***
(0.115)
1+itR -0.076
(.106)
-0.332**
(0.142)
2+itR -- 0.252
**
(0.101)
itr -0.072(0.089)
-0.061
(0.082)
1+itr -0.039(0.089)
-0.049
(0.081)
2+itr -- -0.139
*
(0.082)
1+itTurnover 0.015(0.484)
0.160
(0.451)
1+D itLower -70.145
***
(25.540)
-66.343***
(25.241)
1+D itUpper -4.531
(55.520)
-21.020
(53.95)
F-Test
( LowerD and UpperD )
2.391* 2.409*
Sample size 897 858
F-Test (Model) 83.430*** 92.110***
2R 0.862 0.880
Notes: Significance levels are as follows: *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent
level, and * at the 10 percent level. GMM standard errors in parentheses. Both models were estimated with
fixed state-specific and time-specific effects that are not reported.
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With respect to the individual regressors, changes in the controlling parties of the
states' houses ( 1+D itLower  and 1+D itUpper ) have the largest marginal effect on savings in
both models in the direction predicted by the theory, yet only actual changes in the
controlling party of the states lower house is statistically significant. As is evident from
Table 3.2, an actual change in the controlling party of the lower house causes a reduction
in the current real per capita savings by more than 70 dollars in the one period future
model and more than 66 dollars in the two period future model, both significant at the 1
percent level. This finding is consistent with the theoretical implication that individual
legislators will opt to increase current expenditures (and forgo current savings) when they
anticipate that their ability to control the outcome in the future may be jeopardy.
Moreover, the F-test for the joint significance of LowerD  and UpperD  reveal in each
model that the variables are jointly significant at the 10 percent level. Thus, there is some
evidence that the common pool of public sector savings may make states' current savings
susceptible to systematic fluctuations. From the standpoint of policy, anticipated changes
in the state's political structure prior to a fiscal crisis may adversely impact the state's
prospects for a smooth recovery. One reason that current savings proves to be more
responsive to changes in the controlling party of the state's lower house may be that many
states require appropriations bills to originate in the lower house. 23 According to the
National Association of State Budget Offices (NASBO), fifteen states require that
spending legislation begin in the lower house and several others require that the origin of
such legislation changes between the lower and upper house with each legislative session.
                                                
23 Legislative Budget Procedures: A Guide to Appropriations and Processes in the States,
Commonwealths, and Territories, National Association of State Budget Offices.
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The variable included to capture the effect of reelection uncertainty,
1+itTURNOVER , has an estimated sign which is inconsistent with theory yet it is
insignificantly different from zero. Considering that changes in the controlling party of
the state's lower house is significant and the legislative turnover rate is not, the results
suggest that states' savings responds much stronger to changes in the specific controlling
party than simply to changes in membership.
Of the fiscal variables in the model, revenue proves to be the most significant
determinant of current savings. In both the one and two period models, per capita revenue
in the current period is significant at the 1 percent level. In the model incorporating fiscal
variables from two future periods, all revenue variables are significant, but revenue two
periods in advance ( 2+tR ) is inconsistent with the model's theory. In addition, the
estimated sign of the state's fungible assets ( tA ) is consistent with the theory, but it is
also not statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level. With the exception of the
two period in-advance interest rate ( 2+itr ) , which is significant, the interest rate facing
states proved to have very little influence on states' current savings decisions.
To summarize the empirical results, both models illustrate that current savings has
been adversely affected by actual future changes in the controlling party of states' lower
houses. This finding is consistent with the theoretical model's implication that legislators
will forgo current saving in favor of current spending in the face of uncertainty regarding
their future ability to control political outcomes, and it is also robust with respect to the
inclusion of future fiscal variables. Hence, the empirical results provide support for the
claim that legislators will increase current spending while they are ensured control over
the means of allocation if their future control is in jeopardy.
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3.6 Conclusions
States are active savers and the use of savings as a fiscal policy tool for states has
increased dramatically during the last two decades. Understanding the factors which
influence a state's current savings can provide insights regarding states' abilities to deal
with future fiscal crises. However, the decision-making process of the public sector
induces additional complexities which are not present in simliar consumer optimization
models. Since the group or political party which controls that state's legislature has
tremendous influence over political outcomes due to agenda-setting power and block-
voting, and contintuation of this power is uncertain due to systematic elections, public
sector savings suffers from the common pool problem. That is, no one political party
which currently has control over political outcomes, and thus access to savings, can ever
be certain that they will indefinitely control political outcomes in the future. If the
spending preferences between parties is different, which research by Husted and Kenny
(1997) and Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995) suggests, then expected changes in the state's
future controlling party should adversely impact current savings as legislators opt to
spend the funds while they are ensured control.
This chapter develops a simple extension of the basic LCPI model which can be
used to analyze the effect of political reelection and political control on states' current
saving. The model assumes a representative legislator that chooses the total level of
government spending in each period of their infinite life to maximize the net benefits of
government spending in his district, subject to the state's resource constraint. As the
legislator's expected probability of being reelected and part of the majority party
diminishes, and with it his chance for controlling future political outcomes, the
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legislator's optimal choice is to increase expenditures in the current period while he is
ensured control of the means of allocation. If legislator's are assumed to be homogenous,
then an anticipated change in the state's controlling party will increase the state's current
expenditures and reduce current savings. Thus if legialators form expectations rationally,
the model implies that states' current savings will be succetpible to systematic flucuations
due to changes in the state's political environment.
Using a panel of 39 states over the period from 1973 to 1995, a two-way fixed
effects model is estimated based on the theoretical model. Employing a binary variable
for both the state's upper and lower house to capture the effect of an actual change in the
future majority party, the empirical results provide evidence in support of the theory. The
estimation results reveal that a change in the future controlling party of states' lower
house is correlated with current real per capita savings falling by an average of more than
68 dollars. Thus, this chapter provides evidence that states' current savings may be
influenced systematically by changes in the state's political environment, implying that
politically stable states should, on average, save more than politically unstable states.
Thus states' abilities to mitigate fiscal stress will be influenced by anticipated changes in
states' political environments.
The next chapter examines the determinants of state budget stabilization fund
adoption and investigates the role that political control may have had on states' choices.
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Chapter 4
Determinants of State Budget Stabilization Fund Adoption
4.1 Introduction
States have dramatically expanded their use of budget stabilization funds as a source of
precautionary balances during the last twenty years. While New York became the first
state to adopt a budget stabilization fund in 1945, the majority of states did not adopt
budget stabilization funds until after 1980. Of the 44 states currently utilizing budget
stabilization funds, only 10 states adopted their stabilization fund prior to 1980.24
Although every year of the 1980s, with the exception of 1980 and 1989, witnessed states
adopting stabilization funds for the first time, the bulk of stabilization fund adoption
occurred between 1981 and 1986, when 20 states adopted funds. The conventional view
regarding the increase in stabilization fund usage that occurred during the 1980s, which
has been advocated by Gold (1983) and Sobel and Holcombe (1996a), is that states
adopted stabilization funds in response to the severity of the 1980-1982 recession. This
view holds that states adopted stabilization funds because the lack of reserves that existed
prior to the recession forced states to rely heavily on expenditure cuts and tax increases to
mitigate the recession's impact. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the factors
that influenced states' decisions to adopt budget stabilization funds.
Research by Sobel and Holcombe (1996a), Levinson (1998), and Knight and
Levinson (1999a) suggests that budget stabilization funds may be an effective means to
                                                
24 The states which do not have budget stabilization funds as of 1998 include AL, AR,
HI, IL, MT, and OR. While Alabama has a budget stabilization fund, it may only be used
for the education portion of their budget, and thus is not a stabilization account for the
state's general fund.
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enhancing a state's fiscal health. Levinson (1998) finds that states with budget
stabilization funds experienced less volatile business cycles than states that did not
possess stabilization funds, and Sobel and Holcombe (1996a) find that states with well
structured budget stabilization funds experienced fewer reductions in expenditures below
their long-run growth rate during the 1990-1991 recession than did states without
stabilization funds.
More recently, Knight and Levinson (1999a) find that states with budget
stabilization funds save more than states without budget stabilization funds and that
states' total balances are higher after adopting a budget stabilization fund, suggesting that
budget stabilization funds do in fact enhance states' fiscal positions and their abilities to
remedy revenue shortfalls.
From a theoretical standpoint it does not matter whether states save funds only in
a stabilization fund, only in the general fund, or both, since general fund surpluses and
budget stabilization fund balances earn the same market return and are both subject to
inflation risk and systematic risk. There are however several potential advantages to
retaining monies in a budget stabilization fund rather than the general fund which may
play a role in a state's decision to adopt a budget stabilization fund. First, unlike the
federal government most states face numerous fiscal constraints, such as balanced budget
laws and tax and expenditure limitation laws, which may limit their decision-makers'
options in the event of a revenue shortfall. In fact, expenditure laws in some states
mandate that a fraction of any general fund surplus be returned to citizens. Hence
adopting a budget stabilization fund may provide a state with a means to circumvent such
fiscal limitations.
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Second, a state's decision-makers may collectively decide to save funds in a
budget stabilization fund as opposed to the general fund as a means to avoid political
manipulation by legislators for self-gain since greater restrictions can be placed on the
use of budget stabilization fund balances than can be placed on general fund balances.
Political manipulation of a state's stock of savings may occur in a number of ways. First,
Weingast et al. (1981) developed a model in which legislators have a strong incentive to
spend more than is efficient since the political structure (i.e. political districts) allows
legislators to provide centralized benefits of government expenditures with decentralized
costs. The excess spending in their model derives from the fact that the public sector tax
base is a common pool. In fact, Weingast et al. show that the difference between the
efficient level of government spending and the actual level of government spending
increases as the number of political districts increases because the opportunities to
localize the benefits of government spending while spreading the costs expand.
An empirical test of the Weingast et al. model, conducted by Gilligan and
Matsusaka (1995) using state-level data over the period from 1960-1990, found that
expenditures are positively correlated with the number of seats in the upper house of a
state's legislature.25 So if legislators face a strong incentive to spend excessively, the
demands they place on surplus funds may be quite high. Thus, one political motive for
adopting a budget stabilization fund may represent somewhat of a prisoner's dilemma
scenario. Individually, legislators may each prefer to spend any general fund surplus in
accordance with her preferences. However, given Sobel's (1998) finding that expenditure
                                                
25 Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995) also find that the level of state government spending is
greater than can be explained by variables reflecting constituent interests which suggests
that the spending may be inefficiently high.
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reductions and tax increases significantly increased states' legislative turnover rates, the
potential benefits to legislators from saving the funds may be so high that legislators opt
to establish a stabilization fund to retain surplus funds.
The notion that individuals may voluntarily select collective constraints governing
their behavior is not a novel idea. As Buchanan (1990, p. 4) has noted:
"It is essential to acknowledge, near the outset of the discussion, that individuals
choose to impose constraints or limits on their own behavior primarily, if not
exclusively, as part of an exchange in which the benefits they are anticipated from
the reciprocally extended restrictions on the actions of others with whom they
interact along the boundaries of private spaces and within the confines of
acknowledged public spaces."
The fact that most states now have budget stabilization funds may arise from the
cooperative agreement of individual legislators, despite the fact that each may increase
his or her own utility by spending surplus funds. Buchanan also notes that "a necessary
condition for cooperation in social interaction is the prospect for positive expected gains
by all parties, or, in the gainer-loser terminology, the prospect that there be no net losers."
Thus if states' decision-makers perceive budget stabilization funds as a viable means of
saving which ensures positive gains to all involved, they may collectively agree to
establish a reserve account.
Next, general fund surpluses may also succumb to political manipulation as a
result of the common pool problem associated with public sector savings. Since
legislators who control the political outcome have the means to allocate spending as they
desire, an anticipated change in the state's controlling parties may adversely affect the
current level of savings because legislators in control may decide to spend existing
balances and reduce current saving while they are ensured the voting power to dictate the
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composition of spending. Chapter 3, which estimates a panel of states over the period
from 1973-1995, finds empirical support for this claim. However, the results from
Chapter 3 illustrate the impact of a one-time anticipated change in states' controlling
parties on states' current level of savings. The findings of Chapter 3 imply that over a
much longer period of time states which have experienced more changes in political
control will witness greater reductions in their current savings than states which have
been politically stable, all other factors constant. This suggests that if states' decision-
makers are aware that they may be better off when the funds are saved, meaning no "net
losers" in the spirit of Buchanan, then states which have experienced more changes in
political control over the long-run will have more to gain from saving than states which
have experienced very little long-term political instability. As a result, decision-makers in
states that have a long-run problem with political instability may establish a stabilization
account in an effort to reduce political manipulation resulting from the common pool
problem.
A final potential advantage of budget stabilization funds is that states' decision-
makers may perceive such instruments as a means to continue, or enhance, fiscal
discipline. States' decision-makers that have not had the fiscal discipline necessary to
save monies in the general fund may choose to adopt a budget stabilization fund in the
hopes of enhancing their fiscal health. In contrast, states whose legislators are committed
to saving may decide to adopt a budget stabilization fund as a way to ensure fiscal health
is maintained. Moreover, since bond rating agencies consider a state's ability to mitigate
periods of fiscal stress in their rating calculus, a state's decision-makers may decide to
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utilize a budget stabilization fund as a way to ensure the state's bond ratings are not
lowered.
Using data on the year of adoption for each state's budget stabilization fund, a
panel probit model is estimated over the period from 1945-1996 to examine the role that
state fiscal limitations, economic conditions, political climate, and commitment to saving
have had on states' decisions to adopt stabilization funds. The empirical results provide
evidence consistent with the notion that political control has influenced states' choices. I
find that states which have experienced more changes in political control over the
previous twenty years are more likely to adopt budget stabilization funds. This suggests
that decision-makers in states that have a long-term problem with political instability may
see budget stabilization funds as a means to reduce systematic political manipulation of
their savings.
The estimates also reveal evidence consistent with a political prisoner's dilemma
motive for adopting a stabilization fund since the number of seats in states' upper houses
is positively correlated with adoption. In addition, I also find that states hit harder during
recessions are more likely to adopt stabilization funds, which is likely to explain a
fraction of the large number of adoptions that occurred during the 1980s. However, the
empirical results also indicate that the existence of both tax and expenditure limitation
laws significantly increases the probability a state will adopt a budget stabilization fund.
This finding is important because it provides evidence that many states which adopted
stabilization funds in the mid-1980s probably did so in response to the 'tax revolt' rather
than the 1980-1982 recession. Finally, I find that the unpredictability of states' revenue
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over the business cycle and the state's current fiscal condition are also significant
determinants of stabilization fund adoption.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 briefly examines
states' saving and their reliance on budget stabilization funds, Section 4.3 outlines the
empirical methodology, Section 4.4 presents the empirical results, and Section 4.5
concludes the chapter.
4.2 States' Reliance on Budget Stabilization Funds
While states save to help mitigate periods of fiscal stress, the motivation for doing so may
be as much political as it is economic. In the absence of savings, states must either use
deficit financing (when permitted) and/or rely on expenditure reductions and tax
increases to remedy revenue shortfalls.26 Given Sobel's (1998) finding that expenditure
reductions and tax increases significantly increased states' legislative turnover rates,
states' decision-makers would appear to face a strong incentive to save as an additional
option to weather recessions. Relying heavily on tax increases and expenditure reductions
during an economic downturn could prolong the recession by reducing private sector
expenditures. Moreover, the issuance of new debt, while potentially beneficial in the
short-run, may be harmful if systematically selected as a policy choice if a state's bond
ratings are reduced since the state will face increased costs for capital investment and
other borrowing in the future.
                                                
26 According to Gold (1995) and Fisher (1996) states may also rely on accounting
gimmicks, such as accelerating tax collections, to temporarily delay deficits.
69
The majority of aggregate state savings continues to be retained in the general
fund despite the dramatic increase in the number of states utilizing budget stabilization
funds over the last two decades. Cross-sectional evidence that states' general funds are
the primary instrument of saving is provided in Table 4.1, which reports fiscal-year-end
balances of each state's stabilization fund and general fund. Only 12 states had budget
stabilization fund balances at the end of fiscal year 1996 that exceeded the state's general
fund balance. In fact as Figure 4.1 shows, since 1975 the aggregate share of total balances
retained in budget stabilization funds has rarely been higher than 50 percent. Over this
period states have retained an average of slightly more than 20 percent of total balances
in budget stabilization funds. The large dip in Figure 4.1 which occurred in fiscal year
Figure 4.1 - Aggregate Budget  Stabilization Fund Balances as a Percentage of
Aggregate Total Balances 1975-1996
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Notes: Only includes states which have stabilization funds.
1992, is the result of a small aggregate general fund deficit and a larger positive
aggregate stabilization fund balance. Since only 29 states are prohibited by balanced
budget laws from running general fund deficits in a given fiscal year, the fiscal strain
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generated by the recession resulted in many states witnessing significant deficits in their
general fund along with massive reductions in budget stabilization fund balances.
While monies retained in budget stabilization funds represent a minority of total
balances in the aggregate, states' experiences with stabilization funds are suggestive that
their decision-makers believe they are a useful means of saving. As is evident from Table
4.1, California, Iowa, and New Mexico each utilized a stabilization fund, which was
authorized annually by appropriations legislation, prior to formal adoption. In fact, New
Mexico began utilizing their stabilization fund informally 12 years before the fund was
continuously adopted. One would imagine that if the decision-makers in these states did
not obtain benefits from utilizing a budget stabilization fund, they could have simply
chosen not to make the fund a continuous account.
Additional anecdotal evidence of decision-makers' perception of stabilization
fund effectiveness may be derived from the fact that several states have adopted multiple
funds and no state has removed a stabilization fund without replacing the fund with a
similar vehicle for saving. In Idaho for example, a stabilization fund was initially adopted
in 1984, which was entitled the Budget Reserve Fund, but this fund was replaced July 1,
1999 by the Budget Stabilization Fund. Both the Budget Reserve Fund and Budget
Stabilization Fund served the purpose of providing fungible balances, but the Budget
Stabilization Fund placed greater restrictions on the manner in which funds are to be
deposited and withdrawn. 27
                                                
27 See Idaho Code 59.814.
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Table 4.1 - Adoption Dates of State Budget Stabilization Funds
State Fund Name Year of first
Use
Year of formal
Adoption
Real per capita BSF
balance 1996 †
Real per capita General
Fund balance 1996
AK Budget Reserve Fund 1986 1986
AK Constitutional Budget Reserve 1990 1990 $6.49 $2534.38
AL -- -- -- -- -$20.64
AZ Budget Stabilization Fund 1990 1990 $47.64 $10.01
AR -- -- -- -- $195.14
CA Special Fund for Economic
Uncertainties
1976 1985 $3.12 -$17.00
CO Required Fund Balance
(non-accumulating)
1983 1983 $36.74 $131.65
CT Budget Reserve Fund 1979 1979 $22.25 $171.71
DE Budget Reserve Account 1977 1977 $109.75 $474.51
FL Working Capital Fund 1959 1959
FL Budget Stabilization Fund 1992 1992 $25.89 -$39.36
GA Revenue Shortfall Reserve 1976 1976 $38.41 -$29.91
HI -- -- -- -- $113.42
ID Budget Stabilization Fund 1984 1984 $24.19 $168.36
IL -- -- -- -- $16.31
IN Counter-Cyclical Revenue and
Economic Stabilization Fund
1982 1982 $68.61 $100.38
IA Cash Reserve Fund 1984 1994
IA Economic Emergency Fund 1984 1992 $113.65 -$15.88
KY Budget Reserve Trust Fund
Account
1983 1983 $46.80 $226.51
KS General Fund Ending Balance 1993 1993 $0 $68.90
LA Revenue Stabilization and Mineral
Trust Fund
1990 1990 $0 -$157.00
ME Rainy Day Fund 1985 1985 $27.78 $73.45
MD Revenue Stabilization Account 1986 1986 $82.63 $117.53
MA Commonwealth Stabilization Fund 1986 1986 $80.49 $8.15
MI Countercyclical Budget and
Economic Stabilization Fund
1977 1977 $107.66 $45.65
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State Fund Name Year of first
Use
Year of formal
Adoption
Real per capita BSF
balance 1996 †
Real per capita General
Fund balance 1996
MN Budget Reserve Account 1981 1981
MN Cash Flow Account 1995 1995 $111.59 $87.72
MS Working Cash Stabilization Reserve
Fund
1982 1982 $68.36 $7.99
MO Budget Stabilization Fund 1992 1992 $4.91 $215.42
MT -- -- -- -- $106.23
NC Savings Reserve Account 1991 1991 $61.84 $78.63
ND Budget Stabilization Fund 1987 1987 $0 $398.64
NE Cash Reserve Fund 1983 1983 $9.91 $117.62
NH Revenue Stabilization Reserve
Account
1987 1987 $15.58 $105.19
NJ Surplus Revenue Fund 1990 1990 $30.79 $65.60
NY Tax Stabilization Reserve Fund 1945 1945
NY Constitutional Reserve Fund 1993 1993 $11.75 $116.73
NM Tax Stabilization Reserve 1966 1978 $61.28 $50.76
NV Budget Stabilization Designation 1994 1994 $69.21 $68.65
OH Budget Stabilization Fund 1981 1981 $67.56 $79.53
OK Constitutional Reserve Fund 1985 1985 $31.36 $66.95
OR -- -- -- -- $91.98
PA Tax Stabilization Reserve Fund 1985 1985 $13.81 $28.29
RI Budget Reserve and Cash
Stabilization Account
1985 1985 $48.22 -$49.41
SC General Reserve Fund 1978 1978
SC Capital Reserve Fund 1986 1986 $48.76 -$102.32
SD Budget Reserve Fund 1991 1991 $22.33 $30.68
TN Revenue Fluctuation Reserve 1972 1972 $17.26 -$63.85
TX Economic Stabilization Fund 1987 1987 $0.37 $51.48
UT Budget Reserve Account 1986 1986 $31.88 $75.02
VA Revenue Stabilization Fund 1992 1992 $11.52 $42.03
VT Budget Stabilization Trust Fund 1988 1988 $7.44 $49.60
WA Emergency Reserve Fund 1981 1981 $0 -$64.32
WI Required Reserve 1981 1981
WI Budget Stabilization Fund 1985 1985 $102.23 $144.12
WV Revenue Shortfall Reserve Fund 1994 1994 $27.03 $105.27
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State Fund Name Year of first
Use
Year of formal
Adoption
Real per capita BSF
balance 1996 †
Real per capita General
Fund balance 1996
WY Budget Reserve Account 1982 1982 $8.03 $368.04
Source: Phone survey of states.
† For states with multiple funds, per capita budget stabilization fund balance is the sum of all funds.
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Given that previous research and states' uses of budget stabilization funds over
time suggest that they are an effective means to enhancing saving, it is somewhat
surprising that not all states have selected to utilize stabilization funds. The following
section of the chapter outlines the empirical methodology used to investigate the
determinants of state budget stabilization fund adoption.
4.3 Empirical Methodology
4.3.1 Empirical model
To investigate the determinants of state budget stabilization fund adoption, a panel probit
model is estimated over the period from 1945-1996.28 Since it is of primary interest to
examine the determinants of states' decisions to adopt budget stabilization funds, we
assume that once a state has adopted a budget stabilization fund it becomes an
irreversible choice. That is, once a state adopts a budget stabilization fund no further
observations from the state are included in the sample. The results from the model are
therefore conditional on never having adopted a stabilization fund. 29 The interpretation of
the estimated parameters isolates the role the exogenous variables played in influencing a
                                                
28 The dates of first use rather than formal adoption are used in the empirical model (see
Table 4.1). In addition, states that have multiple stabilization funds are included in the
model using the date the first fund was adopted. A panel probit model was selected over a
parametric or Cox proportional hazard model because both types of hazard models
require the selection of an explicit starting date and the Cox proportional model further
assumes that the baseline hazard is the same for each state at a given point in time.
29 Moreover, excluding observations after a state adopts greatly simplifies the empirical
methodology due to the possibility of simultaneity bias. If one or more of the regressors
in the model changes after a state adopts a fund, then a simultaneous equations
framework must by employed.
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state's choice to adopt a stabilization rather than their role in influencing a state's decision
to adopt and retain a stabilization fund.
The general form of the model estimated may be expressed as:
                               TtNixy ititit ,...,1;,...,1for 
* ==+= eb .     (4.1)
where itx  is a k-dimensional vector of observed exogenous variables, b  is an unknown
parameter vector to be estimated, N is the state index, T is the time index, and ite  is the
unobserved disturbance assumed to be distributed i.i.d. N(0, 2s ).30 In addition, we do not
observe *ity  directly, rather we observe a censored form of 
*
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Given the assumption placed on the disturbance term, we may express as the
conditional probability of adopting a budget stabilization fund as
prob( )(),1 bb itit xxy F== , where F  denotes the standard normal cumulative
distribution function. The log-likelihood function for this problem may then be written
as:
   .}])(1[ln)1()(ln{);,(
11
åå
==
F--+F=
T
t
itititit
N
i
xyxyxy bbb          (4.3)
                                                
30 Relaxing the assumption of error independence was investigated by assuming the
commonly employed random effects panel probit model. The estimate of the
equicorrelation coefficient, computed using Butler's and Moffit's (1982) Hermite
integration technique, could not be rejected as significantly different from zero at
conventional confidence levels.
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From the log likelihood function it is possible to show that the pooled probit estimator is
given by:31
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In addition to estimating the parameter vector that maximizes the log-likelihood
function, marginal effects of the exogenous variables on the probability of adoption are
also computed at the mean of the regressors. From the log-likelihood function expressed
in equation (4.3), we may write the marginal coefficient vector as bbfd )( itx= , where
f  is the standard normal density function and itx  is the mean vector of the regressors.
The next section of the chapter describes the regressors employed in the model
and the estimation results are subsequently presented in Section 4.4.
4.3.2 Factors in stabilization fund adoption
4.3.2.1 Political Factors
As alluded to in the introduction of this chapter, a state's inability to save in the general
fund due to political manipulation by legislators for self-gain may represent an influential
factor in states' decisions to adopt a stabilization fund. If a state's decision-makers have
an incentive to spend inefficiently and therefore place high demands on surplus balances,
legislators may collectively decide to save these surplus balances in a budget stabilization
fund if the benefits to doing so are high enough even though each legislator may
individually prefer to spend the surplus. To account for the prisoner's dilemma motive for
                                                
31 Recently, Bertschek and Lechner (1998) have shown that a class of GMM estimators
attains greater efficiency than does the pooled estimator. Despite the inefficiency of the
pooled estimator, Avery et al. (1983) have shown that it remains consistent.
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adopting a stabilization fund when legislators face an incentive to spend inefficiently, the
number of seats in the lower house and upper house of each state's legislature is included
in the model. We use the number of members as a proxy for the number of seats. The
number of members is obtained from various issues of the Statistical Abstract of the
United States and the Book of States.
Moreover, the common pool problem associated with public sector savings may
make such balances susceptible to political manipulation. Since legislators with the
ability to control the political outcome determine the manner in which public sector funds
are allocated, a legislator may opt to forgo current saving in favor of current spending if
his prospects for controlling the political outcome in the future diminish. In short,
legislators may face an incentive to spend funds when they are ensured control over the
allocation of such funds. Thus to avoid such political manipulation of savings, legislators
may collectively opt to retain funds in a budget stabilization fund since such accounts can
be structured to reduce discretionary influence. While the empirical results from Chapter
3 provide an estimate of the impact of a one-time, or short-run, anticipated change in the
controlling parties of states' legislatures on the current level of savings, the incentive to
adopt a budget stabilization fund as means to reduce political manipulation will be
dependent on the long-run experience of states. All other factors constant, a state which
has witnessed more political instability than another state will, on average, have a lower
level of current savings. Since all legislators may benefit from having reserve balances
available during a contraction, decision-makers in states which have experienced more
political instability over the long-run will have more to gain from saving and thus may be
more likely to choose to constrain their own behavior by adopting a budget stabilization
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fund. To account for the impact of political control, the total number of changes in the
controlling party of both states' houses over the previous twenty-year period is included
in the model. We would expect that states which have experienced more changes in
political control over the long-run to be more likely to adopt a stabilization fund, ceteris
paribus, since the decision-makers in these states have more to gain from saving relative
to decision-makers in states which are politically stable.32
4.3.2.2 Fiscal Constraints
In addition to political motives, states face a complex set of fiscal constraints which may
limit their ability to raise revenue in the short-run, and thus may increase the likelihood
that a state will adopt a budget stabilization fund. One such constraint that has been
shown to be correlated with state fiscal behavior is balanced budget laws. While balanced
budget laws are aimed at controlling public sector deficits, most states' laws are imposed
prior to the start of the fiscal year and thus impose no significant constraint on states'
fiscal behavior (ACIR, 1987). The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
                                                
32 The choice to model a twenty-year time period is derived from the fact that exploring
the impact of long-term political stability requires a sufficiently long time period. The
lack of data on the composition of states' legislatures prior to 1936 limited the time period
that could be employed. The total number of changes in political control in 1945 is the
sum of the number of changes in the state's lower house and upper house between 1936
and 1944. Figures for 1946 to 1955 were computed using data from 1936 to one year
prior to each respective year. Beginning in 1956 and continuing to 1996, figures were
computed using the previous twenty-year period. In addition, I also explored using
separate variables for the state's lower and upper house, but the number of changes in
each house was highly positively correlated over such a long time horizon. Estimating the
model separately with only the lower house and only the upper house revealed that each
was significant at the 10 percent level; however, when the number of changes in both the
lower house and upper house were included neither was significant due to the correlation
between them. As a result, I have chosen to include the sum of the number of changes in
the lower house and upper house.
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has classified state balanced budget laws into five categories. First, the state's governor is
required to submit a balanced budget; second, the state's legislature is required to adopt a
balanced budget; third, the state may carry a budget deficit into the next fiscal year so
long as it to be corrected in the upcoming fiscal year; fourth, the state may not carry
forward a budget deficit into the next budget cycle; and finally, the state may not carry
forward a budget deficit into the next fiscal year. Of these five categories, only the
categories that prohibit deficits to be carried forward into future fiscal years or future
budget cycles impose end-of-the-year limits.
Empirical evidence by Poterba (1994), Alt and Lowry (1994), Bohn and Inman
(1996), and Levinson (1998) suggests that strict balanced budget rules, such as those
which require fiscal-year-end adjustments, have more influence on decision-makers'
fiscal behavior than less stringent laws. In particular, Poterba (1994) finds that in
response to a $100 unanticipated shock, states with stringent balanced budget rules adjust
expenditures and taxes a total of $120 dollars. This is consistent with the findings of
Bohn and Inman (1996) and Alt and Lowry (1994), who find that states with strict
balanced budget rules are associated with higher levels of per capita savings. Bohn and
Inman also find that the annual probability of running a deficit is smaller for states with
strict anti-deficit rules, and they claim that these states use savings as a means to ensure
that fiscal limits do not bind. Thus the evidence seems to suggest that states with stringent
balanced budget rules in place may be more likely to adopt budget stabilization funds
than states with weak balanced budget rules since the states with strict rules are precluded
from deficit financing and thus may have a greater demand for precautionary balances to
avoid spending cuts and/or tax increases during recessions. To account for the potential
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influence of state balanced budget rules, a binary variable is constructed to coincide with
each of the ACIR's (1987) five categories of balanced budget rules.33 We would expect
stringent balanced budget rules to be positively correlated with states' adoption choice,
and weak balanced budget rules to be uncorrelated with stabilization fund adoption,
ceteris paribus.
In addition to controlling for specific balanced budget rules, Bohn and Inman
(1996) find that enforcement of fiscal rules is also a significant factor affecting state
fiscal behavior. They find that elected supreme courts, rather than appointed supreme
courts, are associated with larger state general fund surpluses, suggesting that outsiders
are more likely to enforce existing fiscal rules. To control for the potential impact of
supreme court oversight, a binary variable is included in the model and equal to unity of
the state has an elected supreme court, and equals zero otherwise. Data on whether state
supreme courts are elected or appointed are from Bohn and Inman (1996) and are
assumed to be constant over time.
Moreover, states' choices of savings instruments may also be influenced by the
existence of expenditure and tax limitation laws. Despite the somewhat mixed empirical
evidence regarding the ability of expenditure and tax limitation laws to limit the growth
in public sector spending, both types of constraints have the potential to be tremendously
                                                
33 Each state's balanced budget classification is from ACIR (1987). In addition, the
ACIR's study indicates that many states' balanced budget rules have been in place since
the 19th century, and only Tennessee's classification changed from 'weak' to stringent in
1977, which is after they adopted their stabilization fund. Thus, the balanced budget rule
binary variables for each state are constant throughout the sample period.
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influential as to the manner in which states save.34 In the case of revenue limitation laws,
states may find their ability to increase revenue greatly hampered in a severe recession. In
addition, while expenditure limitation laws are aimed at limiting the growth in spending,
many such laws place restraints on general fund surpluses. California's expenditure
limitation law, which is commonly known as Proposition 13, requires one-half of any
general fund surplus to be returned to citizens. Clearly if California's decision-makers are
committed to saving, doing so only using the general fund may not be feasible. Thus,
states with such general fund restrictions should be more likely to adopt budget
stabilization funds than states without such restrictions, ceteris paribus. Binary variables
are included in the empirical model to control for the existence of tax and expenditure
limitation laws. The dates of adoption for tax and expenditure limitation laws were
obtained from the National Conference of State Legislature's (NCSL) State Tax and
Expenditure Limits, 1998.
4.3.2.3 Revenue Issues
In addition to balanced budget rules and tax and expenditure limitation laws, a state's
ability to generate revenue will also be dependent on its existing tax structure and tax
collections. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) computes
an index of each state's tax effort, which is the ratio of actual state tax collections to the
                                                
34 For evidence that tax and expenditure limitation laws are not binding see Abrams and
Dugan (1986), Cox and Lowery (1990), and Bails (1990). Evidence of their effectiveness
can be found in Dugan (1988), Stansel (1994), Ruben (1995), and Elder (1992).
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state's tax capacity. 35 A tax index greater than 100 (which is the base) signifies that a
state's ability to generate additional revenue through taxation may be reaching its limit.
All other factors constant, states with higher ACIR tax efforts should find it more
difficult to increase tax revenue in the event of a revenue shortfall, and thus may be more
likely to adopt a budget stabilization fund. Since the ACIR's tax effort index is not
computed prior to 1967 and is also not computed annually, each state's average tax effort
is computed based on the ACIR's reported figures that range from 1967 to 1988.
Aside from fiscal and political motives, the fact that many states adopted budget
stabilization funds around the time of the recession of the early 1980s is indicative that
fiscal stress played a role in many states' decisions to adopt stabilization funds, and thus
must also be explored as a potential determinant. While many factors may contribute to
state fiscal stress, Holcombe and Sobel (1997) have convincingly argued that the primary
cause of state fiscal stress is the short-run variability of state revenue streams. During
economic downturns, tax bases tend to contract which adversely impacts state revenue
streams. Thus, a measure of the short-run correlation between a state's revenue and the
state's business cycle will provide a measure of how a state's revenue stream will respond
to an economic downturn. 36
To obtain an measure of each state's short-run revenue variability, I follow the
methodology of Sobel and Holcombe (1996b). Using a twenty-year rolling sample, the
                                                
35 The ACIR determines the state's tax capacity based on the state's tax revenue if taxes
were imposed on twenty-six commonly used tax bases. For more information see ACIR
(1990), 1988 State Fiscal Capacity and Effort.
36 For a discussion regarding the difference between the long-run and short-run variability
of revenue streams, see Sobel and Holcombe (1996b).
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following equation is estimated for each state:
     iii PIR eba +D+=D lnln         (4.5)
where iR  is the real general fund revenue of state i  and iPI  is the total real personal
income of state i . The estimate of b , which Sobel and Holcombe (1996b) refer to as the
short-run elasticity, is a measure of the responsiveness (cyclical variability) of state
revenue to changes in personal income.37 If the estimate of b  is greater than unity, then
the state's general fund revenue varies more than personal income, indicating that the
state's revenue growth should slow more than the state's economy during a contraction.
Thus, one would expect a state with more variable revenue to be more likely to adopt a
stabilization fund, ceteris paribus.
While the responsiveness of a state's revenue stream to changes in the state's
business cycle is an important indicator of the potential revenue shortfall a state may face
during an economic downturn, cyclical variability in a state's economy is also an
important variability measure. For example, a state whose economy does not vary much
in response to shocks, but whose revenue varies highly with changes in the state's
economy, may be more likely to adopt a stabilization fund than a state whose economy
varies highly in response to a shock, but whose revenue does not much vary much with
                                                
37 Since a consistent series for state personal income is not available prior to 1929, each
state's estimate of b  for 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, and 1949 were obtained by estimating
equation (4.5) over the period from 1929 to the each respective year. Beginning in 1950
and continuing until 1996, the estimates were obtained from the sample period 1930-
1950, updated by one period each year. General fund revenue for each state were
obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, state personal income data
were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and all nominal values were
deflated using the CPI (1992=100).
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changes in the state's business cycle. Thus, to account for cyclical variability in a state's
economy, a twenty-year moving sample of each state's standard deviation of the growth
in real personal income is included in the empirical model. 38 All other factors constant,
one would expect states with more variable economies to be more likely to adopt a
budget stabilization fund.
An additional important indicator of variability for states is the variability of
revenue over the business cycle that is caused by non-cyclical factors. As Sobel and
Holcombe (1996b) note, the estimated standard error of the short-run elasticity of
revenue obtained from equation (4.5), provides a measure of the variability of a state's
revenue over the business cycle due to non-cyclical factors. While the estimate of b
from equation (4.5) provides information regarding how a state's revenue stream changes
as a result of the cyclical variability in the state's economy, the standard error ofb  is a
measure of the predictability of the cyclical variability of a state's revenue. To control for
the variability in revenue generated by non-cyclical factors, the estimated standard errors
of each state's short-run elasticity estimate is included as a regressor in the model. States
whose cyclical variability of revenue is less predictable, and thus have larger estimated
standard errors of their short-run elasticity of revenue, should have a higher demand for
precautionary balances and hence be more likely to adopt a budget stabilization, ceteris
paribus.
                                                
38 The variance of states' real growth in personal income was also employed in the panel
probit model and there was no significant change in the results. Since a consistent series
for state personal income is not available prior to 1929, each state's standard deviation of
real personal income growth for 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, and 1949 were obtained by
computing the standard deviation using data over the period from 1929 to the each
respective year. Beginning in 1950 and continuing until 1996, the estimates were
obtained from the sample period 1930-1950, updated by one period each year.
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While the variability measures capture the cyclical variation in state revenue, the
cyclical variation in the state's economy, and the non-cyclical variation in revenue, none
of these measures will capture the actual severity states experienced during contractions.
For example, two states that have the same cyclical variation (as measured by the
standard deviation of their growth in personal income) in their economy could have
substantially different recession experiences. During a recession, one state's real personal
income growth could fluctuate highly, but be positive, while another state's real personal
income growth could fluctuate the same amount but be negative. In each case the cyclical
variability measure will be the same, but the state which experienced negative growth in
real personal income suffered more during the recession than did the state experiencing
positive growth. Thus to account for the severity of recessions, a five-year moving
average of the growth in states' real personal incomes is included as a regressor. A five-
year moving average was selected because states' decision-makers may be making
choices influenced by contractions for several years following the contraction. A priori,
one would expect that if the severity of a recession has influenced states' choice to adopt
a budget stabilization fund, then states will be more likely to adopt a budget stabilization
fund when the state's average real personal income growth is lower, all other factors
constant. Thus, a negative coefficient estimate for this variable would indicate that states
are more likely to adopt budget stabilization during, or just following, contractionary
periods.
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4.3.2.4 Fiscal Preferences
Decision-makers' fiscal discipline and commitment to saving may also influence their
decision to adopt a budget stabilization fund. For example, states that are large savers and
are committed to saving may adopt a budget stabilization fund as a way to ensure the
state continues saving. On the other hand, states whose decision-makers have not been
actively saving may see a budget stabilization fund as a means to instill fiscal discipline
and commit them to saving. Since Bohn and Inman (1996) have found that state per
capita savings is highly correlated with the fiscal constraints states face, simply including
per capita savings in the model would likely induce collinearity problems. Thus, to proxy
each state's fiscal discipline, a fixed time-effects panel model is estimated in which states'
per capita savings is regressed on state balanced budget rules, revenue and expenditure
limitation laws, debt restrictions, and the variability measures described in the preceding
paragraphs.39 The difference between each state's actual saving and predicted saving is
then included in the panel probit model as a proxy for the state's fiscal discipline. A
negative coefficient estimate for this variable would indicate that a state which is
currently saving less than what their fiscal constraints would predict is more likely to
adopt a budget stabilization, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, a positive coefficient
estimate would imply that a state which is currently saving more than their fiscal
                                                
39 The debt categories included in the fixed effects panel model are from Kiewiet and
Szakaly (1996). Since Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996) found state debt restrictions to be
correlated with the level of state debt, debt restrictions are not included in the panel probit
model to avoid collinearity problems with the ratio of debt to personal income. However,
estimates were completed using debt restrictions and the ratio of debt to personal income
and none of the coefficients of the debt restrictions were statistically different from zero.
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constraints would predict is more likely to adopt a budget stabilization fund, all other
factors constant.
  The final variable included in the panel probit model is a proxy for the state's
credit worthiness. State bond ratings are tightly linked to the state's credit worthiness, and
bond ratings are a central component of public sector financing. If a state's bond ratings
are lowered, then capital investment costs for the state rise. A state's decision-makers
may see budget stabilization funds as a way to improve the state's bond rating, or at least
maintain current ratings. As Oregon's Director of Debt Management has noted, "bond
rating companies look to see if there are revenue balances or reserves, which could be
called upon in the event of revenue shortfalls. The ending general fund balance and a
stabilization fund are the most common forms of available monies to meet an issuer's
contingencies."40 Given Bayoumi et al.'s (1995) finding that the ratio of debt to personal
income is negatively correlated with state bond yields, each state's ratio of real gross debt
to personal income is included as a proxy for the state's credit worthiness. A positive
coefficient estimate for this variable would indicate that states that are likely to have good
credit ratings are more likely to adopt a budget stabilization, all other factors constant. In
contrast, a negative coefficient estimate for this variable would indicate that state's which
are likely to have lower credit ratings are more likely to adopt a stabilization fund, ceteris
paribus.
                                                
40 From a "Testimony in Support of a Budget Stabilization Fund," given by Chuck Smith
to Oregon's Senate Budget Committee. The entire testimony is available from URL
http://www.ost.state.or.us/testimony/onsfund.htm [Accessed 20 September 1999].
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4.4 Empirical Results
The maximum likelihood coefficient and marginal coefficient estimates of the panel
probit model are presented in Table 4.2 and provide some interesting insights. First,
stringent balanced budget rules and the enforcement of fiscal rules (elected supreme
court) are uncorrelated with states' decisions to adopt budget stabilization funds.
However, when the state's legislature is merely required to adopt a balanced budget at the
beginning of the fiscal year, the state is significantly less likely to adopt a stabilization
fund. This may be due to the fact that when deficit financing is permitted, the state's
decision-makers are not forced to engage in the politically costly actions of reducing
expenditures and/or increasing taxes.
From the variability measures, only the variability of states' revenue due to non-
cyclical factors is correlated with adopting a budget stabilization fund. Thus, while the
cyclical variability in states' economies and the cyclical variability of revenue over the
business cycle are uncorrelated with states' decisions, states which have more non-
cyclical variability in their revenue streams over the business cycle (as measured by the
standard error of the state's short-run elasticity of revenue with respect to the state's
business cycle) are more likely to adopt stabilization funds than states with more
predictable variability, other factors constant. In fact, the standard error of states' short-
run elasticity of revenue has the largest marginal effect on states' adoption choices. A one
unit increase in a state's standard error (a reduction in the predictability of cyclical
variation) increases the probability the state will adopt a budget stabilization fund by
nearly 3 percent, ceteris paribus.
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Table 4.2 - Determinants of State Budget Stabilization Fund Adoption
Variables Coefficient estimates Marginal coefficient
estimates
Constant -1.565*
(0.858)
-3.680
(2.263)
Fiscal Constraints
Governor submits balanced budget -0.170
(0.351)
-0.401
(0.828)
Legislature adopts balanced budget -0.863***
(0.313)
-2.029***
(0.769)
Deficit corrected in upcoming fiscal year 0.365
(0.243)
0.859
(0.594)
Deficit not permitted in next fiscal year -0.431
(0.323)
-1.015
(0.757)
Deficit not permitted in next budget cycle -0.369
(0.294)
-0.868
(0.691)
ACIR tax effort -0.012
(0.008)
-0.030
(0.019)
Elected supreme court -0.066
(0.181)
-0.155
(0.425)
Revenue limitation law 0.851**
(0.374)
2.001**
(0.993)
Expenditure limitation law 1.081***
(0.301)
2.543***
(0.822)
Fiscal Preferences
Difference between actual and predicted savings 0.002***
(0.0007)
0.005***
(0.002)
Ratio of real gross debt to real personal income -1.135**
(0.484)
-2.670**
(1.040)
Variability Measures
Std. error of short-run elasticity of total revenue 1.241**
(0.492)
2.917**
(1.287)
Std. deviation of real personal income growth -0.081 -0.192
Short-run elasticity of total revenue with respect to state
business cycle
(0.074)
0.113
(0.186)
(0.171)
0.267
(0.440)
5-year moving average of real PI growth -0.071*
(0.036)
-0.167*
(0.087)
Political Factors
Number of seats in lower house -0.0001
(0.001)
-0.0002
(0.003)
Number of seats in upper house 0.022**
(0.010)
0.052**
(0.025)
Total number of changes in controlling parties over
previous twenty years
0.040*
(0.022)
0.095*
(0.056)
Sample size 1849
Log-likelihood -159.06
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.17
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are as follows: *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level,
** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level. Marginal coefficients and their standard errors are reported times
100.
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In addition, the measure of the severity of recessions, the five-year moving
average of states' real personal income growth, is negative and significant at the 10
percent level. This is consistent with the notion that recessions have played a role in
states' choices. The marginal coefficient indicates that a 1 percent reduction in a state's
five-year average growth rate in personal income increases the likelihood that a state will
adopt a stabilization fund by .167 percent. Despite the small magnitude of the estimated
marginal coefficient, this results lends evidence in support of Gold (1983) and Sobel and
Holcombe (1996a), who claim that many states which adopted stabilization funds,
especially in the early 1980s did so as a result of the 1980-1982 recession.
Further, the coefficient of the total number of changes in the controlling political
party of states' houses over the previous twenty years is statistically significant at the 10
percent level. This result is consistent with the notion that decision-makers in states
which have experienced more long-term political instability have more to gain from
saving and thus may be more likely to adopt a budget stabilization fund to reduce the
common pool problem. In addition, the coefficient for the number of seats in the state's
upper house is significant at the 5 percent level. Although the magnitude of the marginal
coefficient for the number of seats in the upper house is rather small (.052), this finding is
consistent with a political prisoner's dilemma motive for adopting a stabilization fund.
Aside from possible political motives, the existence of both tax and expenditure
limitation laws significantly increases the probability that a state will adopt a budget
stabilization fund. A tax limitation law in place increases the probability that a state will
adopt a budget stabilization fund by 2 percent, while the existence of an expenditure
limitation law increases the probability by 2.5 percent. The finding that expenditure
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limitation laws significantly increases the probability that a state adopts a stabilization
fund suggests that states' decision-makers have attempted to circumvent the 'tax revolt' of
the 1970s and 1980s by finding alternate methods to maintain reserves, which may
explain many state's adoption choices in the mid-1980s. This result indicates that while
the recession of the early 1980s did in fact play a role in states' choices, the recession
alone is not likely to explain the entire growth in stabilization fund usage which occurred
during the 1980s.
The empirical results are also consistent with the notion that states in good fiscal
health are more likely to adopt budget stabilization funds than states in poor fiscal health,
all other factors constant. In fact, the results show that states are more likely to adopt a
stabilization fund when their current savings is larger than predicted based upon their
existing fiscal constraints. Moreover, states are more likely to adopt a budget stabilization
fund when their ratio of real gross debt to personal income is low, which is likely to
coincide with a high credit rating. Thus, there is some evidence that states that are
committed to saving and maintaining the state's credit worthiness see budget stabilization
funds as a way to maintain their fiscal health.
To summarize the empirical results, the panel probit estimates yield evidence that
is consistent with the claim that budget stabilization funds are more likely to be adopted
as a means of saving in states which are committed to fiscal discipline, as measured by
the state's ratio of real gross debt to personal income and the difference between actual
savings and predicted savings based on the state's fiscal constraints. Budget stabilization
funds are also more likely to be adopted in years during, or just following, an economic
contraction. In addition, existing tax and expenditure limitation laws increases the
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probability that a state will adopt a budget stabilization fund. This suggests that some
states may have attempted to circumvent the fiscal constraints of the tax revolt era by
using stabilization funds rather than the state's general fund as a vehicle for saving. In
addition, the empirical results also illustrate that states with greater unpredictability in the
cyclical variability of their revenue streams are more likely to adopt budget stabilization
funds. Finally, the results are consistent with the notion that decision-makers in states
which have witnessed high politically instability adopted budget stabilization funds as a
method to reduce political manipulation of savings resulting from the common pool
problem.
4.5 Conclusion
While budget stabilization funds are a popular vehicle of saving for state governments,
the rise in fund usage has been a relatively recent phenomenon. Of the 44 states that
currently utilize a budget stabilization fund in conjunction with the state's general fund
for securing precautionary funds, more than two-thirds did not begin utilizing a
stabilization fund until after 1980.
While previous research investigating the effectiveness of budget stabilization
funds has generally indicated that states have benefited from their presence, an
investigation of the factors influencing states' decisions to adopt budget stabilization
funds has thus far been untouched by the literature. Using unpublished data obtained
from each state on the year of stabilization fund adoption, this chapter examines the role
that state economic, political, fiscal preferences, and fiscal conditions played in states'
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decision to adopt stabilization funds by estimating a panel probit model over the period
from 1945-1996.
The empirical results provide some evidence that states adopted budget
stabilization funds for a variety of reasons. First, the results provide evidence in support
of Gold (1983) and Sobel and Holcombe (1996a), who claim that the dramatic increase in
stabilization fund usage during the 1980s was due largely to the 1980-1982 recession.
However, the estimates also reveal that not all of the adoptions that occurred during the
1980s are likely to be a direct result of the recession. The existence of tax and
expenditure limitation laws, the majority of which were adopted between 1979 and 1985,
also significantly influenced states' adoption choices. Thus, there is evidence that at least
some states adopted budget stabilization funds during the 1980s as a means to lessen the
sting of tax and expenditure limitation laws rather than in response to the recession. This
finding is likely due to the fact that stabilization funds provide states' decision-makers
with an acceptable method to circumvent some fiscal mandates.
In addition, the results indicate that the predictability of the cyclical variability of
a state's revenue over the business cycle, rather than cyclical variability in the state's
economy or the cyclical variability in the state's revenue, is a principle factor affecting
states' choices. Thus, states whose revenue streams are less predictable over the business
cycle, regardless of how cyclical, are more likely to adopt stabilization funds, all other
factors constant.
Furthermore, the fact that the number of seats in a state's upper house is positively
correlated with adopting a stabilization fund is consistent with a political prisoner's
dilemma motive. Since legislators may individually prefer to spend any surplus, even
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though they may collectively be better off by saving the funds, they may opt to save in a
stabilization fund since stabilization funds have the potential to require saving.
Next, states are more likely to adopt budget stabilization funds when their ratio of
real gross debt to personal income is small, and their current level of savings is greater
than the quantity that would be predicted given their fiscal constraints, ceteris paribus.
These findings are consistent with the notion that states which are committed to sound
fiscal policies and maintaining the state's credit worthiness are more likely to adopt
stabilization funds than states which have lower credit ratings and less commitment to
fiscal discipline.
Finally, the empirical results provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that
decision-makers opted to establish stabilization funds as a means to reduce political
manipulation resulting from the common pool problem.
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Chapter 5
Are State Budget Stabilization Funds only the Illusion of Savings?
5.1 Introduction
"Prudent financial management requires not only paying today's bills in a timely
manner, but also providing for an uncertain future. For a state government, that
uncertainty can include more than economic downturns. It also includes the
potential for natural disasters, cutbacks in federal support for vital state programs,
and adverse court decisions. Although Illinois is in its best financial shape since
1989, it is still unprepared for uncertainty. The state's lack of reserves could mean
that it will again suffer severe fiscal distress in the future." – "Saving for a Rainy
Day," State of Illinois Comptroller's Fiscal Focus, February/March 1999.
State governments consider reserve balances to be an integral component of fiscal
management and the number of states utilizing budget stabilization funds as a means to
maintain fungible monies has increased dramatically in the last two decades. While states
continue to rely on expenditure reductions and discretionary tax increases to mitigate
periods of fiscal stress, states have become increasingly dependent on accumulated
reserves (or savings) as a short-run policy tool. According to a 1993 General Accounting
Office survey of states, of the 32 states which reported experiencing a fiscal deficit, about
one-third of the aggregate deficit was corrected using accumulated balances held in
budget stabilization funds.
The fiscal institutions facing many states can make raising revenue difficult in the
short-run. Along with balanced budget rules, many states also face expenditure and tax
limitation laws which restrict revenue and spending growth, and debt restrictions which
limit the short-term and long-term general obligation debt a state may issue, all of which
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impact states' policy options in the event of a revenue shortfall.41 However, since most
states face balanced budget laws are stock rather than flow in nature, current expenditures
for these states may exceed current revenue as long as the state has sufficient reserves to
match the revenue shortfall. Consequently, states have long engaged in the practice of
saving during expansions for use during periods of depressed revenue growth, but the
dramatic increase in budget stabilization fund usage has been a significant change in
states' attempts to secure precautionary funds.
In general, when states run surpluses in the general fund, states with budget
stabilization funds (hereafter BSFs) deposit a fraction of that surplus in the state's
stabilization fund and retain the remainder in the general fund. From an accounting
standpoint, surpluses in states' general funds are non-accumulating since they are
automatically treated as revenue in the next fiscal year. In contrast, BSF funds are
accumulating because they are not automatically considered a component of revenue in
the next fiscal year. Thus, the total fungible reserves available to a state at the end of any
given fiscal year is the sum of the state's BSF balance and general fund surplus, while the
contribution to savings in that particular fiscal year is the sum of the change in the state's
general fund surplus plus the change in the state's BSF balance from the previous year.
States' abilities to mitigate periods of fiscal stress using savings are dependent on
the total balances available from the state's general fund and BSF. From an economic
                                                
41 For evidence that stringent balanced budget rules have real effects see Levinson
(1998), Alesina and Bayoumi (1996), Poterba (1996, 1995, 1994), Bohn and Inman
(1996), Alt and Lowry (1994), and ACIR (1987). See Poterba (1996), Rueben (1995),and
Elder (1992) for an examination of state tax and expenditure limitation laws; see von
Hagen (1991), Bunch (1991), and Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996) regarding state debt
limitations. For a review of state fiscal institutions in general see Knight and Levinson
(1999b) and Bohn and Inman (1996).
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standpoint it does not matter whether states retain balances only in the general fund, only
in a BSF, or both, since general fund surpluses and BSF balances earn the same market
return and are subject to the same economic risks (inflation risk and systematic risk).
There are however potential advantages to holding funds in a stabilization fund as
opposed to the general fund. First, states whose decision-makers do not possess the fiscal
discipline necessary to retain surplus balances for future use may adopt stabilization
funds that require monies to be placed into the BSF. This can be accomplished by
requiring surplus balances in the general fund to be transferred to the BSF or by requiring
deposits on an annual basis. For this to enhance a state's fiscal health, it is necessary that
legislators retain the monies placed in the BSF until they are truly needed.
Second, without contributing more to savings in a given year, states may structure
BSFs in such a way as to retain the funds they do save longer. Since, in principle, a BSF
which is structured identically to the states general fund should be a perfect substitute for
general fund balances, states can increase their total balances available at any given time
if funds placed in the BSF are retained longer than surplus balances in the general fund.
This can be accomplished by opting for more stringent withdrawal rules than exist in the
general fund (such as a supermajority voting rule) making it more difficult to spend
existing BSF balances, and states may also restrict the services for which BSF balances
can be used.
Next, states facing flow balanced budget constraints (such as Michigan) and states
facing restrictions on the size of general fund surpluses (such as California) may use a
budget stabilization fund as means to circumvent such restrictions and maintain
precautionary balances. Finally, adopting a budget stabilization fund to be used in
98
conjunction with the general fund may ignite a sense of fiscal awareness in states'
decision-makers causing them to be more financially prudent regardless of the fund's
structure. Hence, states use of budget stabilization funds have the potential to alter the
savings behavior of states by increasing the amount of money states save in a given year
and/or increasing the rate at which states retain the funds that they do save.
While budget stabilization funds can be potentially beneficial for states, if the
structure of a state's budget stabilization fund closely resembles the state's general fund,
which means that funds are deposited and withdrawn at the discretion of the legislature
for any purpose, utilizing a budget stabilization fund may have no noticeable impact on
the state's savings behavior. If a state's legislature does not possess the fiscal discipline to
retain monies in the state's general fund and BSF balances can be appropriated as easily
as general fund balances, it is difficult to imagine that the state's legislature will save any
more, or retain funds longer, simply because they have multiple vehicles for saving.
Although research investigating the impact that budget stabilization funds have
had on states' fiscal behavior is rather limited, this research does suggest that stabilization
funds have had a favorable impact on states' fiscal health. Over the period from 1969-
1995, Levinson (1998) finds that states with budget stabilization funds experienced less
volatile business cycles than states that do not possess stabilization funds. Similarly, in a
paper examining the impact that stabilization funds had on states' ability to cope with
fiscal stress during the 1990-1991 recession, Sobel and Holcombe (1996a) find that states
with budget stabilization funds experienced fewer reductions in expenditures below their
long-run growth rate than states without stabilization funds, and that states whose funds
had explicit deposit requirements experienced significantly less fiscal stress than states
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whose BSFs did not contain such requirements. More recently, Knight and Levinson
(1999a), using a panel of data from 1984-1997, find that states with BSFs save more than
states without BSFs and that states' total balances are higher after adopting a BSF. In
addition, Knight and Levinson find that total balances respond one-for-one with increases
in stabilization fund balances, suggesting that budget stabilization funds and states'
general funds are not perfect substitutes.
Using data on the fiscal-year-end balance of each state's BSF from inception, this
chapter examines the impact of each state's budget stabilization fund on the state's
savings behavior over their entire history of BSF usage. A transfer function model is
estimated for each state to obtain estimates of the change in each state's average rate of
saving and average total balances between the state's pre-BSF savings behavior and BSF
savings behavior. This approach allows me to formally examine the substitutability or
complementarity of BSFs and general fund surpluses. Second, using the estimated
behavioral changes from the transfer function models, I examine the extent to which the
structure of stabilization funds has influenced their effectiveness by regressing the
estimated change in states' average rate of savings and average total balances on fund
characteristics.
The empirical results illustrate that one-third of states have experienced a
significant change in their savings behavior after enacting a budget stabilization fund,
suggesting that for a majority of states budget stabilization funds have been perfectly
substitutable with states' general funds. The states that have benefited witnessed a
significant increase in their total balances, but not their savings rate. This indicates that
the states that are saving more after enacting stabilization funds are doing so by retaining
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balances longer, not from contributing more to savings. Most important, the estimates
reveal that states can most benefit from a BSF if they are required to deposit funds and
restrict how the funds may be spent. Thus the results do not indicate that budget
stabilization funds are ineffective, rather they indicate that the more stringent a state's
budget stabilization is relative to the state's general fund, the more likely the state is to
save more after utilizing a budget stabilization fund.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 5.2 discusses budget
stabilization funds and the role they have in states' saving, Section 5.3 outlines the
empirical methodology used to estimate the change in states' savings behavior and
presents the results of such estimation, Section 5,4 examines the role BSF characteristics
play in the behavioral changes experienced by states after enacting a BSF, and Section
5.5 concludes the chapter.
5.2 The Role of Budget Stabilization Funds in States' Saving
Although the goal of BSFs to provide a stock of fungible balances is common to all
states, there is wide variation across states in the structure of stabilization funds. The
most profound differences in the structure of stabilization funds occur in the methods for
depositing funds, withdrawing funds, and the maximum size of the fund. This
information, along with the adoption date and first deposit date, are included in Table 5.1.
As is evident, a majority of states deposit funds into their BSF only in the event of
a general fund surplus and withdraw funds at the discretion of the legislature. However,
several states, whose funds would be classified as 'stringent funds,' use statutory formulae
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Table 5.1 - Structure of State Budget Stabilization Funds
State Fund Name Year
Adopted
First
Balance
Deposit Rule Withdrawal Rule Maximum Fund Size
AK Budget Reserve Fund 1986 1991 Appropriation Appropriation No limit
AK Constitutional Budget Reserve 1990 1991 Mineral revenues in
excess of permanent
fund*
¾ of legislature No limit
AL -- -- -- -- -- --
AZ Budget Stabilization Fund 1990 1994 Statutory formula Statutory formula Rolling cap
AR -- -- -- -- -- --
CA Special Fund for Economic
Uncertainties
1976 1977 General Fund Surplus Revenue Shortfall No limit
CO Required Fund Balance
(non-accumulating)
1982 1982 4 % of revenue forecast Revenue shortfall 4% of revenue forecast
CT Budget Reserve Fund 1979 1984 Not less than 10% of
General Fund surplus
Governor request and 2/3
legislative approval
5% of current net General
Fund appropriations
DE Budget Reserve Account 1979 1979 General Fund surplus 3/5 of legislature 5% of General Fund
revenue
FL Working Capital Fund 1959 1965 General Fund surplus Revenue shortfall 10% of previous year's
General Fund revenue
FL Budget Stabilization Fund 1992 1995 Required appropriation
equal to 5% of last year's
general fund revenue
Revenue shortfall 10% of previous year's
General Fund revenue
GA Revenue Shortfall Reserve 1976 1976 3% of General Fund
surplus
Appropriation No limit
HI -- -- -- -- -- --
ID Budget Stabilization Fund 1984 1984 Appropriation Appropriation No limit
IL -- -- -- -- -- --
IN Counter-Cyclical Revenue and
Economic Stabilization Fund
1982 1985 Statutory formula Statutory formula 7 % of General Fund
revenue
IA Cash Reserve Fund 1984 1994 Appropriation Single-bill appropriation
not to cause fund to fall
below 3% of revenue
estimate for that year
Statutory formula
IA Economic Emergency Fund 1984 1992 Appropriation Appropriation 5 % of revenue estimate
for that fiscal year
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State Fund Name Year
Adopted
First
Balance
Deposit Rule Withdrawal Rule Maximum Fund Size
KY Budget Reserve Trust Fund
Account
1983 1983 General Fund surplus and
appropriation
Appropriation 5 % of General Fund
revenue
KS General Fund Ending Balance 1993 1993 7.5% of General Fund
expenditures that year
Appropriation No limit
LA Revenue Stabilization and
Mineral Trust Fund
1990 -- Revenues exceeding $750
million from minerals
Appropriation No limit
ME Rainy Day Fund 1985 1985 ½ of General Fund
surplus
Appropriation 5 % of General Fund
revenue
MD Revenue Stabilization Account 1985 1986 Required appropriation
equal to 5% of estimated
GF revenue that year
Appropriation Lessor of 5 % of General
Fund revenue or $50
million
MA Commonwealth Stabilization
Fund
1985 1986 General Fund surplus Appropriation 5 % of budgeted revenue
MI Countercyclical Budget and
Economic Stabilization Fund
1977 1978 Statutory formula Statutory Formula 25 % of General Fund
revenue
MN Budget Reserve Account 1981 1984 Appropriation Appropriation $522 million
MN Cash Flow Account 1995 1996 Required appropriation Appropriation $350 million
MS Working Cash Stabilization
Reserve Fund
1982 1983 Appropriation Appropriation 7 ½ % of General Fund
revenue
MO Budget Stabilization Fund 1992 1992 Appropriation Appropriation 5 % of General Fund
Revenue
MT -- -- -- -- -- --
NC Savings Reserve Account 1991 1991 General Fund surplus Appropriation 5 % of General Fund
revenue
ND Budget Stabilization Fund 1987 1990 General Fund surplus in
excess of $40 million
Revenue must be 2 ½ %
below forecast
No limit
NE Cash Reserve Fund 1983 1984 General Fund surplus Revenue shortfall No limit
NH Revenue Stabilization Reserve
Account
1987 1987 General Fund surplus Revenue shortfall 5 % of General Fund
revenue
NJ Surplus Revenue Fund 1990 1993 50 % of General fund
surplus
Revenue shortfall 5 % of anticipated
General Fund revenue
NY Tax Stabilization Reserve Fund 1945 1946 Statue Revenue shortfall No limit
NY Constitutional Reserve Fund 1993 1994 General Fund surplus Appropriation No limit
NM Tax Stabilization Reserve 1966 1967
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State Fund Name Year
Adopted
First
Balance
Deposit Rule Withdrawal Rule Maximum Fund Size
NV Budget Stabilization Designation 1994 1994 Statutory formula Revenue shortfall 8 % of General Fund
revenue
OH Budget Stabilization Fund 1981 1985 5 % of previous year's
General Fund revenue if
surplus is realized
Appropriation No limit
OK Constitutional Reserve Fund 1986 1988 10 % of previous year's
General fund revenue if
surplus is realized
Governor request and 2/3
legislative approval or ¾
legislative approval
No limit
OR -- -- -- -- -- --
PA Tax Stabilization Reserve Fund 1985 1986 15 % of General Fund
surplus
2/3 legislative approval 3 % of anticipated
General Fund Revenue
RI Budget Reserve and Cash
Stabilization Account
1985 1985 Appropriation Revenue shortfall 3 % of resources
SC General Reserve Fund 1978 1978 Statute requiring 3 % of
previous year's General
Fund revenue
Revenue shortfall and
zero balance in CRF
No limit
SC Capital Reserve Fund 1986 1986 Statute requiring 2 % of
previous year's General
Fund revenue
Revenue shortfall No limit
SD Budget Reserve Fund 1991 1992 General Fund surplus Revenue shortfall 5 % of General Fund
appropriations
TN Revenue Fluctuation Reserve 1972 1972 10 % of estimated tax
revenue growth
Revenue shortfalls 5 % of estimated tax
revenue
TX Economic Stabilization Fund 1987 1990 ½ of General Fund
surplus plus oil & gas
royalties
Revenue shortfall or
appropriation
10 % of General Fund
revenue
UT Budget Reserve Account 1986 1987 25 % of General Fund
surplus
Revenue shortfall 8 % of General Fund
appropriations
VA Revenue Stabilization Fund 1992 1995 Statutory formula Statutory formula 10 % of annual tax
revenues
VT Budget Stabilization Trust Fund 1988 1988 General Fund surplus Revenue shortfall 5 % of prior year's
appropriations
WA Emergency Reserve Fund 1981 1989 100 % of General Fund
surplus
2/3 legislative approval 5 % of biennial General
Fund revenue
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State Fund Name Year
Adopted
First
Balance
Deposit Rule Withdrawal Rule Maximum Fund Size
WI Required Reserve 1981 1981 1 % of General Fund
revenue
Revenue shortfall No limit
WI Budget Stabilization Fund 1985 1985 Appropriation Appropriation No limit
WV Revenue Shortfall Reserve Fund 1994 1995 General Fund surplus Revenue shortfall 5 % of General Fund
appropriations
WY Budget Reserve Account 1982 1983 Appropriation Appropriation 5 % of estimated General
Fund revenue
Notes: * Mineral income includes royalties, rent, income tax, production tax, and property tax revenue obtained from minerals.
Source: Phone survey of states.
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to determine deposits and withdrawals. These states include Arizona, Indiana, Michigan,
and Virginia. In general, the statues governing such funds stipulate that deposits and
withdrawals can only be made when the growth in real personal income (or some similar
economic indicator) exceeds or falls below some established level. Sobel and Holcombe
(1996a) find that states which are required to save in their stabilization funds experienced
significantly less fiscal stress during the 1990-1991 recession, and Knight and Levinson
(1999a) find that over the period from 1984 to 1997 states with deposit and withdrawal
formulas saved significantly more than states whose funds were not subject to such
requirements.
In contrast to 'stringent funds,' a majority of states have structured stabilization
funds so that deposits and withdraws occur at the discretion of the state's decision-
makers, and thus would fall into a classification of 'weak funds.' Sobel and Holcombe
(1996a) find that states that were not required to save in their budget stabilization funds
had negligible balances entering the 1990-1991 recession. At least on the surface, a weak
stabilization fund would seem to be more substitutable with the state's general fund since
legislators can more easily allocate the funds for any purpose. However, if legislators of a
given state are committed to saving and thus do not access their stabilization funds unless
they are truly needed, states adopting 'weak funds' may benefit. From the standpoint of
existing research it does seem as though states will be better off (enhancing their fiscal
position) with the adoption of 'stringent funds' as opposed to 'weak funds.'
Despite the evidence suggesting that stringent funds enhance a state's fiscal
position, visual inspection of aggregate per capita total balances and aggregate per capita
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stabilization balances, which is shown in Figure 5.1, does not reveal much of a noticeable
relationship.42
Figure 5.1 - Average Per Capita Budget Stabilization Fund Balances and Average
Per CapitaTotal Balances 1975-1996 (in 1992 dollars)
$ -50
$ 0
$ 50
$ 100
$ 150
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996
Per capita total balances Per capita BSF balances
Notes: Only includes states with stabilization funds.
Aside from the apparent simultaneous increase in average per capita total balances and
average per capita BSF balances that occurred in the late 1970s, average per capita BSF
balances have remained fairly stable while average per capita total balances show
considerable volatility. Thus, the raw data seem to suggest that average per capita total
                                                
42 Figure 1 includes only states which utilize budget stabilization funds. Thus, AL, AR,
HI, IL, MT, and OR are excluded. According to the National Conference of State
Legislatures (NCSL) and National Association of State Budget Offices (NASBO),
Alabama has a budget stabilization fund. Discussions with Carolyn Middleton of
Alabama's Executive Budget Office revealed that Alabama's budget is separated between
education and the general fund and are voted on by the Legislature separately. In
addition, the stabilization fund utilized by AL can only be used for deficits in education
expenditures, and thus is not a general fund account stabilization fund.
107
balances are not very responsive to changes in average per capita BSF balances. This of
course does not imply that the level of average per capita total balances is not higher
since the introduction of stabilization funds, only that changes in average per capita total
balances do not closely mirror changes in average per capita BSF balances.
One feature that the raw data reveals is that states have accessed their stabilization
funds quite frequently over the period from 1975 to 1996. As Table 5.2 illustrates, during
this period the percentage of states with stabilization funds that have either deposited or
Table 5.2 - Budget Stabilization Fund Usage 1975-1996
Year Number of states
depositing
Percentage of
states with funds
depositing
Number of states
withdrawing
Percentage of
states with funds
withdrawing
1975 2 50 2 50
1976 1 17 4 67
1977 3 38 3 38
1978 5 56 3 33
1979 6 60 3 30
1980 2 20 7 70
1981 5 36 5 36
1982 4 24 6 35
1983 7 35 6 30
1984 14 64 4 18
1985 16 64 6 24
1986 11 37 10 33
1987 23 70 3 9
1988 17 50 11 32
1989 21 62 9 26
1990 13 35 17 46
1991 9 23 22 56
1992 18 44 14 34
1993 24 59 10 24
1994 28 65 10 23
1995 25 58 15 35
1996 33 77 8 19
For states with multiple funds, it is considered a deposit if the sum of all fund balances in year t exceed the
sum of all fund balances in year t-1. Withdrawals are determined analogously.
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withdrawn funds in a given year has averaged more than 80 percent. The most active year
during this period (excluding 1975 when only 4 states had stabilization funds) was 1995
when 93 percent of states utilizing stabilization funds either deposited or withdrew funds.
Even though 1995 was a period of aggregate economic expansion, 35 percent of states
with stabilization funds withdrew funds. In fact, during the recent expansion (1992-1996)
an average of 27 percent of states utilizing stabilization funds withdrew funds in any
given year. While this may seem high, a majority of states withdraw funds only in the
event of a revenue shortfall. This means most states may withdraw funds at any time
when actual revenues are less than forecasted revenues. Thus withdraws during
expansions can occur even for the most fiscally disciplined state.
The next section of the chapter outlines the empirical methodology used to
examine how states' behavior has changed since enacting BSFs.
5.3 Estimating the Change between States' Pre-Budget Stabilization Fund and
Budget Stabilization Fund Savings Behavior
5.3.1 Specifying the transfer function model
In the empirical models, a transfer function is estimated for each state on its real
contribution to savings in a given year (or rate of savings) and then separately on its total
quantity of real funds available in any given year (or total balances). A state's rate of
saving ( tRS ) is defined as the real change in the fiscal year-end balance of the state's
general fund from the previous year plus the real change in the state's BSF balance,
divided by the state's revenue. This provides a measure of the state's contributions to total
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balances in any given year as a percentage of revenue collected.43 A state's total balances
( tTB ) is the state's fiscal year-end general fund surplus plus the balance in the state's
BSF. As Gold (1995) claims, the total balances available to a state at any given time is
perhaps the best indicator of a state's fiscal health. If states have only retained existing
funds longer and not actually contributed more to savings during their BSF usage, then
one would expect to find a statistical difference in the state's total balances, but not in rate
of savings, between its pre-BSF and BSF years. If on the other hand, states have
increased their annual contributions to total balances during their BSF years then one
would expect to find statistical differences in the state's rate of saving and total balances.
To examine how a state's savings behavior with a budget stabilization fund
compares to their savings behavior without a budget stabilization fund, a transfer function
is applied to an autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model for each state's rate of
saving and total balances.44 A transfer function is a series of binary variables, or
interventions, which are used to determine the impact that some known event has had on
a particular time-series of interest. In its simplest form, a transfer function is simply the
coefficient of the intervention variable (or binary variable) which is applied to a given
time-series (such as an ARMA) model. If an event occurred at time t which was assumed
to have a permanent effect on a particular time-series, the transfer function is the
coefficient of this intervention variable (which equals zero prior to the event occurring
                                                
43 All figures were deflated using the CPI (1992=100).
44  See Enders (1995), Mills (1990), and McCleary and Hay (1980) for a discussion of
intervention analysis and transfer functions.
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and one in every subsequent period) and is interpreted as the change in the level of the
time-series due to the intervention. 45
While obtaining estimates of the total behavioral change states have experienced
is of primary interest, separate transfer functions are specified for both adopting, and
depositing in, a BSF because many states adopted BSFs several years prior to depositing
funds. For instance, Ohio formally adopted a BSF in 1981 but did not have a positive
balance until 1985. If such a state changes its savings behavior after adopting a BSF, such
as retaining higher balances in the general fund with the intention of later transferring
those funds to the BSF, then ignoring the potential impact of adopting a BSF may bias
downward the estimated total change experienced by states.
The general form of each transfer function used is tIL
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where y is either the state's rate of saving or the state's total balances, ia  and ib  are the
coefficients of the p autoregressive terms and q moving average terms respectively, tA  is
                                                
45 Transfer function models are similar to a standard test between two means, but because
many time-series processes are serially correlated such a test is likely to yield
questionable results. A properly specified transfer function model will account for the
possibility of serial correlation by ensuring the residuals in the model approximate white
noise.
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the intervention term for a state's adoption of a BSF, and tD  is the intervention term for a
state's first deposit into the BSF.46 While the estimated mean of a 'standard' ARMA
model is  
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Ad  < 1, and Dd  < 1 to ensure stationarity. Thus the intervention terms provide one
manner in which to estimate how a state's behavior has changed as a result of adopting,
and depositing in, a BSF.47
Prior to estimating the intervention models, a stationary ARMA model for each
state's rate of saving and total balances was specified.48 The ordered criteria used to select
the AR and MA lags were: (1) insignificance of the Ljung-Box Q-Statistic (1979) for
                                                
46 Since 14 of the 44 states with BSFs had positive balances in the year in which the fund
was adopted (see Table 5.1), only one transfer function is modeled for these states
because it is not possible to isolate both the impact of adopting and depositing.
47 While the empirical models include separate interventions for adopting and depositing
in BSFs, including only one intervention term for the year of BSF adoption would also
allow one to estimate the total behavioral change between pre-BSF and BSF savings
behavior, albeit without specific effects for adopting and depositing.
48 Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) tests were performed on each state's rate of saving
and total balances for the period from 1946 to one year prior to the first intervention,
which for most states was one year prior to BSF adoption. The sample periods for New
York (1915-1944), Florida (1938-1958), New Mexico (1938-1965), and Alaska (1960-
1985) differed since NY, FL, and NM adopted BSFs much earlier than other states, and
AK did not receive statehood until 1959. The stationarity tests are reported in Tables C1
and C2 located in Appendix C.
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residual serial correlation; (2) Box-Jenkins (1976) notion of parsimony for the
significance of AR and MA terms; and (3) lowest Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).
The stationarity of each series has implications for the structure of the
intervention term. If a given state's rate of savings is stationary, then specifying the
intervention terms to equal zero in all years prior to the occurrence of the respective
intervention, and unity in other all years, implies that the intervention is assumed to
exhibit a permanent effect. To model the same impact on a nonstationary series, or series
which has been first differenced, the intervention term must also be first differenced. In
this case the intervention variable takes on the value of unity in the year of the
intervention and equals zero in all other years. This formulation is equivalent to modeling
a permanent impact when the series is stationary. Thus for all states whose rate of saving
and total balances are stationary or trend stationary, the intervention variables equal zero
prior to either adopting, or depositing in, a BSF and equal unity in every subsequent year.
For the states whose series must be first differenced to ensure stationarity, the
intervention variables equal unity only in the year in which the state either adopted, or
deposited in, a BSF and equal zero in all other years. Specifying the intervention
variables differently according to the stationarity of each series ensures that the
interpretation of the transfer function holds across all states regardless of the stationarity
of the series.
Statistical differences exist in the savings behavior of states between a state's pre-
BSF years and BSF years if the estimated mean of the state's rate of saving or estimated
mean of its total balances is different between the two periods. If states have been
contributing more to savings as a result of utilizing budget stabilization funds, then one
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would expect to find a positive and significant change in the state's rate of saving
between its pre-BSF and BSF years. If on the other hand, states are not contributing more
to savings but are retaining the funds they do save longer, then one would expect to find a
positive and significant change in the state's total balances but an insignificant change in
the state's rate of saving.
5.3.3 Results of Intervention Estimates
The estimates of the change in each state's average rate of saving and average total
balances between each state's pre-BSF and BSF savings behavior are reported in Tables
5.3 and 5.4 and provide some interesting findings.49
Beginning with individual states' savings rates ( tRS ) which are located in Table
5.3, the estimated change in states' behavior resulting from adoption, depositing, and the
total estimated change are reported in separate columns. As the results indicate, while
most states' average rate of saving is higher during the BSF period, nearly all states did
not experience statistically significant gains. In fact, the estimates reveal that only
Kentucky contributed significantly more to savings in a given fiscal year when budget
                                                
49 The maximum likelihood estimates of each state's initial impact and "rate of decay" are
in Tables D1 and D2 located in Appendix D. Since the intervention models 'fit the data,'
each state's intervention model was estimated with both short-run transfer functions ( Aw
and Dw ) and short and long-run transfer functions. The model with the lowest Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC) was then selected contingent on the insignificance of the
Ljung-Box Q-Statistic. Thus states whose behavior was better modeled with only an
initial impact term have no decay terms reported.
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Table 5.3 - Estimated Change in States' Savings Rates
Dependent variable: tRS = (Current Savings/Revenue)*100
State Adoption
Impact
First
Deposit
Impact
Total
Estimated
Change
State Adoption
Impact
First Deposit
Impact
Total
Estimated
Change
AK 4.617
(19.145)
3.493
(24.379)
8.110
(17.463)
ND -0.392
(3.603)
2.428
(4.827)
2.036
(2.019)
AZ 1.200
(2.746)
-0.375
(4.016)
0.825
(3.137)
NE -3.186
(2.936)
3.380***
(0.403)†
0.195
(5.755)†
CA 2.423
(6.666)
-1.951
(6.719)
0.472
(1.891)
NH -- -0.607
(2.230)
-0.607
(2.230)
CO -5.546
(4.010)
6.706
(4.122)
1.160
(0.928)
NJ -1.193
(5.336)
2.280
(6.999)
1.087
(4.606)
CT 1.648
(6.211)
-0.456
(6.781)
1.192
(4.425)
NM -2.863
(5.529)
2.648
(5.515)
-0.215
(0.829)
DE -- 3.617
(3.552)
3.617
(3.552)
NY -1.324
(1.459)
1.127
(2.318)
-0.197
(2.269)
FL 2.904
(2.458)
-2.007
(2.325)
0.897
(1.480)
NV -- 2.738
(3.032)
2.738
(3.032)
GA -- 0.270
(1.485)
0.270
(1.485)
OH 2.361
(2.821)
-1.521
(3.086)
0.840
(1.787)
IA 0.635
(2.076)
1.139
(3.265)
1.774
(2.659)
OK -1.549**
(0.692)†
1.317
(1.959)
-0.233
(2.645)†
ID -- 1.184
(0.929)
1.184
(0.929)
PA -0.433
(7.592)
-0.257
(7.856)
-0.690
(2.591)
IN 3.756
(4.084)
-3.366
(206.685)†
0.389
(206.127)†
RI -- 0.132
(2.897)
0.132
(2.897)
KS -- 1.426
(3.404)
1.426
(3.404)
SC -- 0.317
(1.809)
0.317
(1.809)
KY -- 1.460*
(0.801)
1.460*
(0.801)
SD 5.980
(7.892)
-5.892
(9.467)
0.088
(2.285)
LA -1.583
(1.682)
-- -1.583
(1.682)
TN -- 0.050
(0.981)
0.050
(0.981)
MA 1.232
(6.551)
-1.482
(106.876)†
-0.251
(106.256)†
TX 0.293
(2.482)
-0.910
(2.863)
-0.617
(1.696)
MD -1.379
(5.564)
1.645
(5.764)
0.266
(1.942)
UT -4.482
(5.239)
5.503
(5.438)
1.021
(1.429)
ME -- -0.063
(1.004)
-0.063
(1.004)
VA 1.917
(2.323)
-2.509
(4.533)
-0.592
(3.341)
MI 5.989
(5.060)
-5.089***
(1.838)†
0.899
(7.630)†
VT -- -0.399
(2.296)
-0.399
(2.296)
MN 0.307
(4.740)
0.063
(5.047)
0.370
(2.558)
WA 0.476
(1.839)
-0.848
(2.429)
-0.372
(1.841)
MO -- 1.861
(2.422)
1.861
(2.422)
WI -- 0.734
(0.892)
0.734
(0.892)
MS 2.731
(5.656)
-1.851
(5.774)
0.880
(1.754)
WV -1.420
(8.207)
3.008
(10.496)
1.588
(5.134)
NC -- 0.838
(3.278)
0.838
(3.278)
WY 15.247**
(6.416)
-16.860***
(6.555)
-1.163
(1.661)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficient estimates, including initial impact and decay terms for all
models, are reported in Appendix B.
† indicates bootstrapped standard errors obtained from 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations.
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Table 5.4 - Estimated Change in States’ Total Balances
Dependent variable: tTB =Total Balances
State Adoption
Impact
First
Deposit
Impact
Total
Estimated
Change
State Adoption
Impact
First Deposit
Impact
Total
Estimated
Change
AK 888.234
(1243.204)
624.050
(1042.449)
1512.285
(1783.087)
ND -56.360
(54.266)
130.889**
(57.847)
74.529
(47.592)
AZ -227.202
(227.641)
184.053
(264.137)
-43.154
(321.948)
NE -11.280
(38.670)
82.315***
(30.514)†
71.021***
(42.956)†
CA -1984.857
(1880.915)
3145.902*
(1852.051)
1164.045
(1482.672)
NH -- -23.016
(14.224)
-23.016
(14.224)
CO -366.796*
(208.919)
462.273**
(602.930)
94.476
(100.667)
NJ -474.975
(592.354)
917.970
(564.923)
442.994
(846.051)
CT 434.507
(263.096)
210.068
(279.419)
644.575***
(220.460)
NM 38.627
(126.167)
47.041
(126.517)
85.668
(252.860)
DE -- 409.396**
(146.644)†
409.396**
(146.644)†
NY 451.708
(378.32)
-115.870
(99.684)
335.837
(325.407)
FL 167.591
(248.862)
-120.251
(237.491)
47.340
(166.837)
NV -- 139.693***
(49.614)
139.693***
(49.614)
GA -- 318.096
(242.978)
318.096
(242.978)
OH 58.976
(441.516)
828.421*
(441.695)
887.398
(630.738)
IA -14.036
(95.983)
155.091
(120.769)
141.054
(116.660)
OK -371.653**
(143.447)
334.719**
(140.898)
-26.934
(280.080)
ID -- 4442.304
(215519.47)†
4442.304
(215519.47)†
PA 335.983
(728.789)
194.723
(732.948)
530.707
(688.983)
IN 175.736
(209.685)
448.963*
(224.500)
624.699***
(127.719)
RI -- 32.140
(119.174)
32.140
(119.174)
KS 189.231
(137.450)
189.231
(137.450)
SC -- 127.193
(110.382)
127.193
(110.382)
KY -- 305.713**
(152.186)
305.713**
(152.186)
SD 63.984
(51.906)
-33.800
(56.238)
30.184
(24.201)
LA -338.496**
(150.682)
-- -338.496**
(150.682)
TN -- 457.557*
(231.164)
457.557*
(231.164)
MA 650.925
(421.091)
-579.003
(431.452)
71.921
(293.873)
TX -980.146**
(460.253)
-4.674
(462.204)
-984.820**
(490.299)
MD -169.725
(285.885)
129.177
(246.883)
-40.547
(408.408)
UT -49.739
(71.739)
130.794*
(74.297)
81.054***
(31.295)
ME -- 111.427**
(54.871)
111.427**
(54.871)
VA 370.334**
(148.609)
39.423
(179.954)
409.758**
(178.454)
MI 913.900*
(522.515)
75.793
(528.807)
989.694***
(248.048)
VT -- -106.042
(755.632)†
-106.042
(755.632)†
MN 262.359**
(101.034)†
512.084***
(140.489)
774.429***
(153.000)†
WA -205.521
(178.647)
-54.303
(217.856)
-259.825
(184.063)
MO -- 1781.798**
(410468.91)†
1781.798**
(410468.91)†
WI -- 639.186***
(125.831)
639.186***
(125.831)
MS 17.034
(121.255)
229.530*
(123.803)
246.564***
(37.672)
WV -41.942
(109.578)
178.497
(111.277)
136.555
(132.687)
NC -- 210.431
(207.094)
210.431
(207.094)
WY 316.666***
(71.448)
-110.736
(70.280)
205.930**
(94.675)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficient estimates, including initial impact and decay terms for all
models, are reported in Appendix B.
† indicates bootstrapped standard errors obtained from 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations.
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stabilization funds were used in conjunction with the general fund than when their
contributions were retained only in the general fund.50 Kentucky's average rate of saving
from 1983 to 1996, the years in the sample that Kentucky had a BSF, was 1.46 percent
higher than its average rate of saving from 1946 to 1982.51 On the other hand, the fact
that 43 of the 44 states which utilize BSFs did not experience significant gains in their
rate of saving provides very strong evidence that states have not contributed more to
savings each year as a result of enacting BSFs.
The estimated total balance models have states fairing somewhat better than they
did in their savings rates. Of the 44 states with stabilization funds, the total estimated
change in the state's average total balances for 16 states is positive and significant
between their BSF period and pre-BSF period, including Kentucky. Since the total
balance model estimates are not adjusted for population, it is difficult to draw conclusions
when comparing states. However, as a percentage of 1996 expenditures, the state
experiencing the largest increase in average total balances between its BSF years and pre-
BSF years was Missouri. As a percentage of its 1996 budget, Missouri's average total
balances during its BSF years was 16.9 percent higher than its average total balances for
its pre-BSF years. Delaware and Wyoming also experienced gains in their total balances
                                                
50 For states in which both an initial impact and rate of decay were appropriate (see Table
D1 and D2 in Appendix D), significance of the long-run impact and total estimated
change was determined by Monte Carlo simulation since the long-run effect is a non-
linear transformation of the impact and rate of decay. The standard errors reported for
such estimates are bootstrapped standard errors obtained from the simulations.
51 Incidentally, the finding that Kentucky experienced a significant increase in its savings
rate may simply be due to random noise. In a sample size of 44 states, one could expect
on average to randomly find 4 states with significantly higher savings rates at the 10
percent level.
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of more than 10 percent of their 1996 budget, and the average increase in states' total
balances, for those states whose gain was significant, was nearly 6 percent of the 1996
budget.
Despite the sizable gains in total balances experienced by one-third of states,
nearly two-thirds of states (28 out of 44) have experienced no significant change in their
savings behavior between their BSF years and pre-BSF years. In addition, since only one
of the 16 states which did witness statistically higher total balances after utilizing a
budget stabilization fund also experienced a significant increase in their rate of savings,
this suggests that nearly 95 percent of states which have benefited from BSFs have done
so not by saving more, but by retaining existing balances longer. If states have not saved
more each year and have a larger average stock of fungible balances in any given year,
then it must be the case that states have been retaining the funds that they do save longer.
Thus, while the intervention results indicate that BSFs have been perfectly substitutable
with the general fund for most states, the few that have gained have done so by retaining
balances longer rather than actually saving more.
From a policy perspective, a state's total balances is arguably more important than
the rate of savings since states' abilities to survive revenue shortfalls depends on the total
quantity of fungible balances available when the shortfall arises (Gold, 1995). The results
of the intervention models reveal that nearly two-thirds of states are no better prepared
for mitigating revenue shortfalls as a result of enacting a budget stabilization fund,
suggesting that BSFs are not an automatic cure for fiscal woes. The one-third of states
which have increased the retention of existing funds since utilizing BSFs, and thus have
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significantly higher total balances, have strengthened their ability to deal with periods of
fiscal stress relative to when they maintained balances only in the general fund.
5.4 The Role of Budget Stabilization Fund Characteristics in Influencing Savings
Behavior Changes
The intervention results reveal that for a majority of states budget stabilization funds have
been nothing more than substitutes for the state's general fund, implying that most states
could be just as well-off fiscally if funds were retained only in the general fund. An
important question is why have some states experienced significantly higher total
balances and rates of savings after enacting budget stabilization funds while other states
have not. A natural point of departure for such an investigation is to examine the role of
fund characteristics, such as deposit and withdrawal rules, since there is wide variation
across states (see Table 5.1).
To examine the role of fund characteristics in influencing states' behavioral
changes, the estimates of each state's total change in their average rate of saving and
average total balances after enacting budget stabilization funds are regressed on a set of
indicator variables reflecting fund characteristics (which are assumed to be constant over
time) and estimated using Weighted Least Squares. Previous research has indicated that
fund characteristics may play an important role in the benefits states receive from BSFs.
Sobel and Holcombe (1996a) find that states which require deposits in BSFs experienced
significantly fewer expenditure reductions below their long-run trend growth during the
1990-1991 recession, and Knight and Levinson (1999a) find that states with stringent
withdrawal requirements and no limits on their BSFs saved more than other states with
BSFs.
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As the Weighted Least Squares estimates reveal in Table 5.5, relative to the
omitted categories of depositing and withdrawing only upon appropriation and limiting
the maximum size of the fund to 5 percent or less, fund characteristics play a very
important role in the behavioral changes experienced by states after enacting budget
stabilization funds. Considered jointly the set of indicator variables are not jointly
significant in explaining the estimated change in states' savings rate behavior, but are
significant at the 1 percent level in explaining the estimated change in states' total
balances behavior.
As for the specific fund characteristics, states which are required to deposit funds
by various methods seem to have faired much better than states which deposit only by
legislative appropriation. For instance, states which require savings in their budget
stabilization funds by limiting the percentage of forecasted revenue they can allocate,
which includes Colorado, Kansas, and Wisconsin, had significantly larger gains in their
total balances than did states which deposit funds by appropriation, the omitted category.
In fact, these states experienced gains in their total balance in excess in $233 million
relative to states which appropriate funds to their BSFs.52 States which deposit funds
based off a statutory formula, which includes Arizona, Indiana, Michigan, Nevada, and
Virginia, experienced significantly larger gains in their rate of saving than do states
which deposit by appropriation. Mandating deposits in accordance with state business
cycle activity is correlated with states experiencing a 2.4 percent increase in their rate of
                                                
52 Recall that the Weighted Least Squares coefficients have been normalized by the
standard error of states' estimated total changes. Hence the results do not lend themselves
to cross-state comparisons. They do however indicate the normalized magnitude gain of
specific fund characteristics relative to the omitted categories.
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Table 5.5 - Impact of Budget Stabilization Fund Requirements on Estimated
Behavioral Change
Variables Savings Rate Model Total Balances Model
Constant 0.411
(0.541)
150.820**
(56.822)
Deposit by statutory formula 2.424***
(0.400)
32.037
(99.370)
Required deposit by appropriation -0.095
(0.446)
215.430*
(134.680)
Deposit by General Fund Surplus 0.130
(0.487)
-52.761
(62.282)
Limit on Forecast Expenditures 0.711
(0.430)
233.820*
(129.37)
Withdrawal by statutory formula -2.784***
(0.956)
320.950*
(164.550)
Withdrawal by revenue shortfall -0.268
(0.264)
-102.840**
(48.524)
Withdrawal by supermajority -0.870**
(0.421)
-11.011
(192.930)
Fund size greater than 5 percent 0.170
(0.293)
59.672
(37.045)
Sample size 44 44
F-Test (Model) 0.890 6.11***
2R 0.168 0.582
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are as follows: *** denotes significance at the 1
percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
saving relative to states that appropriate deposits. In addition, requiring states' decision-
makers to appropriate funds into the BSF, where the amount to deposit is often
determined as a percentage of the previous year's revenue, is associated with states
experiencing gains in their total balances in excess of $215 million relative to states
which are not required to appropriate funds.
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Withdrawal requirements more stringent than legislative approval are also
influential. Relative to states which withdraw funds by legislative appropriation, states
which withdraw funds based off a statutory formula, which include Arizona, Indiana,
Michigan, and Virginia, experienced significant behavioral changes in both their savings
rate and total balances behavior. While statutory formulas vary somewhat across states,
most are structured to coincide with the state's business cycle. In Arizona for instance,
withdraws from the state's BSF can only occur when the real annual growth in Arizona's
total personal income (excluding transfer payments) is below 2 percent and below the
average real annual growth over the previous 7 years. Such states had a 2.7 percent lower
rate of saving after enacting a budget stabilization fund. If a statutory formula for
withdraws increases the retention rate of balances, then this point estimate is not
surprising. If states' decision-makers are forced to retain funds in a BSF because business
cycle conditions do not permit withdraws, then such a state could save less each year and
continue to maintain the same total quantity of funds as the state maintained when funds
were only held in the general fund. Moreover, the states that withdraw funds only by
formula experienced total balance increases of more than $320 million relative to states
that withdraw by legislative approval, which is the largest magnitude of all the indicator
variables in the total balance model. 53
Finally, limits on fund size prove to be an insignificant determinant of the change
experienced by states. Although limits on fund sizes generally hover around the
recommended 5 percent level of the budget, many states have very large limits (25
                                                
53 Alternative empirical specifications of the total balances model in Table 5.5 were also
explored. The results of the alternative specifications are in Table E1 in Appendix E.
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percent) and others have no limits (Sobel and Holcombe, 1996a). However, given that
very few states have had binding limits during any period of their BSF usage, it is not
surprising that states whose funds may be greater than 5 percent of the budget have not
experienced significant gains relative to states which limit their funds to be five percent
of the budget or less.
Considering the results of both the intervention models and Weighted Least
Squares estimates, the empirical results provide very strong evidence that budget
stabilization funds have been nothing more than substitutes for states' general fund
accounts. The estimates also reveal that the fraction of states which have noticeably
different behavior as a result of enacting BSFs have gained from retaining the funds they
do save longer rather than actually saving more. In addition, the structure of the state's
fund is shown to be an influential factor in determining how a state may benefit from a
BSF. States whose funds have deposit requirements, either through mandating
appropriations or through limiting the allocation of forecasted revenue, and states which
withdraw funds by statutory formula, experienced gains in their total balances in excess
of $530 million relative to states which deposit and withdraw funds solely at the
discretion of the state's legislature. Thus for states to actually benefit from utilizing a
budget stabilization fund, the empirical results presented here provide very strong
evidence that states must adopt a stabilization fund which is much more stringent than the
state's general fund.
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5.5 Conclusions
The number of states utilizing budget stabilization funds has increased dramatically in the
last two decades, bringing the total number of states utilizing such fiscal measures to 44.
At first glance, stabilization funds seem to be perfectly substitutable with states' general
funds, however budget stabilization funds have the potential to enhance states' fiscal
positions by increasing the retention rate of existing fund balances and/or increasing the
rate at which states save. Previous research has indicated that states' fiscal health is
enhanced with the adoption of budget stabilization funds, and that the structure of
stabilization funds plays a large role in determining whether or not a state will benefit
from utilizing a stabilization fund. The literature has suggested that states whose funds
possess no maximum limit, stringent deposit rules, and stringent withdrawal rules seem to
fair better than states whose funds do not contain such provisions.
Using unpublished data on each state's budget stabilization balance over its entire
existence, I estimate a transfer function model to obtain estimates of the change in each
state's average rate of savings and average total balances over the entire history of a
state's BSF usage. While one-third of states have experienced a significant increase in
their total balances since utilizing BSFs, nearly two-thirds of states (28 out of 44) have
experienced no significant change in their savings behavior between their BSF years and
pre-BSF years. Since nearly all of the states with statistically higher total balances after
utilizing a budget stabilization fund did not experience a significant increase in their rate
of saving, these states have benefited from BSFs by retaining the funds they do save
longer rather than contributing more to savings each year.
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In addition, regressing the estimated change in each state's average rate of saving
and average total balances on a set of indicator variables reflecting fund characteristics, I
find that the structure of a state's fund is an important determinant of the estimated
change experienced by states. The estimates, which are consistent with those of Sobel
and Holcombe (1996a) and Knight and Levinson (1999a), reveal that states whose funds
have explicit rules requiring funds be deposited, and withdraw funds only by statutory
formula, experienced significantly larger changes in their total balances as a result of
utilizing budget stabilization funds than did states whose funds only permit deposits and
withdraws at the discretion of the legislature and limit the size of their fund to be 5
percent of the budget or less. In fact, states which mandate deposits into their BSF and
have a statutory formula restricting withdraws, experienced increases in their total
balances in excess of $530 million relative to states whose funds are governed solely at
the discretion of the state's legislature. 
Thus while budget stabilization funds appear to be perfectly substitutable with
most states' general funds, this is by no means suggestive that budget stabilization funds
are an ineffective means of saving for states. In fact, the empirical results provide very
strong evidence that BSFs which are stringent, meaning states' decision-makers are
required to deposit funds and are limited to withdrawing funds only in accordance with
business cycle activity, greatly increases the likelihood that a state will save more after
utilizing a BSF. Thus states seeking to enhance their fiscal positions and expand their
ability to mitigate periods of fiscal stress should enact stringent budget stabilization funds
rather than enacting a fund which closely resembles the state's general fund.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Prospects for Future Research
State governments have long been active savers, yet very little research has been
conducted to understand the political and economic aspects of state governments' savings
behavior. Despite the lack of research, states' use of savings in fiscal policy choices plays
a central role in states' abilities to mitigate periods in which expenditure demands exceed
states' supply of available balances. States' opportunities for weathering recessions
without the need for expenditure reductions, tax increases, or the issuance of new debt is
dependent on states' supply of reserve balances. The most dramatic change in states'
efforts to retain such reserve balances has been the use of budget stabilization funds,
often referred to as rainy day funds, designed to provide states' decision-makers with an
additional instrument for saving. While stabilization fund usage by state governments has
a long history, it has only been in last twenty years that stabilization funds have become
an extremely popular means of saving. This dissertation investigates several aspects of
the savings behavior of state governments, including the effectiveness of stabilization
funds.
An aspect of state government savings that has not previously been explored is
the common pool problem associated with savings in the public sector. Chapter 3
addresses the issue of the common pool problem by investigating how political control
influences the current level of states' savings. Unlike private sector individuals, the right
to access and spend funds in the public sector is granted to the party or coalition that
controls political outcomes. Thus, public sector decision-makers who are currently
determining the allocation and composition of spending are not necessarily guaranteed
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the right to continue to make such decisions in the future since their prospect for future
decision-making is contingent on remaining in office and retaining political control. As a
result of the uncertainty in controlling future political outcomes, political manipulation of
a state's current savings by legislators for self-gain may occur if the decision-makers
presently controlling political outcomes expect to lose their ability to control political
outcomes (and thus the allocation of funds) in the future. Chapter 3 develops a theoretical
model which shows that a representative legislator will choose to increase the current
level of spending and decrease the current level of saving when his prospects for
controlling future political outcomes diminish. An empirical model is also estimated to
test the theoretical model. The empirical results provide strong evidence in support of the
notion that states' legislators opt to increase current spending and reduce current saving
when a change in the future controlling party of states' lower houses is expected. The
empirical results imply that state governments' savings may be systematically adversely
affected by anticipated political changes. Hence, states that are more politically unstable
than other states should be ill-prepared to deal with recessions relative to states that are
politically stable.
While the common pool problem inherent in public sector savings permits
systematic political manipulation of states' savings, budget stabilization funds provide
states' decision-makers with the potential means to lessen the common pool problem by
constraining the manner in which public sector funds can be allocated. In short, although
legislators may have an incentive to exploit the common pool problem for self-gain, if the
benefits to saving the funds are large enough, each legislator may voluntarily agree to
constrain their own behavior in exchange for other legislators constraining their behavior
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(Buchanan, 1990). Thus, the adoption of budget stabilization funds may be in response to
systematic political manipulation of states' saving.
The determinants of state budget stabilization fund adoption are investigated in
Chapter 4. An empirical model is estimated using 46 states over the period from 1945 to
1996 to examine the role that political, economic, fiscal conditions, and fiscal preferences
have had on states' choices to adopt stabilization funds. The empirical results presented in
Chapter 4 provide evidence consistent with the notion that decision-makers in states with
long-run problems of political stability are more likely to adopt stabilization funds as a
additional method for saving than politically stable states because the expected gains
from saving are larger for politically unstable states. In addition, I also find evidence
consistent with a political prisoner's dilemma motive for adopting a stabilization fund
since the number of seats in states' upper houses is positively correlated with stabilization
fund adoption. Given that legislator incentives to spend inefficiently are increasing with
the number of political districts (because an increasing number of districts provides them
with increased opportunities to centralize spending and decentralize costs) legislators
may place high demands on surplus balances. Since the number of seats in states' upper
houses is positively correlated with states' adoption choices, this provides evidence
consistent with the notion that the benefits to retaining surplus balances is large enough
that states' decision-makers have opted to establish stabilization funds even though they
have an incentive to spend any surplus funds.
In addition to political motives, I also find evidence that states hit more severely
by recessions are more likely to adopt budget stabilization funds, which may explain a
fraction of the large increase in stabilization fund adoptions immediately following the
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1980-1982 recession. Moreover, the empirical results in Chapter 4 indicate that states
which have expenditure and tax limitation laws in place are more likely to adopt a
stabilization fund. This finding suggests that at least some states adopted stabilization
funds to circumvent the fiscal constraints enacted as a result of the 'tax revolt' of the late
1970s and early 1980s. I also find evidence that states which are committed to fiscal
discipline and maintaining sound fiscal health are more likely to adopt budget
stabilization funds than are states in poor fiscal health.
The final research chapter of the dissertation, Chapter 5, investigates how states'
savings behavior has changed since utilizing budget stabilization funds. Since monies
retained in budget stabilization funds are typically allocated from states' general fund
surpluses, states may not be enhancing their fiscal health by adopting stabilization funds
since the balances held in the stabilization fund may be perfectly substitutable with
balances held in states' general funds. In short, budget stabilization funds and general
funds may be fungible substitutes.
Using unpublished data from each state, an empirical model is estimated in
Chapter 5 for each state to examine how each state's average rate of saving and average
total balances have changed since adopting a budget stabilization fund. The empirical
results reveal that while one-third of the states has experienced significantly higher
average total balances after adopting budget stabilization funds, the majority of states'
budget stabilization funds are no more than fungible substitutes for states' general funds.
That is, only 16 of the 44 states currently utilizing budget stabilization funds have
experienced a significant increase in their reserve balances since adopting a stabilization
fund. Moreover, I find that nearly all states which have benefited from stabilization funds
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have done so not by increasing the rate at which they save annually, rather they have
benefited from retaining the funds they do save longer.
Chapter 5 also estimates an empirical model to explore the role that the structure
of states' budget stabilization funds has played in the savings' gains experienced by states
since adopting a stabilization fund. The empirical results reveal strong evidence that the
structure of states' stabilization funds is extremely influential in determining the gains to
savings states have experienced. I find that states whose stabilization funds contain
explicit withdrawal and deposit rules are much more likely to experience significant gains
in their total balances than are states whose decision-makers have complete discretion
governing deposits and withdrawals. Thus while many states have not enhanced their
fiscal health, and thus their ability to mitigate recessions, by adopting budget stabilization
funds, this does not suggest that stabilization funds are an ineffective means of saving. In
fact, the empirical results from Chapter 5 reveal that budget stabilization funds are an
effective means of saving, but only when they are structured properly.
While this dissertation has provided insights into several important aspects
regarding the savings behavior of state governments, the prospects for future research in
this area are bright. For instance, this dissertation adopted a direct approach to
investigating the effectiveness of budget stabilization funds by exploring how states'
savings behavior has changed since utilizing stabilization funds. However the
'effectiveness' of budget stabilization funds may be measured by different criteria. An
indirect approach to examining the 'effectiveness' of stabilization funds would be to
examine if states' growth rates in expenditures have remained closer to their long-run
averages since adopting stabilization funds.
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In addition, the concept of fiscal stability provides an additional indirect approach
to exploring states' savings and budget stabilization funds. Pollock and Suyderhoud
(1986) constructed a theoretical index of state fiscal stability based on the state's
expenditures, revenue, and their long-run growth rates, and an empirical investigation of
the role of savings and budget stabilization funds in achieving greater fiscal stability
seems particularly fruitful. While the notion of state fiscal stability can be a rather
complex idea, the data provided in this dissertation does provide a point of departure for
further investigations into this matter.
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Appendix A
The Determinants of Public Sector Saving
To obtain the reduced-form arguments of the legislator's savings function, we may totally
differentiate equation (5) and use the fact that )(×-= ttt GRS  to sign the corresponding
derivatives. For instance, the impact of current fungible assets on current spending is
given by:
                                         
y
b ),()1( 111 +++ +=
¶
¶ ttAAtt
t
t XAVrP
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G
 > 0                             (A.1)
where  ),()( 111
2
++++-= ttAAtttttNNt XAVPRGU bgqqy . We know from Stokey and
Lucas (1989) that AAV  is negative due to the concavity of the utility function and the
convex constraint (Theorem 4.8, p.81). As a result,  y < 0 which in turn implies that
t
t
A
S
¶
¶
 < 0.
The impact of current interest rates on current spending has an ambiguous sign.
The effect is given by:
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Since no theoretical restrictions are placed on the state's current fungible assets ( tA ), the
impact of current interest rates on current spending can not be conclusively signed. As a
result, the sign of  
t
t
r
S
¶
¶
 is also ambiguous. However, it is likely that under a wide range
of parameter values current fungible assets will be positive, implying that an increase in
current real interest rates will likely increase current spending (by way of the income
effect).
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In addition, the effect of current revenue on current spending is conclusively
positive, however its impact on savings is positive only when restrictions are placed on
the model's parameters. The impact of current revenue on current spending may be
written as:
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 > 0.              (A.3)
tt gq >  is a sufficient condition to ensure that  
t
t
R
G
¶
¶
 < 1. If this condition holds we have
t
t
R
S
¶
¶
 > 0. 
The probability that a legislator is reelected and part of the majority party ( 1+tP )
has a negative effect on current spending and a positive effect on current saving, which
can be seen from the following expression:
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Moreover, using the one period update of equation (6) in conjunction with
equation (5) allows us to sign the effect that future revenue has on current spending.
Differentiating equation (5) with respect to future revenue ( 1+tR ) yields:
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The sign of  ),( 111 +++ ttAR XAV t  can be found by differentiating the one period update of
equation (6) with respect to future revenue, recalling that 1+tR  does not belong to 2+tX .
Thus, ),()1(),( 2212111 ++++++ +=+ ttAAttttAR XAVrPXAV t b < 0  which implies that
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1+¶
¶
t
t
R
S
 < 0. Hence, expectations of higher future revenue suppresses current savings in
favor of current spending. Comparative statics for future revenue extending beyond
period t+1 can be determined in a similar manner.
Finally, differentiating equation (5) with respect to future interest rates yields an
ambiguous effect which is given by:
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Differentiating the one period update of equation (6) with respect to future interest rates
( 1+tr ) gives us ]),()1(),([),( 2211222111 +++++++++ ++=+ ttAAttttAtttAr XAVArXAVPXAV t b ,
which can not be conclusively signed.
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Appendix B
Since there was little variation in the estimates of first-order serial correlation between
the one and two period future model, only the one period results are presented.
Table B1 - Cochrane-Orcutt Estimates of First-Order Serial Correlation Within
Individual States
State Estimates of rˆ State Estimates of rˆ
Alaska 0.22 New Hampshire 0.67
Alabama 0.51 New Jersey 0.77
California 0.54 New Mexico 0.67
Colorado 0.77 Nevada 0.59
Delaware 0.53 New York 0.82
Florida 0.45 Ohio 0.83
Georgia 0.45 Oklahoma 0.60
Hawaii 0.92 Oregon 0.48
Illinois 0.75 Pennsylvania 0.62
Kentucky 0.69 Rhode Island 0.73
Louisiana 0.44 South Carolina 0.57
Massachusetts 0.85 Tennessee 0.50
Maryland 0.87 Texas 0.75
Maine 0.51 Utah 0.70
Michigan 0.29 Virginia 0.67
Missouri 0.70 Vermont 0.85
Mississippi 0.88 Washington 0.27
Montana 0.21 Wisconsin 0.50
North Carolina 0.77 West Virginia 0.74
North Dakota 0.84
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Appendix C: Stationarity Test Results and ARMA Specifications
Table C1 - Stationarity Tests on States' Savings Rate Prior to BSF-Adoption
State ADF Statistic
(level)
State ADF Statistic
(level)
State ADF Statistic
(level)
AK -6.396***
(0)
MD -6.253***
(0)
OK -5.655***
(1)
AZ -8.833***
(0)
ME -7.197***
(0)
PA -6.566***
(1)
CA -6.716***
(0)
MI -5.801***
(1)
RI -8.489***
(0)
CO -6.642***
(2)
MN -5.818***
(1)
SC -5.332***
(2)
CT -4.662***
(1)
MO -6.249***
(3)
SD -9.493***
(0)
DE -5.790***
(0)
MS -8.841***
(0)
TN -4.923***
(0)
FL -7.241***
(0)
NC -10.228***
(0)
TX -7.021***
(0)
GA -5.937***
(0)
ND -6.270***
(1)
UT -9.393***
(0)
IA -6.424***
(1)
NE -6.366***
(2)
VA -6.813***
(2)
ID -7.197***
(0)
NH -7.520***
(0)
VT -6.073***
(1)
IN -6.331***
(0)
NJ -9.251***
(0)
WA -4.303***
(4)
KY -8.149***
(0)
NM -6.971***
(0)
WI -5.869***
(1)
KS -5.989***
(1)
NY -5.213***
(1)
WV -10.642***
(0)
LA -9.142***
(0)
NV -9.164***
(0)
WY -8.029***
(0)
MA -8.119***
(1)
OH -6.054***
(0)
Notes: Model lag lengths are in parentheses below ADF Statistics and were selected according to Akaike's
Information Criterion (AIC).  Significance levels are from Mackinnon (1991) and are denoted as follows:
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level. Tests
included both a constant term and linear trend.
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Table C2 - Stationarity Tests on States' Total Balances Prior to BSF-Adoption
State ADF
Statistic
(level)
ADF
Statistic
(D )
State ADF
Statistic
(level)
ADF
Statistic
(D )
State ADF
Statistic
(level)
ADF
Statistic
(D )
AK -2.577
(2)
-3.454*
(2)
MD -1.495
(0)
-5.944***
(1)
OK -2.249
(0)
-7.486***
(1)
AZ -2.419
(0)
-4.189***
(4)
ME -4.295***
(0)
-- PA -3.196*
(1)
--
CA -4.080**
(0)
-- MI -4.077**
(1)
-- RI -2.741
(0)
-6.422***
(0)
CO -5.999***
(1)
-- MN -4.599***
(1)
-- SC -3.651**
(1)
--
CT -3.763**
(1)
-- MO -5.112***
(2)
-- SD -5.063***
(2)
--
DE -3.784**
(0)
-- MS -4.917***
(0)
-- TN -2.024
(2)
-5.093***
(0)
FL -3.350*
(0)
-- NC -3.646**
(0)
-- TX -3.368**
(1)
--
GA -3.000
(0)
-6.218***
(1)
ND -3.357*
(0)
-- UT -4.328***
(0)
--
IA -4.022**
(1)
-- NE -5.099***
(1)
-- VA -4.343***
(1)
--
ID -5.048***
(1)
-- NH -1.315
(0)
-6.079***
(1)
VT -2.202
(1)
-6.306***
(1)
IN -3.862**
(0)
-- NJ -2.734
(0)
-7.144***
(0)
WA -4.376***
(0)
--
KY -3.257*
(0)
-- NM -4.278**
(1)
-- WI -4.030**
(1)
--
KS -4.012**
(1)
-- NY -3.791*
(2)
-- WV -3.942**
(2)
--
LA -5.489***
(1)
-- NV -3.992**
(0)
-- WY -0.949
(2)
-5.011***
(2)
MA -4.193**
(0)
-- OH -2.469
(0)
-5.686***
(0)
Notes: Model lag lengths are in parentheses below ADF Statistics and were selected according to Akaike's
Information Criterion (AIC).  Significance levels are from Mackinnon (1991) and are denoted as follows:
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level. Tests
included a constant and a linear trend.
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Table C3 - ARMA Specifications of Intervention Models
State
Savings Rate Model Total Balances
Model State
Savings Rate
Model
Total Balances
Model
AK ARMA(0,0) ARMA(0,0) ND ARMA(0,2) ARMA(1,0)
AZ ARMA(0,0) ARMA(0,0) NE ARMA(0,2) ARMA(0,1)
CA ARMA(0,0) ARMA(3,0) NH ARMA(0,0) ARMA(1,0)
CO ARMA(2,0) ARMA(0,0) NJ ARMA(1,0) ARMA(0,0)
CT ARMA(0,1) ARMA(2,0) NM ARMA(0,1) ARMA(1,0)
DE ARMA(0,0) ARMA(1,0) NY ARMA(0,1) ARMA(0,1)
FL ARMA(1,0) ARMA(1,0) NV ARMA(1,0) ARMA(1,0)
GA ARMA(0,0) ARMA(1,0) OH ARMA(0,0) ARMA(0,0)
IA ARMA(2,0) ARMA(1,0) OK ARMA(0,2) ARMA(2,0)
ID ARMA(2,0) ARMA(2,0) PA ARMA(2,0) ARMA(1,1)
IN ARMA(1,0) ARMA(0,1) RI ARMA(0,0) ARMA(0,0)
KS ARMA(0,0) ARMA(1,1) SC ARMA(0,0) ARMA(2,0)
KY ARMA(0,1) ARMA(1,0) SD ARMA(0,2) ARMA(0,0)
LA ARMA(1,0) ARMA(1,0) TN ARMA(2,0) ARMA(0,0)
MA ARMA(2,0) ARMA(1,0) TX ARMA(0,0) ARMA(1,0)
MD ARMA(0,0) ARMA(0,0) UT ARMA(1,0) ARMA(1,0)
ME ARMA(0,2) ARMA(1,1) VA ARMA(0,1) ARMA(1,0)
MI ARMA(0,0) ARMA(0,1) VT ARMA(1,0) ARMA(2,0)
MN ARMA(0,0) ARMA(2,0) WA ARMA(3,0) ARMA(1,0)
MO ARMA(0,0) ARMA(2,0) WI ARMA(0,1) ARMA(0,1)
MS ARMA(0,0) ARMA(0,0) WV ARMA(1,0) ARMA(1,0)
NC ARMA(0,0) ARMA(0,1) WY ARMA(1,0) ARMA(1,0)
Notes: Total balance models of CO, NM, and TX also included a linear time trend.
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Appendix D: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Intervention Models
Table D1 - Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Savings Rate Model
Adoption
Intervention
First Balance
Intervention
Adoption
Intervention
First Balance
Intervention
State Initial
Impact
Decay Initial
Impact
Decay State Initial
Impact
Decay Initial
Impact
Decay
AK 4.617
(19.145)
-- 3.493
(24.379)
-- ND -0.392
(3.603)
-- 2.428
(4.827)
--
AZ 1.200
(2.746)
-- -0.375
(4.016)
-- NE -3.186
(2.936)
-- 6.420
(5.339)
-0.899***
(0.170)
CA 2.423
(6.666)
-- -1.951
(6.719)
-- NH -- -- -0.607
(2.230)
--
CO -5.546
(4.010)
-- 6.706
(4.122)
-- NJ -1.193
(5.336)
-- 2.280
(6.999)
--
CT 1.648
(6.211)
-- -0.456
(6.781)
-- NM -2.863
(5.529)
-- 2.648
(5.515)
--
DE -- -- 3.617
(3.552)
-- NY -1.324
(1.459)
-- 1.127
(2.318)
--
FL 2.904
(2.458)
-- -2.007
(2.325)
-- NV -- -- 2.738
(3.032)
--
GA -- -- 0.270
(1.485)
-- OH 2.361
(2.821)
-- -1.521
(3.086)
--
IA 0.635
(2.076)
-- 1.139
(3.265)
-- OK -3.024
(2.812)
-0.951***
(0.185)
1.317
(1.959)
--
ID -- -- 1.184
(0.929)
-- PA -0.433
(7.592)
-- -0.257
(7.856)
--
IN 3.756
(4.084)
-- -2.441
(7.247)
0.275
(1.956)
RI -- -- 0.132
(2.897)
--
KS -- -- 1.426
(3.404)
-- SC -- -- 0.317
(1.809)
--
KY -- -- 1.460*
(0.801)
-- SD 5.890
(7.892)
-- -5.892
(9.467)
--
LA -1.583
(1.682)
-- -- -- TN -- -- 0.050
(0.981)
--
MA 1.232
(6.551)
-- -2.291
(10.008)
-0.545
(3.140)
TX 0.293
(2.482)
-- -0.910
(2.863)
--
MD -1.379
(5.564)
-- 1.645
(5.764)
-- UT -4.482
(5.239)
-- 5.503
(5.438)
--
ME -- -- -0.063
(1.004)
-- VA 1.917
(2.323)
-- -2.509
(4.533)
--
MI 5.989
(5.060)
-- -9.268
(8.109)
-0.821***
(0.241)
VT -- -- -0.399
(2.296)
--
MN 0.307
(4.740)
-- 0.063
(5.047)
-- WA 0.476
(1.839)
-- -0.848
(2.429)
--
MO -- -- 1.861
(2.422)
-- WI -- -- 0.734
(0.892)
--
MS 2.731
(5.656)
-- -1.851
(5.774)
-- WV -1.420
(8.207)
-- 3.008
(10.496)
--
NC -- -- 0.838
(3.278)
-- WY 15.247**
(6.416)
-- -16.86***
(6.555)
--
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Asymptotic impacts of intervention terms are included in Tables 5.3
and 5.4 in Chapter 5. The year of BSF adoption and first balance were the same for DE, GA, ID, KY, ME,
MO, NC, NH, NV, RI, SC, TN, VT, and WI.
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Table D2 - Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Total Balances Model
Adoption
Intervention
First Balance
Intervention
Adoption
Intervention
First Balance
Intervention
State Initial
Impact
Decay Initial
Impact
Decay State Initial
Impact
Decay Initial
Impact
Decay
AK 888.234
(1243.2)
-- 624.050
(1234.0)
-- ND -56.360
(54.266)
-- 130.88**
(57.847)
--
AZ -227.202
(227.64)
-- 184.053
(227.64)
-- NE -11.280
(38.670)
-- 149.15***
(53.867)
-0.812***
(0.103)
CA -1981.85
(1880.9)
-- 3145.9
(1852.9)
-- NH -- -- -23.016
(14.224)
--
CO -366.79*
(208.91)
-- 462.27**
(206.93)
-- NJ -474.97
(592.35)
-- 917.97
(592.35)
--
CT 434.507
(263.09)
-- 210.068
(279.41)
-- NM 38.627
(126.16)
-- 47.041
(126.51)
--
DE -- -- 79.423***
(26.044)
0.806***
(0.078)
NY 451.708
(378.32)
-- -115.870
(99.684)
--
FL 167.591
(248.86)
-- -120.251
(237.49)
-- NV -- -- 139.69***
(49.614)
--
GA -- -- 318.096
(242.97)
-- OH 58.976
(441.51)
-- 828.421
(441.51)
--
IA -14.036
(95.983)
-- 155.091
(120.76)
-- OK -371.6***
(143.44)
-- 344.71***
(140.89)
--
ID -- -- 20.434***
(5.005)
0.995***
(0.051)
PA 355.98
(728.78)
-- 194.72
(732.94)
--
IN 175.736
(209.68)
-- 448.96*
(224.50)
-- RI -- -- 32.140
(119.17)
--
KS -- 189.231
(137.45)
-- SC -- -- 127.193
(110.38)
--
KY -- -- 305.71**
(152.18)
-- SD 63.984
(51.906)
-- -33.800
(56.238)
--
LA -338.49**
(150.68)
-- -- -- TN -- -- 457.55*
(231.16)
--
MA 650.925
(421.09)
-- -579.003
(431.45)
-- TX -980.14**
(460.25)
-- 4.674
(462.20)
--
MD -169.725
(285.88)
-- 129.177
(285.88)
-- UT -49.739
(71.739)
-- 130.79*
(74.29)
--
ME -- -- 111.42**
(54.871)
-- VA 370.33**
(148.60)
-- 39.423
(179.95)
--
MI 913.90*
(522.51)
-- 75.793
(528.80)
-- VT -- -- -43.318
(30.348)
0.591
(0.366)
MN 467.52**
(176.46)
-0.782**
(0.135)
512.08***
(140.48)
-- WA -205.521
(178.64)
-- -54.303
(217.85)
--
MO -- -- 283.30**
(117.35)
0.841***
(0.263)
WI -- -- 639.18***
(125.83)
--
MS 17.034
(121.25)
-- 229.53**
(123.80)
-- WV -41.942
(109.57)
-- 178.497
(111.27)
--
NC -- -- 210.431
(207.09)
-- WY 316.66***
(71.448)
-- -110.736
(70.280)
--
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Asymptotic impacts of intervention terms are included in Tables 5.3
and 5.4 in Chapter 5. The year of BSF adoption and first balance were the same for DE, GA, ID, KY, ME,
MO, NC, NH, NV, RI, SC, TN, VT, and WI.
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Appendix E
Table E1 - Robustness Tests of the Total Balances Model in Table 5.5
Model in
Table 5.5
Size of
Budget
Weighting by
Budget
P-Value
Model
Weighting variable SE( bˆ ) SE( bˆ ) SE ÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
Budget
bˆ
None
Constant 150.820**
(56.822)
137.550**
(63.818)
1.719
(1.081)
0.669***
(0.119)
Deposit by statutory formula 32.037
(99.370)
38.77
(101.470)
2.978
(2.331)
0.587
(0.483)
Required deposit by appropriation 215.430*
(134.680)
203.410*
(124.500)
2.002*
(1.308)
0.361**
(0.175)
Deposit by General Fund Surplus -52.761
(62.282)
-48.011
(63.760)
-0.607
(0.789)
0.119
(0.120)
Limit on Forecast Expenditures 233.820*
(129.37)
222.340*
(133.01)
2.757*
(1.383)
0.327*
(0.186)
Withdrawal by statutory formula 320.950*
(164.550)
294.880*
(175.110)
-1.422
(2.499)
-0.228
(0.337)
Withdrawal by revenue shortfall -102.840**
(48.524)
-100.230**
(49.372)
-1.219*
(0.677)
-0.203*
(0.103)
Withdrawal by supermajority -11.011
(192.930)
-33.313
(200.600)
-0.723
(1.642)
-0.330*
(0.167)
Fund size greater than 5 percent 59.672
(37.045)
54.690
(38.885)
0.402
(0.794)
0.053
(0.096)
Size of the 1996 budget -- 0.002
(0.005)
-- --
Sample size 44 44 44 44
F-Test (Model) 6.11*** 5.34*** 2.51** 2.00*
2R 0.582 0.585 0.361 0.315
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are as follows: *** denotes significance at the 1
percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
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